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Managing the performance of social service-providing nonprofit organizations
(NPOs) has become more and more complex in the past few decades as executives have
had to cope with increasing competition, demands from a diversified set of stakeholders,
rapidly changing technologies, and mounting scrutiny from funders and consumers. To
help reduce the complexity of strategic management, organizations have been encouraged
to adopt formal strategy formation processes, such as highly-structured strategic planning
models. However, there are no demonstrated “best practices” or conclusive evidence of
the utility of formal strategy formation within the nonprofit sector. The stakes of
mismanagement are high for the organizations and the at-risk individuals and
communities they serve. Poor strategic management could result in inefficient use of
resources and/or ineffective service delivery and possibly organizational or even sector
destabilization.
The study employed a mixed-methods comparative multi-case study design that
leveraged a unique cluster of three “most-similar” children’s mental health services

ii

NPOs in the Saint Louis area. Over 20 key informant interviews were conducted, as
were several organizational observations. This data was combined with over a decade of
strategy-related documents and financial records to describe the organizations’ strategic
positions and external environment, as well their strategy formation and implementation
processes relative to their internal organizational contexts. Additionally, the study set out
to explore whether and how the organizations’ strategy formation processes influence
their strategic content and how strategy implementation may mediate the relationship
between strategy formation and organizational performance.
The findings show that while seemingly very different on the surface, the
organizations’ strategy formation processes are actually very similar and typically fail to
yield true strategic or competitive insight. The rich descriptions also demonstrate how
nimble and sophisticated modern nonprofit organizations have to be when implementing
new initiatives to meet changing market demands. The “most-similar case” sampling
method allowed for a powerful cross-case analysis capable of exploring causal
mechanisms often ignored in this area of research. The study’s findings call into question
the conventional wisdom around the necessity of formalized strategic planning and
highlight the role leadership and administrative capabilities have in achieving sustainable
organizational performance. Furthermore, it presents a revised conceptual model of
strategic management that demonstrates why much of the documented link between
formalized strategy formation processes and superior organizational performance may be
spurious, both being caused by certain internal organizational characteristics and
differences in strategy implementation. Implications for organizations, accrediting
bodies and funders, as well as researchers are also discussed.
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CHAPTER ONE: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT IN NONPROFIT SOCIAL
SERVICES
Managing the performance of social service-providing nonprofit organizations
(NPOs) has become more and more complex in the past few decades as executives have
had to cope with increasing competition, demands from a diversified set of stakeholders,
rapidly changing technologies, and mounting scrutiny from funders and consumers
(Anheier, 2005; Hall, 2006; Hudson, 2005; O’Neill, 2002; Salamon, 2003; Young, 2003).
While leaders of NPOs cannot fully control their environments, they can attempt to
control how their organizations meet, influence and prepare for the demands their
environments place on them by creating and implementing proactive strategies.
To help reduce the complexity of strategic management, funders, researchers and
the popular press have encouraged nonprofit executives and boards to adopt formal
strategy formation processes, such as highly-structured strategic planning models
(Allison & Kaye, 2003; Bryson, 2004; Mulhare, 1999; Stone, Bigelow, & W. F.
Crittenden, 1999; Webster & Wylie, 1988a). Formal planning has also been cited as a
way to increase decision-making transparency and cope with high pressures for
accountability and efficiency often placed upon nonprofit organizations, especially those
that receive government funding. Despite the push for strategy formation formalization,
there are no demonstrated strategic management “best practices” within the nonprofit
sector or conclusive evidence of the utility of formal strategy formation within a
nonprofit context (W. F. Crittenden, 2000). This leaves nonprofit executives and boards
with little guidance or assurance that the time and energy spent on formal strategic
management is worthwhile.
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The vital underlying question to researchers and leaders alike is “Is there a ‘best’
way of forming strategy”, one that gives an organization a competitive advantage by
helping them choose the “right” strategy? Many theorists and researchers have
concluded that the “best” strategy formation process depends on the organization’s
internal organizational context (Butler, 1998; W. F. Crittenden & V. L. Crittenden, 2000;
Hart, 1992) and that the “right” strategy depends on what the external environment
demands (Porter, 1996). However, there is still a bias buried in the research that, ceteris
paribus, there must be a best practice and that best practice must be highly rational and
therefore formalized to optimize decision making. This bias likely comes from a
historical focus on rational optimization within management and economics
(Jarzabkowski, Balogun, & Seidl, 2007; Mintzberg & Lampel, 1999; Mintzberg, Lampel,
Quinn, & Goshal, 2005; Townley, 2002) and a human desire to control and improve
processes.
To varying degrees of success, researchers have tried to demonstrate the positive
impact formalized strategy formation processes can have on both nonprofit and for-profit
organizational performance (W. F. Crittenden, 2000; Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst,
2006; Stone et al., 1999). Unfortunately, most of these empirical efforts are plagued with
serious measurement and model specification problems that introduce so much error into
the analysis many of the findings are questionable (Boyd, 1991; Boyd & Reuning-Elliott,
1998; C. C. Miller & Cardinal, 1994). The field is still trying to develop relevant and
sensitive measures of strategy formation (W. F. Crittenden, 2000; W. F. Crittenden & V.
L. Crittenden, 1997; W. F. Crittenden, V. L. Crittenden, Stone, & Robertson, 2004;
Katsioloudes & Tymon, 2003). As it stands now, most measures are checklists of tools
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(such as using financial forecasts or a consultant), when more flexible domains of
behavior such as participation, openness, flexibility, timing, formality, etc. may be more
useful and variable. A more thorough understanding of strategy formation practices
within nonprofits would be helpful in developing grounded and robust measures.
More fundamentally, the question of whether the strategy formation process
matters at all to the content of chosen intended strategy(ies) is still a matter of debate.
This is especially questionable for NPOs that typically operate in highly institutional
environments in which their autonomy is often severely threatened due to their
dependence on external groups such as the government, etc. (Akingbola, 2006; DiMaggio
& Powell, 1983; Salamon, 1987). This is an especially relevant question to human
service nonprofits, such as those that provide mental health treatment, that essentially
operate as an extension of federal and local governments. It is unclear how much
flexibility they have in determining their strategies when their fate is so tightly coupled
with legislation, regulations and governmental priorities.
Furthermore, assuming that an organization does somehow arrive at an intended
strategy most favored by the external environment, their performance is directly based on
how well they can implement the strategy, i.e., how closely their realized strategy
resembles their intended strategy. While this is common sense, unfortunately, we still
understand very little about strategy implementation in the field (Hutzschenreuter &
Kleindienst, 2006; Stone et al., 1999), leaving a gap in knowledge and measurement that
is another source of error in models examining the relationships between strategy
formation and organizational performance.
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When examining the link between strategy formation and organizational
performance, researchers have typically not explored or controlled for the obvious
intervening impact of strategy implementation. This is symptomatic of a strategic
management literature that is stuck at evaluating causal effects between strategy
formation process and organizational performance. To move forward, insight is needed
into the causal mechanisms embedded in the processes that create the relationships, i.e.,
how the various components and characteristics interact to result in a positive outcome.
Methodological challenges of this type of inquiry are partly to blame, but so is the fact
that the key process components and relevant domains of variation within
implementation have not been systematically identified and described in order to measure
the process sufficiently. Understanding these processes is crucial to the development of
sensitive and robust measures for future research and providing executives with specific
information for practice.
Research Aims
To meet the needs highlighted in the literature, the current dissertation project
utilized a mixed-methods comparative multi-case study of a cluster of nonprofit mental
health services organizations most-similar on the domains of client needs, service
offerings, funding requirements, competitive dynamics, and historical norms and
experiences (i.e., external environmental context). The organizations were chosen from
the sampling frame of 65 organizations compiled for a larger project examining the
impact of implementing innovations on organizational performance. This multi-case
study method allowed for an in-depth analysis of the strategic management over the past
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10 years within nonprofit mental health services organizations to achieve the following
research aims:
Aim 1: To describe the organizations’ strategic positions within their external
environmental context.
Aim 2: To describe the organizations’ strategy formation processes within their
internal organizational contexts.
Aim 3: To explore whether and how the organizations’ external environmental
context and strategy formation processes influence resulting intended strategies.
Aim 4: To describe the organizations’ strategy implementation processes relative
to the intended strategies within their internal organizational contexts.
Aim 5: To clarify causal mechanisms and explore patterns of how strategy
implementation mediates the relationship between strategy formation and organizational
performance.

The study is innovative in its sample and focus. Its unique sample of
organizations with relatively homogenous external environments simplified the crosscase analysis, allowing the impact of strategy formation and implementation processes on
organizational performance to be more clearly examined. Its purpose to understand
causal mechanisms and implementation has also been called for by numerous researchers
(Gerring, 2007; Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst, 2006; Stone et al., 1999) and its focus on
nonprofit organizations is unique. The study’s findings provide insight into the variations
within strategy formation and implementation processes that could assist in the
development of more useful measures and more specified models to aid in the quest to

5

determine how strategy formation process impacts nonprofit organizational performance;
efforts were also made to produce insights immediately useful to managers, such as the
range of possible practices, necessary conditions for success, etc.

Background and Significance of the Problem
The Importance of Strategic Management in Nonprofit Mental Health Services
Organizations
The nonprofit sector plays a significant role in American society, helping meet
public demand for services as diverse as education, advocacy, medical care and
community arts. In 2008 there were almost one million 501(c)3 public charities
registered with the IRS, and the over 350,000 that reported their financial information
generated revenues greater than $1.44 trillion (Wing, Roeger, & Pollak, 2010), and
employed almost 10% of all US workers (Independent Sector, 2007). Nonprofits’ role is
especially prominent in providing mental health and substance abuse services, services
that potentially 30% of American adults (ages 18-54) (Kessler, Chiu, Demler, & Walters,
2005; Narrow, Rae, Robins, & Regier, 2002) and 20% of American children (ages 3-17)
(Kataoka, Zhang, & Wells, 2002) could benefit from each year based estimates of
symptoms. In 2002, at least 65% of outpatient mental health and substance abuse
treatment centers were nonprofit, as were 43% of psychiatric and substance abuse
hospitals (C. Burke, 2007). Together, these organizations received an estimated $5.516.9 billion in 2004 Medicaid funding, which represents the majority of the sector’s total
revenues (C. Burke, 2007).
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Historically, nonprofit mental health services organizations have faced extremely
volatile funding and policy environments, a trend not expected to change in the near
future (C. Burke, 2007). There is also mounting pressure for them to implement
empirically-supported treatments and other “best practices” despite scant guidance as to
how to install them in their organizations (Proctor et al., 2009). In addition, nonprofit
mental health services organizations are subject to the challenges felt across the wider
nonprofit sector, such as increasing competition, demands from a diversified set of
stakeholders, rapidly changing technologies, and mounting scrutiny from funders and
consumers (Anheier, 2005; Hall, 2006; Hudson, 2005; O’Neill, 2002; Salamon, 2003;
Young, 2003). The 2008 global financial crisis and resulting budget cuts are likely to
exacerbate the organizations’ task of meeting these challenges in the short to mediumterm given their reliance on private contributions and public contracts.
In short, the strategic management of nonprofit mental health services
organization is a difficult and precarious feat for executives and boards. They have a
unique responsibility to society to effectively and efficiently utilize donors’, consumers’
and tax payers’ funds to provide quality mental health services (Frumkin & Andre-Clark,
2000). Hence, it is imperative that the organizations have effective strategy formation
and implementation processes (whatever effective processes may look like), as poor
strategic management could result in poor service delivery and possibly organizational
decline and demise, possibly even sector destabilization. The stakes of mismanagement
are high for the individuals and communities they serve. A better understanding of
strategic management processes and their impact is an important step in the quest to assist
mental health services organizations and all nonprofits achieve greater and sustainable
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results. The current study’s aims seek to generate insights to inform organizational
practices and the empirical research.
Macro-Theories of Organizational Change
Most theories of strategic management focus on how actions taken by an
individual or group can catalyze organizational change and impact organizational
survival; however, many other forces can affect an organization’s ability to control its
fate. Several key theories of organization-environment interaction and organizational
change, such as resource dependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), neo-institutionalism
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and population ecology (Hannan & Freeman, 1977) vary in
their assumptions about how much influence an organization can have on its future,
therefore possibly limiting the impact of proactive strategic management. For the
purposes of the current study, these macro-level forces must be taken into account when
trying to understand the organizations’ chosen strategies and their impact on
performance, warranting a brief review here.
Resource dependence theory. In their seminal work on resource dependence
theory, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argue that in order to survive most organizations need
resources (money, labor, customers, legitimacy, etc.) that are controlled by others,
causing interdependencies that can lead to an imbalance of power (defined as control
over resources). The scarcer and more crucial a resource is, the more power its supplier
has in the dyadic relationship and environment in general, though both parties are
dependent on one another for survival. An increase in interdependence and coupling of
activities leads to an increasingly shared fate and ultimately a loss of autonomy and an
inability for the organization to freely exercise managerial and strategic discretion when
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needed (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). This is certainly an issue with nonprofit
organizations, who often control very little of their means of production and rely on
largely political processes for scarce resource allocation such as legislation, grant awards,
donations, etc. They can sometimes become a pawn in funders’ social agendas, rather
than autonomous agents deciding how best to fulfill their mission.
To maintain both adequate and stable resources and strategic and management
autonomy, organizations have to successfully manage their interdependencies. In
practice, executives face several paradoxes including how to comply with contradictory
demands from multiple groups, how to maintain autonomy and discretion while also
cooperating with purveyors to decrease resource supply uncertainty, and how to get more
power over others without giving their own away. To help manage these paradoxes,
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) advise organizations to loosen dependencies whenever
possible by diversifying resource providers or activities. However, diversifying exposes
and organization to additional, potentially conflicting demands from external groups,
therefore organizations should also differentiate their products or services to gain power,
as well as maintain slack resources in order to have the ability to exercise discretion when
coping with demands.
Within a resource dependency framework organizational executives have an
important role in the change process. In addition to a symbolic role of vision-setting and
accountability, managers can also help the organization adapt to environmental
constraints or try to manipulate the environment to be more in the organization’s favor.
Various strategic management processes may be able to help organizations identify and
manage their interdependencies in a proactive and structured manner in order to retain as
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much power as possible. Despite being constrained with respect to political and lobbying
activities, NPOs can still yield enormous power and influence in the environment by
mobilizing consumers, pressuring lawmakers, increasing awareness about their cause,
etc.
Institutional isomorphic mechanisms. Actively managing dependencies is one
key driver of ongoing organizational change, for it is a complex interdependent web of
relationships that constantly has to be attended to. This type of adaptation is an example
of competitive pressures acting upon an organization. Since organizations, especially in
highly-specialized arenas, are likely to experience very similar environments and respond
to them in similar ways, over time organizations in the same field often become relatively
homogenous (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).
However, in addition to the isomorphic pressures related to competition for
resources, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) delineated political and ceremonial pressures
that also contribute to organizational change and eventual isomorphism. The author’s
neo-institutional analysis of organizations contends that in addition to competing for
resources and customers, organizations also compete for legitimacy and political
influence, opening the way for coercive, mimetic and normative pressures to influence
their adaptation. Coercive pressures are direct or indirect demands from a group the
organization depends on for crucial resources as well as by societal and legal expectation;
for example, all United Way-funded organizations adopting formal strategic planning
processes and standardized reporting practices as a requirement to continue receiving
funding. Mimetic pressures to emulate another organization that is perceived to be more
successful are often more subtle and are common in the face of technological or
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environmental uncertainty as organizations grope for best practices. Similarly,
individuals’ sense of trends, norms and standards of professional practice can cause
normative pressures that can cause and organization to change to be more like its peers.
Institutional isomorphic pressures can be particularly strong and quick to form in
the nonprofit sector that is often tightly interconnected via small personnel pools,
coalitions, professional associations and shared funding streams (DiMaggio & Powell,
1983). While this can decrease consumer choice, it can also increase overall goods and
services quality and competition if organizations are coalescing around a particularly
robust and highly effective organizational form. Unfortunately, DiMaggio and Powell
(1983) point out that while each individual organization may be acting rationally,
collectively the organizational field may be coalescing around a less-than-optimal form.
This is especially likely when changes are driven by institutional isomorphic pressures
that are not often connected to organizational effectiveness or efficiency, but rather
political and group behavior. Within the nonprofit mental health services sector
converging toward a non-optimal organizational form, such the use of interventions based
on convention or common practice rather than evidence, could lead to poor client
outcomes and an inefficient use of public funds. Staving off this possibility is another
reason formal strategic management processes may be especially important in the
nonprofit arena. NPOs may need to dedicate time and energy to systematically analyzing
and managing institutional pressures in order to maintain mission focus and effectiveness
as well as competitive differentiation.
Population ecology. Despite the literature’s emphasis on the adaptive capabilities
of organizations and especially the role of management in the process, the truth is that
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many organizations die, never going through a rebirth or failing in the process of
reorientation. Rather than placing all of the blame on the organization’s inability to
effectively adapt, Hannan and Freeman (1977) argue that environmental selection is just
as strong a force, if not stronger in explaining organizational survival. This is because
organizations’ structural inertia often constrains their ability to change, leaving only those
originally best-suited to environmental demands able to survive. The only way an
organizational field evolves is through the birth of novel organizational forms and the
subsequent death of obsolete forms, usually at the spurring of changed environmental
demands. This theory drastically reduces the role and power of management to affect
their organization’s strategy and the effectiveness of formal strategic management
processes. While this viewpoint is rather harsh, Hannan and Freeman (1977)
persuasively argue that environmental determinism does impact organizational survival
and that a tempered view of the power of executive action is warranted.
Punctuated change. Tushman and Romanelli (1985) offer a theory of punctuated
organizational change that helps bridge the adaptationist and selection theories,
advancing the now commonly-espoused notion that organizations can and, indeed, do go
through strategic reorientations in order to realign their strategies, structures, power and
systems to the demands of their environment. These relatively infrequent dramatic
periods of organizational change punctuate longer periods of incremental adaptation, or
convergence toward the organization’s chosen strategic orientation. The environment
still selects out organizations that do not reorient when needed, choose an inappropriate
strategy, or is not able to successfully implement their strategy (Tushman & Romanelli,
1985). However, punctuated change theory puts strategic control back in the hands of the
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executives and allows room for the possible differential impact of various strategic
management processes.
Convergence happens as a result of middle managers and executives making their
best efforts to manage multiple interdependencies and environmental demands given a
particular strategic direction. As convergence continues it is assumed that organizations
become more competent at their actions, and therefore, if the activities are appropriate to
the environment, performance will improve over time. However, convergent periods also
establish rules and norms creating inertia that can constrict members’ behaviors and
worldviews, compromising an organization’s ability to accurately assess the
environment, determine whether a reorientation is needed, and carry out the change if
deemed necessary (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985). Hence, a paradox arises in that high
performance requires a certain degree of convergence (in addition to the right strategic
orientation) that could simultaneously negatively impact the organization’s long-term
survival by precluding reorientations when demanded by the environment.
Occasionally, pressures to reorient can overcome inertial pressures, especially
under two circumstances: 1) the convergence process has failed to create adequate
performance over a certain period of time, or 2) the organization’s current strategic
orientation is deemed ineffective due to large environmental changes (Tushman &
Romanelli, 1985). Since many environmental changes can be anticipated and/or adapted
to, performance pressures are seen as the key driver of reorientation, but it is incumbent
upon executive leadership to define and monitor their performance thresholds as well as
proactively anticipate changes, a key aspect of most formal strategy formation processes.

13

Similar to previous adaptationist theories, the theory of punctuated change views
executives as key catalyzing and shaping agents for fundamental change, mediating the
dual pressures for stability and large-scale change. Tushman and Romanelli (1985)
hypothesize that high-performing organizations will reorient when environmental
demands dictate, while lower-performing organizations may reorient too often or not
enough, drawing connections between performance, executive decision-making and
organizational survival. This theory could lead to the hypothesis that effective strategic
management processes could help organizations assess and react to environmental
demands and improve their performance.
Strategic Decisions and Content
Managing an organization requires a myriad of daily decisions, but there are some
decisions that rise to an extreme level of importance. Nutt and Wilson (2009) defined
these “strategic decisions” as decisions that are:
…large, expensive, and precedent setting producing ambiguity about how to find
a solution and uncertainty in the solution’s outcome. Once implemented, a
strategic decision stipulates premises that guide operational decisions that follow.
A strategic decision is often difficult to reverse once human and financial
resources have been committed to their cause. (pg. 4)
A decision can be seen as a discrete choice made between alternative courses of
action; it necessarily involves some aspect of the unknown that cannot be reliably
predicted (March & Simon, 1958). Strategic Management literature is dominated by
explorations of possible alternative courses of action, better known as “strategic content”
(Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst, 2006). Questions of which strategy may yield the most
competitive advantage given industry conditions are frequently approached using one of
a handful of very well-known frameworks, such as Michael Porter’s Five Forces (1996,
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2008) or Wernerfelt’s Resource-Based View of the firm ((1984); RBV). These
frameworks sit within a larger stream of industrial organization research that explores
how and why industries are structured. The field uses descriptive and economic methods
to explain and predict the boundaries between firms and the market and how those
structures impact competitive action and performance (Ghemawat, 2005).
Porter’s “Five Forces” combines an analysis of competitive actions (or rivalry)
between firms, with the horizontal threat of new entrants and substitutes and the vertical
power of buyers and suppliers to determine the attractiveness of an industry and identify
possible sources of profitability (Porter, 2008). Porter argues that higher than average
profitability is only gained if an organization can maintain a strategically differentiated
position, which is different than simply achieving operational effectiveness, but rather
performing activities differently or performing different activities than rival organizations
(Porter, 1996). Grounded in multiple industry analyses, Porter also classified four stages
within an industry’s life cycle (introduction, growth, maturity and decline) in which the
industrial forces combine in predictable ways that make certain generic strategies more or
less advantageous (Harrigan & Porter, 1983; Grant, 2007).
Beyond the generic strategies of cost leadership and differentiation, Porter’s Five
Forces framework actually does not provide much guidance about possible strategies;
hence, the resource-base view of the firm has been readily adopted as a useful
complement that shifts focus on to building organizations’ internal capabilities to
leverage unique configurations of resources (Grant, 2007). This internal focus gives
organizations many more strategic options and the hope of stability in the face of market
changes. In this framework, competitive advantage is gained when an organization is
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able to configure tangible, intangible or human resources that are rare, valuable,
inimitable and non-substitutable (Barney, 1991). Furthermore, the same configuration of
resources may be more profitable in the hands of an organization that has a robust set of
dynamic capabilities, or key routines that help bring together and reconfigure extant
resources to meet current and future demands placed on the firm (Barney, Wright, &
Ketchen, 2001; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997).
Decision Making and Strategy Formation
Taken together, the Five Forces approach to industry analysis and the RBV
approach to organizational analysis have helped many researchers explain and predict
successful strategies. However, choosing a suite of successful strategies within an
applied organizational setting in real-time is much more complicated. Under the stress
often caused by the uncertainty surrounding high-stakes strategic decisions, deciders in
organizational settings often turn (or are pressured to turn) to formalized strategy
formation processes to try to make the task (seem) more manageable. Formalized
strategy formation processes typically involve a sequential use of structured analytical
tools and written articulation of the chosen strategies. It is thought that more formalized
processes can help ward off common decision errors stemming from limited information
processing capacities (Hogarth, 1980) and reliance on heuristics (Tversky & Kahneman,
1974), dominant logic (Bettis & Prahalad, 1995) and groupthink (Janis, 1977).
However, most leaders are aware that, as Simon (1955) argued, humans arrive at
decisions based on principles of satisficing, rather than optimizing. Complete objectivity
and rationalization is virtually impossible for a decision of any complexity—it requires
too much information, too much time, and too many variables. A “good enough”
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alternative that meets a minimal set of standards and is judged to be better than the status
quo is often chosen to save time and effort (March & Simon, 1958; Simon, 1955). The
process to arrive at a satisfactory versus an optimal decision typically involves fewer
decision criteria and alternatives, and has a simpler, often random and incomplete testing
order and model (Janis, 1977). Sometimes this approach can appear haphazard, leading
Lindblom (1959) to label it “muddling through”. However, often the process of
satisficing actually brings an organization incrementally closer to a desired optimal
reality (Noda & Bower, 1996). Finding the right balance between robustness and
efficiency in a strategy formation process is the Holy Grail for most managers and
strategy process researchers.
Common formal strategy formation processes. While proof of its robustness,
efficiency and even utility is lacking, most NPOs and even for-profit organizations, for
that matter, are prescribed a very similar formal strategy formation process. At the center
of the process is a relatively simple question model that helps executives structure the
information acquisition and processing stages of decision making by asking participants
to articulate and sometimes rank the organization’s strengths, weaknesses, opportunities
and threats (Allison & Kaye, 2003; Anheier, 2005; Bryson, 2004; Mintzberg, 1994;
Webster & Wylie, 1988b). This is widely known as a “SWOT analysis”. It can involve
many different information gathering activities, from surveys of internal or external
stakeholders, culling of secondary data, financial forecasting, etc. The process’ goal is to
produce an objective and comprehensive awareness of an organization’s external
environment and internal capabilities to identify critical issues the organization needs to
address to remain viable.
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Once a SWOT analysis is performed, the process moves on to the identification of
possible strategic responses and the selection of the most appropriate and feasible course
of action to achieve the desired future state. The assumptions of SWOT analysis lay
squarely within the fit/alignment strategy perspective that argues a good strategy should
create an organization that “fits”, or is aligned with its external environment, and that this
congruence will enable maximum performance (Ghemawat, 2005; Mintzberg, 1990).
This is broadly in keeping with the strategic positioning and resource-based perspectives.
Another analytical tool gaining popularity in the both the for-profit and non-profit
sector is the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) (Kong, 2008; Rigby, 2007), which is often used
in tandem with a SWOT analysis and helps organizations ensure their strategy is
balanced and that they have a way to monitor its implementation. Coming from a
resource-based view of the firm, the BSC was developed by Robert Kaplan and David
Norton as a way to supplement traditional financial measures of organizational
performance with indicators of future-oriented, capacity-building “softer” resources to
gain a more comprehensive understanding of performance and potential strategies.
Traditional BSCs have four “perspectives” labeled “Financial,” “Customer,”
“Internal Business Processes,” and “Learning & Growth” for which mission-related
objectives and performance measures are articulated (Kaplan & Norton, 1996).
According to Kaplan and Norton (1996), companies have also used the Balanced
Scorecard as a strategic management tool—allowing the indicators to guide decision
making and resource allocation. The underlying theory of the BSC assumes a causal
relationship between the “perspectives” whereby strong learning and growth will improve
internal business processes, which will in turn satisfy customers and secure financial
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performance. The soundness of this causal theory and BSC’s appropriateness as a
strategic management tool has been challenged, but it is still seen as a promising multidimensional planning and management tool especially if it can be used to help advance
understanding of how performance is created (Kong, 2008; Norreklit, 2000).
Regardless of the methods used to derive them, in a formal process chosen
intended strategies are usually written down in a formal planning document with
accompanying action plans. This document is often used to communicate the strategic
plan to multiple stakeholders, and is also thought to help increase accountability and
transparency. Many newer prescriptive processes add explicit steps for implementation
and ongoing evaluation and monitoring of the strategies, thus closing the decisionmaking feedback loop (Allison & Kaye, 2003; Bryson, 2004).
The streamlined strategic planning process may seem simple, but the analysis
embedded in it is quite complex, resting on multiple judgments and potentially
contentious decisions. The high-stakes of the decisions could increase political behavior;
however, adherence to a formal process, such as strategic planning, has been shown to
decrease intra-organizational politics and result in better decisions (Dean & Sharfman,
1996). In addition to its potential to enforce orderly and “good” decision making,
strategic planning’s coordination and communication functions have also been recently
emphasized (Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst, 2006).
Limitations of formal planning. Despite substantial penetration into the business
world (Rigby, 2007), formalized strategy formation still has critics who argue that more
natural processes, such as intuition and adaptive learning are just as or more successful at
developing strategies. In The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning, Henry Mintzberg,
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planning’s most vocal critic, argues that “the rationality assumed in strategic planning
can be irrational when judged against the needs of strategy making” (1994, p. 221). He
sees strategy formation as a craft, needing creativity, tacit knowledge, hands-on learning,
pattern recognition, and, occasionally radical departures from previous forms (Mintzberg,
1987). Mintzberg (1994) warned that the assumptions of classic strategic planning—the
superiority of formulization, separation of thought from action, quantitative analysis, and
environmental forecasts—can lead to stagnant and useless strategies.
In addition, Mintzberg (1994) argues that formal planning models and tools do
not usually tell the organization how to create strategy or inspire strategic or creative
thinking. It is assumed that if the process is followed and the tools used that a strategy
will emerge, but there is no guidance about where the strategies come from. While others
have criticized formal planning processes, they usually cite the same shortcomings and
ask whether it is the ideal way to develop effective strategy, or if it is too constrictive and
inferior to more ad-hoc incremental approaches that can be more flexible to dynamic
environmental changes (Brews & Hunt, 1999; Butler, 1998).
To planning’s credit, it has withstood many harsh objections and has adapted to fit
the needs of modern organizations. Over the past two decades researchers have found
that in practice strategic planning has changed to include less emphasis on fullyelaborated processes and systems, increased use of multiple and complementary
analytical tools, involvement of multiple levels of staff, with more attention to
organizational culture to increase the chance of implementation (Bonn & Christodoulou,
1996; I. Wilson, 1994). When taken to an extreme, it is true that rabid formalization and
unrefined quantitative analysis could lead organizational strategy astray; however, the

20

classic streamlined strategic planning process must have some utility, as it is practiced in
millions of organizations around the world to this day. Determining what that utility
might be is part of the purpose of the current study.
Heracleous (1998) suggests that both strategic thinking (advocated by Mintzberg)
and strategic planning are necessary but not sufficient aspects of successful strategic
management practice. He provides an insightful analogy—strategic planning is singleloop learning, whereas strategic thinking is double-loop learning. Double-loop learning
is necessary to move an organization beyond its frames of past behavior into a mental
space where truly unique and novel strategies can be generated. However, a structure
like strategic planning is still necessary in order to organize people in the process of
deciding upon alternative strategies and operationalizing them into implementable tactics.
Both types of thinking and processing are necessary, and are wrapped up in a dynamic
relationship (Brews & Hunt, 1999; Heracleous, 1998). Therefore, successful strategic
management may be more multi-faceted and flexible that traditionally-prescribed
formalized processes would suggest.
Modes of strategy formation. Mintzberg criticizes strategy process research for
being overly prescriptive, not taking into account the myriad ways leaders and
organizations develop strategy in the real world (1994). This is a valid point of view and
reflective of that fact that few researchers have set out to systematically describe what is
actually happening in the field. There has been some effort to create typologies of
strategy formation processes, these often lead to disjointed theories with little clarity for
practice or future research (Hart, 1992; Liedtka, 2001). Hart (1992) tried to address this
problem by creating an integrated typology of strategy-making processes based on 12
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extant typologies. He organized them according to three common themes: assumptions
about the ideal degree of rationality, the role of top management in setting a vision, and
the involvement of other organizational members (Hart, 1992). The individual strategymaking process types were then mapped onto five overarching “modes,” which were
further described with respect to top management’s priorities and under which
organizational contexts each mode may be most prevalent (see Table 1).
A later contingency framework of strategic decision-making processes offered by
Butler (1998) maps onto Hart’s typology fairly well, and further argues that particular
processes may be not just more prevalent, but also more advantageous depending on the
level of ambiguity/uncertainty related to the ends or ultimate goal of a decision (degree of
politicality) and the level of ambiguity/uncertainty related to the means of achieving the
ends (degree of complexity) (see Table 1).
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Table 1: Combined Integrative Frameworks for Strategy-Making Processes
Hart’s (1992) Strategy-Making Modes
Descriptors

Command

Symbolic

Rational

Transactive

Generative

Style

Imperial

Cultural

Analytical

Procedural

Organic

Strategy
drivers

Leader or small
top team

Mission and a
vision of the
future

Formal
structure and
planning
systems

Internal process
and mutual
adjustment

Organizational
actors’
initiative

Top
management’s
role

Commander:
provide
direction

Coach:
motivate and
inspire

Boss: evaluate
and control

Facilitator:
Empower and
enable

Sponsor:
Endorse and
support

Organizational
Members’
Role

Soldiers: obey
orders

Player: respond
to challenges

Subordinate:
follow the
system

Participant:
learn and
improve

Entrepreneur:
experiment and
take risks

Management
Priorities

Centralization
of all functions

Communicating
via symbols,
metaphors,
emotion

Data
gathering and
analysis;
monitoring
and control
systems

Processes and
systems to
facilitate
interaction and
learning

Nurturing
people and
fostering
processes for
experimentation

Organizational
Context

Small orgs with
low-complexity
environments

Medium-large
orgs in dynamic
environments,
looking to
rapidly grow or
reorient

Medium-large
orgs in stable
environments
looking to
grow and
solidify
position

Large, mature
orgs with many
stakeholders
looking to
continuously
improve

Any org in a
turbulent
environment
looking to
innovate

Butler’s (1998) Strategic Decision-Making Processes
Centralization

Inspiration

Computation

Key features

Decision
making
concentrated in
one person

Relies on
personal trust
and charisma of
leader

Step-by-step
synchronized
process of
analysis

Progress
through quasiresolution of
conflict via
political
process

Experts are
allowed to
make decision
based on
experience and
intuition

Decision’s
Politicality

Medium

High

Low

High

Low

Decision’s
Complexity

Medium

High

Low

Low

High

Limiting
Factors

Overload due to
capacity limits
of decision
maker

Anarchy

Neglect of
tacit
knowledge;
premature
closure

Lack of
agreement or
compromise

Informational
biases; framing
effects;
information
asymmetries

Representative
types from the
literature

Entrepreneurial;
synoptic design

Cultural;
ideological;
adhocracy;
garbage can

Formal
planning;
bureaucratic;
synoptic map

Logical or
disjointed
incrementalism;
adaptive

Organic; logical
incrementalism
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Negotiation

Expertise

Both Hart and Butler point out that there is no single “right” process mode. Rather,
the organizational context and content of each strategic decision must be understood in
order to determine the “best” process. Both authors also posit that firms will make better
strategic decisions if they are capable of operating in multiple strategy-making modes
because they would have a better chance of matching the process with the demands of the
context and the content.
While all typologies include a wide range of strategy formation processes, and more
recent ones advocate combining multiple processes when relevant, most have a clear bias
toward the rational/computation modes found in the normative literature. Butler’s (1998)
framework would suggest that organizational leaders should work first to reduce
politicality and complexity (i.e., the uncertainty) of the decision so that it could be more
amenable to traditional normative processes that are more likely to lead to the most
rational alternative being chosen. Hart (1992) actually hypothesizes that symbolic,
rational, and transactive modes, which feature more collaborative analysis, would be
predictive of higher performance than command or generative strategy formation
processes.
Despite many attempts to describe actual decision-making processes within
organizations and understand them from a strengths-perspective based on contingencies,
the vast majority of normative strategy processes prescribed to organizations only fall
within the rational/computation process mode, striving to make the process as “rational”
and “objective” as possible. The current study was designed to enable in-depth
descriptions of processes in practice and a comparative analysis across organizations to
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help expand the normative boundaries and also assist leaders in choosing effective and
efficient processes.

A Conceptual Model of Strategic Management
Through a close reading of the literature and a review of extant models, a
conceptual model of strategic management was developed to organize the study’s inquiry
(see Figure 1). It can be read like a series of coupled input-process-output models where
the process has a transformative effect on the input. Each process can be described in
terms of its bundles of activities, or components, its qualitative characteristics, and its
temporal relationship with other elements of the model. The strategic management
process is broadly grouped into strategy formation and strategy implementation, both of
which mediate the relationship between external environmental context and
organizational performance. The process is also influenced by and influences the
organization’s unique internal context.

Conceptual Model of Strategic Management
Strategic Management
Strategy Formation
External
Environmental
Context t

Strategy
Formation
Process

Strategy Implementation
Strategy
Implement.
Process

Intended
Strategy

Realized
Strategy

Organizational
Performance

Internal Organizational Context

t Construct

Delayed relationship

controlled for during current study’s cross-case analysis

Figure 1. Conceptual Model of Strategic Management
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Strategy formation processes attempt to make sense of and often anticipate
environmental demands in order to determine what course of action (intended strategy) is
most likely to result in strong and sustainable organizational performance in the face of
competition. It combines cues from the external environment (market volatility and
competitive dynamics, funding requirements, population needs, etc.) and information
about an organization’s internal context (capabilities, cultural norms, market position,
etc.) and transforms it into intended strategies. This process can take on many forms,
from executive directors just “muddling through” by making successive decisions
(Lindblom, 1959) to highly methodical and comprehensive approaches to formal
proactive planning (Mintzberg, 1994).
As outlined above in Table 1 (pg. 23), several researchers have created typologies
to organize strategy formation’s various characteristics and try to describe clusters of
variations into recognizable patterns of strategy formation. Common variable
characteristics include the role of various organizational members, the frequency with
which the process is carried out, its comprehensiveness in searching for information, the
process’ distinctiveness from other management activities, its openness and flexibility,
and the level to which political behavior is tolerated, which is often contrasted with the
degree to which the process is formalized in terms of data collection, analysis and
decision making (Bell, Bromiley, & Bryson, 1997; Butler, 1998; Hart, 1992; Maranville,
1999; Mintzberg, 1990, 1994; Sharfman & Dean, 1997). A key ongoing tension in the
history of strategy formation process research is the relative value of formality,
specificity and control versus creativity, openness and spontaneity (Mintzberg &
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Westley, 2001). Whether it should happen before or in conjunction with implementation
efforts is also a matter of debate (Mintzberg, 1987; Mintzberg & Westley, 2001).
Regardless of its level of formalization, each intended strategy becomes the input
for a strategy implementation process, which results in realized strategy. It is likely that
each unique strategy will need a somewhat tailored implementation process, but that
there may be hallmarks of successful implementation process evident across most
strategy implementations (Nutt, 1987, 1989). Not only does a successful strategy
implementation process need to create the necessary operational changes required to
realize the intended strategy, but it also needs to attend to the psychological components
of the change (T. N. Burke, 2008). Hence, components such as regular and open
communication and stakeholder involvement have been consistently found to be related
to implementation success (Bryson & Bromiley, 1993; Nutt, 1989). The less successful a
strategy implementation process is, the larger the gap between the intended and realized
strategy (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). If the intended strategy was best-suited to meet the
needs of the environment, then this gap could result in lost performance gains, a point
that many researchers trying to demonstrate a positive relationship between certain
strategy formation processes and organizational performance fail to appreciate.
The possibility of adaptation of an intended strategy or emergent strategies
overtaking intentions during the implementation process due to new environmental
demands is acknowledged (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). It is accounted for by the arrow
between external environmental context and strategic management. However, this
relationship has been left intentionally vague in the conceptual model because its exact
nature is unclear. It could be that external environmental context moderates the
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relationship between an intended strategy and its implementation process or that it
influences the process directly. How this relationship works could also be considered a
component (monitoring and adapting) or characteristic (recursiveness) of the
implementation process itself. Furthermore, it is not clear at what point adaptation
should/could be considered an additional strategy formation process. Hopefully this issue
will be somewhat clarified by the present study.
It is also acknowledged that the boundaries around the embedded strategic
management processes and linearity with which they occur may differ dramatically by
organization and are idealized for the purposes of the conceptual model.
Strategic management process variation is thought to be largely dependent upon,
though also impact, an organization’s internal organizational context (W. F. Crittenden
& V. L. Crittenden, 2000; Hart, 1992). Internal context is akin to the organization’s
culture, which noted management researcher Edgar Schein defines as:
A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its
problems of external adaptation and internal integration that has worked well
enough to be considered valid and therefore to be taught to new members as the
correct way you perceive, think and feel in relation to those problems. (2010, p.
18)
Organizational culture consists of and is reinforced by the group’s language, customs,
traditions and norms. It is expressed in both their formal and informal values and habits
of thinking, acting and making meaning (Schein, 2010). These, and other domains of
internal organizational context, such as the professionalism of the administration, the size
of the board and an organization’s competitive position and capabilities, have been found
to likely influence an organization’s strategic management (W. F. Crittenden & V. L.
Crittenden, 2000; Glaister, Dincer, Tatoglu, Demirbag, & Zaim, 2008; Porter, 2008;
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Wernerfelt, 1984; Wolch & Rocha, 1993). It is known that larger organizations are
typically more complex and therefore rely on more formal means of communication and
control, which tends to lead to more formalized strategy formation processes that
emphasize rationality, data gathering, monitoring, etc. (Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst,
2006; C. C. Miller & Cardinal, 1994; Stone et al., 1999).
An organization’s internal context is undoubtedly shaped, in part, by its external
environmental context. As reviewed above, factors such as resource dependencies,
funding volatility, institutional pressures, demographic shift, historical events, etc.
encourage organizations to organize and adapt themselves in particular ways that may
impact their operations for a long time (Akingbola, 2006; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983;
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Porter, 1996). External environmental cues are also the major
input for strategy formation and may influence the implementation process as well. The
entire purpose of strategy formation is to make sense of and often anticipate
environmental demands in order to determine what course of action is most likely to
result in strong and sustainable organizational performance. The more closely aligned an
organization’s realized strategy is with what the environment demands, especially if it
also differentiates it from its competitors, the more likely it is to perform well (Barney,
1991; Porter, 1996). Hence, external environmental context moderates the relationship
between strategic management and organizational performance. There is also a time
delay, estimated to be up to four years, between changes in strategy formation and its
observable impact on organizational performance (Brews & Hunt, 1999). This can be
accounted for by the time it may take an organization to implement an intended strategy
and for that strategy to be noticed by the environment and impact organizational
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performance. Over time, an organization’s performance can affect both its internal and
external contexts.
Unlike some previous models and studies (Bell et al., 1997; Hutzschenreuter &
Kleindienst, 2006; Stone et al., 1999), the conceptual model in Figure 1 (pg. 25) and the
current project emphasize the potentially distinct roles of strategy formation and
implementation and how they may be temporally related in many organizations. Only by
exploring the potential mediating role of strategy implementation can we begin to
understand the mechanisms by which strategic management may impact organizational
performance.
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CHAPTER TWO: SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The majority of for-profit organizations engage in strategic planning, using a
variety of complementary analytical tools (Rigby, 2007). While it is assumed by
researchers that most of these for-profit processes are transferable to a nonprofit context,
it is unclear how most nonprofit leaders approach the task of strategic management in
practice and what effect these processes have on their organization’s performance. A
review of nonprofit-specific strategy process research was published in 1999 (Stone, et
al.), but the field of nonprofit management has changed considerably in the past two
decades. Additionally, nonprofit strategic management research is often siloed, not
taking into account advances in the broader strategic management field that could apply
to the voluntary sector. Therefore, this chapter summarizes recent reviews of strategy
process research in both the private and nonprofit sectors and goes on to update prior
work with a systematic review of nonprofit-specific literature published in the past
decade. These findings helped to guide the current dissertation study’s data collection
and analysis.
Most Recently Published Systematic Literature Reviews
Despite differences that have been drawn between the private and nonprofit
sectors, it is helpful to ground nonprofit-specific knowledge in what has been produced in
the wider for-profit-focused literature. Since most formal strategic management practices
were first developed in the private sector, this context it is highly relevant to the aims of
the current study.
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General Review
Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst (2006) recently wrote a very thorough and wellorganized review of the strategy process literature published between 1992 and April
2005. The review built off of previous reviews written by Huff and Reger (1987) and
Rajagopalan, Rasheed, and Datta (1993) on the same topic. A familiar framework of
antecedents, processes (split between formulation and implementation), and outcomes
was used to organize the discussion, though each domain was broken into several more
operationalized constructs, adding to the richness of the review. Additionally, they
reinforce the recursive nature of strategy process by noting that outcome variables are
identical to antecedent variables, just observed at time t+1.
The authors performed a systematic electronic search of 21 prominent
management journals using 10 keywords (see Table 2 below, pg. 39), yielding an
impressive 227 relevant articles, about half empirical and half conceptual. Empirical
articles were arranged by the variable relationship under investigation. Hutzschenreuter
and Kleindienst (2006) identified four major streams in the empirical research, assessing
the strength of evidence for supporting the relationship between: 1) antecedents and
strategy processes, 2) antecedents and outcomes, 3) process and outcomes, and 4) the
interrelationship between the different strategy process variables, namely the strategists’
characteristics, decision content and the sequence of actions performed to arrive at a
strategy. Essentially, between 1992 and 2005 over 200 articles were published assessing
a framework very similar to the conceptual model presented in Chapter 1 (see Figure 1 in
Chapter 1, pg. 25).
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Key empirical findings included:
1) Antecedents and strategy processes
a) Increased organizational size and specialization may increase difficulty in
formalizing strategy processes across divisions.
b) Increased environmental uncertainty may increase information search and
analysis costs, impacting strategists’ reliance on intuition and expertise.
c) Research on strategy implementation is sparse.
2) Antecedents and outcomes
a) Structural environmental factors and unique organizational characteristics
influence strategy processes, and in turn, performance.
b) Initial good performance may increase organizational inertia, leading to decreases
in openness, more rigid processes and decreased performance over time.
3) Process and outcomes
a) The link between planning and performance is still the most commonly addressed
empirical question.
b) Formal strategic planning does increase organizational performance.
c) Strategic planning has changed significantly from the highly-bureaucratized
process of the 1970s.
i) It is less often seen as a way to develop strategy, but more as a device to
increase information, communication, integration and coordination. There is
recognition that strategy formation is ongoing, and that emergent strategies
are incorporated into a plan.
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4) Interrelationship between the different strategy process variables
a) Increased rationality and comprehensiveness increase decision outcome success,
especially in more stable environments.
b) Strategy process is contingent upon group characteristics (size, level of
socialization, trust, etc.).
c) Strategists’ cognitive models/worldviews impact their evaluation of information.
d) Research on strategy content-process link is sparse.
Over 100 conceptually-focused articles were also reviewed by Hutzschenreuter
and Kleindienst (2006). Most sought to further clarify and tease apart the concepts of
strategy process, formulation and implementation, though a handful were focused on
defining the strategists’ personal and cognitive context or advancing conceptual
integration or methodologies. In general, work in this area has revealed an increased
acceptance of the strategy process as a highly dynamic, causally complex and organic
process. The barriers between formulation and implementation are also beginning to
crumble, as the process has been described and handled with more fluidity. However,
formal strategy formation processes are still seen as an important part of strategic
management, though conceptual and measurement imprecision is still hobbling research.
Interestingly, Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst (2006) did not mention any
hypothesized or confirmed differences between private, public, or nonprofit organizations
with respect to strategy process. They indiscriminately include several articles that
examine strategy processes in public hospitals, government agencies, and a few NPOs.
While this level playing field is refreshing, many have argued that there are many reasons
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why strategy processes within NPOs would be different than in other organizational
contexts (Beck, C. A. Lengnick-Hall, & M. L. Lengnick-Hall, 2008; Kong, 2008). In
addition, the review’s finding that structural environment and top management
characteristics impact processes and resulting performance could support the case for
sector differences in preferred strategic management processes and their impact on
performance.
Nonprofit-specific Review
In 1999, Stone, Bigelow and W. F. Crittenden published a review of two decades
worth of research on strategic management in NPOs. It is the only review of its kind.
While the authors did not specifically address the question of sector differences, they did
argue that the topic of strategic management needed heightened attention as the size and
importance of NPOs has increased dramatically since the study of nonprofit management
began to blossom in the 1970s and pressures for accountability and performance continue
to be amplified.
Stone et al. (1999) performed a systematic review of empirical articles spanning
two decades (1977 to Spring 1997) related to nonprofit strategic management. They
covered many of the same journals as Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst (2006), but added
several nonprofit-specific sources as well (see Table 3 below, pg. 40). Unfortunately,
they gave very little other information about how they performed their search. The
search yielded a total of 66 empirical studies, none of which overlap with articles
reviewed by Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst (2006); this is partly because the reviews
only searched six years in common, but mainly because the bulk of the articles reviewed
by Stone et al. (1999) were found in nonprofit-specific journals, such as Nonprofit
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Management & Leadership, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, and
Administration in Social Work (see Table 3 below, pg. 40).
The 66 nonprofit-specific articles were separated into three categories: strategy
formulation (21), content (24), and implementation (21), each of which were then
analyzed with respect to how they informed knowledge about the strategy process
determinants and outcomes and organizational performance (see Figure 1 in Chapter 1,
pg. 25) of the strategic management process. Overall, Stone et al. (1999) found the
“considerable” research base to be very fragmented, with few connections between
studies. Additionally, they observed that it was still unclear whether NPOs used formal
strategic management processes to improve client outcomes, or if it was a more internally
or funder-oriented process. They hint at the possibility that strategic planning may take
on a symbolic role in organizations, decoupled from other strategic activities. In contrast
with Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst’s (2006) findings, Stone et al. (1999) highlight the
lack of research on the strategy process and performance link in nonprofits, citing a lack
of consensus with regard to measuring performance in NPOs. Although like
Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst (2006), they also call for more research into the
dynamic interactions between variables and more emphasis on implementation.
Given the focus of the current study, several of Stone et al.’s (1999) findings from
their review of the 21 studies of strategy formulation in NPOs warrant further coverage.
As of 1997 when the last article reviewed was published, it appeared that many NPOs
had not yet adopted “formal” strategic planning, usually operationalized as the full sixstage SWOT-focused strategic planning model (see previous chapter). However, it did
appear that several key determinant variables were related to formalization. The most
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critical factor related to formal planning was an increase in pressure from funders to do
so, leading to the assertion that “nonprofits plan when they have to”. Increased
organizational size was also associated with more formal planning, but not organizational
age. This relationship was explained by an increase in coordination needs as well as
increased resources and managerial sophistication enabling planning. Interestingly,
formal planning was also more common when strategists’ had prior agreement about the
organization’s goals and mission; therefore, goal consensus may be a necessary
prerequisite, not an outcome of planning.
In terms of short-term outcomes from planning, the articles reviewed showed
evidence of changes in internal organizational dynamics and increased external
legitimacy, though perhaps a decrease in autonomy. Again, the strategy formulationperformance link had not been thoroughly explored. A few articles did find an increase
in funding and members resulting from planning, and one found that, controlling for size,
NPOS that used formal planning outperformed those with less formal processes.
Many of Stone et al.’s (1999) conclusions about strategy formulation in a
nonprofit context are not surprising any more, but reflect important knowledge
advancements in a field that was virtually non-existent before the late 1970s.
Additionally, their review offers additional insights about why and when NPOs choose to
engage in formal planning and the unique impact resource dependencies may have on
third sector strategic management. Taken with Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst’s (2006)
conclusions, there are consistent findings that formal strategy processes do increase
performance, though as of 1999, this link still needed more evidence in the nonprofit
arena. It may also be concluded that organizational size is an important variable to
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understanding strategy process, but that there may be an inverted-u shaped relationship
with the propensity and ability to formalize. Stone et al. (1999) calls for further research
into the major variable relationships Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst (2006) identified in
the larger and more current body of research, specifically the antecedents to strategy
formulation, the connections between process and content and implementation, and the
process-performance link, all of which are explored in the current study.

Updated Review of Empirical Nonprofit Strategy Process Literature
It is unknown if researchers have heeded Stone et al.’s (1999) suggestions. While
the past decade has seen a continued increase in attention on nonprofit management
issues, the nonprofit strategy process literature has not been reviewed. Therefore, a
systematic review was undertaken to determine the current state of the empirical
literature and further inform data collection and analysis.
Method
The current systematic review of articles published between mid-1997 and the
end of 2010 combined the previous reviews’ search strategies, using Hutzschenreuter and
Kleindienst’s (2006) electronic search terms describing strategy process (see Table 2) and
Stone et al.’s (1999) list of “prominent management journals” (see Table 3). The search
terms were slightly modified to allow for more permutations of spelling and phrases, as
well as to include a few updated terms, such as “strategic management”. Furthermore, an
additional search parameter of keywords describing NPOs was added to keep the review
focused on Third Sector organizations.
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Table 2: Terms Used in Abstract Search
Strategy Process Terms
(from Hutschenreuter & Kleindienst, 2006)

(AND)

(strateg* and process*) OR
“strateg* process*” OR
“strategy making” OR
“strategy formulation” OR
“strategy formation” OR
(Strateg* and decision) OR
“strateg* decision” OR
“strateg* plan*” OR
“strategy implementation” OR

Nonprofit Terms
NPO* OR
nonprofit* OR
“non profit*” OR
“non-profit*” OR
“voluntary organi*” OR
“voluntary sector” OR
“third sector”

Additional Terms used:
“strateg* management” OR
“strateg* change” OR
“strateg* orientation*”
The EBSCO host interface was used to search for the 19 keyword phrases in the
abstracts of articles indexed in the SocIndex and Business Source Complete databases.
The results were then limited to the 18 peer-reviewed journals listed below to be
comparable with Stone et al.’s (1999) review. When EBSCO did not provide access to
the full date range needed, other sources were used as necessary to conduct and electronic
“hand search”.
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Table 3: Journals Searched, 1997 through 2010
Electronic Search Source
Journals used by Stone et al. (1999)

SocIndex

Academy of Management
Executive/Perspectives (since 05)+
Academy of Management Journal+

X

X

X

X

+

X

X

X

X

Administrative Science Quarterly
+

California Management Review
+

Decision Sciences

To 2009

Harvard Business Review

+

+

Journal of Management

+

Journal of Management Studies
Long Range Planning

+

Other*

X

+

Academy of Management Review

Management Science

Business Source
Complete

X

X

X

X

X

X

Blackwell

X

+

Organization Studies

X

X

X

X

Sloan Management Review

To 2004
+

Strategic Management Journal

X

Administration in Social Work

X

Nonprofit Management & Leadership

X

Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly

X

Public Administration Review

X

Yale Program on Non-profit Organizations
Working Papers (last paper posted in 2001)

Google Scholar

Online database

+

Journals also searched by Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst (2006).
*Searches did not yield any results for 1997-2010.
Stone et al. (1999) also searched the working papers of Yale’s Program on Nonprofit
Organizations, which yielded 5 articles on strategy formulation when searched in 1997,
but none when searched in late 2010. This may be because the program stopped posting
papers in 2001.
The search yielded 26 non-duplicate articles. Upon review of these articles’
abstracts, three were found to be reviews or editorials, two focused on public or military
agencies; one was covered in the Stone et al. (1999) review, and eleven did not
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specifically address strategy process, but rather issues of board dynamics, strategy
content or other topics. This left only nine articles for review.

Results
Publishing Rate and Journal Distribution
Stone et al. (1999) identified 21 articles about strategy formulation in NPOs
published between 1977 and early 1997. Similarly, between late 1997 and 2010, nine
articles have been produced, indicating a small, but steady publishing rate over the past
three decades with the publications becoming more concentrated in a handful of
nonprofit-specific journals. Furthermore, the articles included in the current review
cluster around 2000 and 2008, meaning years pass without a single high-quality study
about strategy process in NPOs appearing in a reputable peer-reviewed journal (see Table
4).
Table 4: Comparison of NP Strategy Formulation Articles Reviewed by Stone et al.
(1999) and Now (2010)
Stone et al. (1999)
Now (2010)
Journal
Harvard Business Review

Years

Total

1982

1

Journal of Management Studies
Long Range Planning

Years

Total

2000, 2007

2

1987, 1990

2

Strategic Management Journal

1988

1

Administration in Social Work

1978, 1985,
1986, 1988

4

Nonprofit Management &
Leadership

1992, 1993,
1996, 1997

4

1999, 2000,
2004, 2008

4

Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector
Quarterly

1988, 1989,
1991, 1992

4

2000, 2000, 2008

3

Yale Program on Non-profit
Organizations Working Papers
(last paper posted in 2001)

1987, 1988,
1990, 1991, 1993

5

Total relevant articles

21
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Key Findings
The nine articles are summarized in Appendix A (pg. 273).
Quality of the research. In addition to summarizing the articles’ key questions
and findings, I also rated the quality of their study design as “good”, “fair” or “poor” to
help determine which results should be given the most weight. Unfortunately, by and
large, the articles currently reviewed were of weak scientific rigor. To be fair, two of the
articles (W. F. Crittenden, 2000; Nutt, 2000) did try to build some causal argument by
collecting survey data at two time points and combining quantitative findings with key
informant interviews to improve the interpretation of the results. However, more were
based on loose opportunistic “case studies” based on authors’ current or previous
professional experiences (e.g., Parker, 2007), and after thorough examination, it was
questionable as to whether several of the articles should have been included in this review
of “empirical research.” Two were “From the Field” reflections of practice experiences
(Krug & Weinberg, 2004; Mara, 2000), one was a conceptually-oriented “Case Study”
(Medley & Akan, 2008), and another was a “Research Note” with limited findings and
implications (Siciliano, 2008).
Themes. Several of the reviewed articles investigated variable relationships
commonly cited in previous reviews, such as the relationship between contextual
antecedent variables and strategy process (Maranville, 1999; Stone, 2000) or between
strategy processes and organizational performance (W. F. Crittenden, 2000; Siciliano,
2008). Three articles also focused exclusively on process-related variables, trying to
further our understanding of various stages of strategic decision-making (Medley &
Akan, 2008; Nutt, 2000; Parker, 2007). Taken together, these articles reinforce the utility
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of traditional formal modes of strategic management but also the importance of process
flexibility in obtaining positive results. Also evident was the central role of context when
analyzing strategic process.
A theme seemingly unique to recent investigations into strategy formulation in
NPOs is the applicability of specific strategic analysis tools and techniques. Three
articles (Greenlee & Trussel, 2000; Krug & Weinberg, 2004; Mara, 2000) took a
commonly-used tool from the for-profit sector (i.e., portfolio planning, financial analysis,
or group decision-making techniques), adapted it for use in the nonprofit sector, and
explored its validity, utility, or acceptability in this new setting. Overall, they found the
tools to be useful, though their findings must be tempered by the limitations of their
single-case study designs.
Key findings from the three “fair” to “good” quality articles. W. F. Crittenden
(2000) found evidence of a positive link between traditional modes of strategic planning
and performance as measured by three years of balanced budgets and meeting fundraising
targets. Less successful organizations appeared to lack key strategic management
attributes such as focus on product offerings, financial acumen, marketing, and
diversification. The study also found that strategy process and performance are
interrelated over time, and that organizations’ processes frequently change. Findings
should be cautiously interpreted, however, given the small sample size (31
organizations), 47% non-response rate and un-validated strategy process measure.
Nutt (2000) focused specifically on the alternative generation stage of strategic
planning, or the processes by which organizations arrive at the universe of possible
strategies from which to choose. The study’s methodology was strong; it compared
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practices across all three sectors and analyzed 376 specific decision cases. Six alternative
generation approaches were inductively categorized via multiple key informant
interviews into preference for the existing solution, innovation, benchmarking (simple or
integrated) and search (simple or cyclical). There was evidence of sector-based
differences in preferred approaches and decision success. NPOs used benchmarking and
existing solutions more often than other approaches, but had better decision success when
they used search approaches (soliciting proposals from third-parties to address need).
NPOs had the highest complete plan adoption rate after two years, but they took longer to
arrive at a decision than private organizations.
Stone’s (2000) in-depth case study of a multi-sector collaborative alliance to
assist welfare-to-work participants found that involvement in the collaborative increased
the complexity of the decision-making environment of individual NPOs by increasing
uncertainty and the density of relationships that had to be managed. Despite this,
collaborations had virtually no impact on formal strategic planning activities, which were
seen as an internally-focused process of which the collaborations could be seen as an
aspect of implementation. Stone (2000) hypothesized that the decoupling of strategic
planning from collaborative activities may help NPO’s retain decision-making authority
and that current models of strategy formulation may be ill-equipped to cope with a more
dynamic and political environment in which many NPOs now find themselves. Of
course, as with all case studies, it is difficult to generalize her findings to the wider
nonprofit sector.
These articles’ research questions and findings demonstrate the variety of the
strategy process literature and hint at the complexity and the potential value of strategic
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planning in a nonprofit context. Furthermore, Nutt’s (2000) study provides evidence of
the potential for NPOs to make good strategic plans that are more often implemented than
in other sectors. Stone’s (2000) findings raise further questions worthy of future
exploration.

Discussion
The state of the nonprofit-specific strategy process literature is disappointing.
The nine articles reviewed do little to address the gaps Stone et al. (1999) pointed out in
the literature: generally disjointed studies with limited data on actual strategic
management practices in the nonprofit sector and even less evidence of various
processes’ impact on organizational performance. The insights they do offer are
extremely limited by the studies’ generally poor methodological rigor.
Despite NPOs being of great importance to the national economy and service
provision, and nonprofit management gaining attention and legitimacy as a separate field
of study, the unique challenges of the strategic management of these organization is not
being addressed by researchers and academics. The publishing rate for such articles has
not increased from the 1970s, and there is a clear schism between for-profit and nonprofit
knowledge bases and advancements. There are two different tacks one could take when
trying to understand this situation. One is that research on NPOs is theoretically and
methodologically lacking and the academic community seems to be doing little to rectify
this. On the other hand, it may be that the fields of private sector and third sector strategy
process research are converging with the realization that basic tenets of the process are
the same, just impacted by different environmental contexts. Nutt’s (2000)
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conceptualization and investigation of private, nonprofit, and public organizations as
laying on a continuum of “publicness” that impacts strategy process is perhaps evidence
of this possibility.
If this is the case, that the literature streams are converging, then researchers of
NPOs need to approach their questions with more scientific rigor, on par with researchers
of for-profit organizations. Or, they need to ask different questions specifically pertinent
to NPOs. Some investigators seem to already be taking this route by looking at issues of
tool transferability, though this line of inquiry could also benefit from more rigorous
methodology. Additionally, it would be prudent to first document the transferability and
impact of for-profit tools “as is” before studying adapted tools.
Limitations
During the course of the systematic search and reading the represented articles,
other seemingly pertinent studies were discovered. However, they were not published in
the selected journals, therefore their quality is unknown. It did appear, however, that
several of the articles were based on studies conducted in the UK and Australia, and
therefore more likely to be published in region-specific or international journals not
covered by this review. A limitation of the current systematic search was its narrow
focus on primarily American academic journals. While it is possible that the articles’
findings would not hold to US NPOs due to contextual differences between the nations’
third sectors, a wider-reaching survey of the literature is warranted, provided the quality
of the journals can be verified. Inclusion of search terms of nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) may have also yielded additional articles and insights such as those
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furnished by Lindenberg (2001), though differences between American NPOs and
international NGOs could also have limited applicability.
Next Steps
Investigating the validity, utility, or acceptability of for-profit strategic analysis
tools in a nonprofit context may be a fruitful avenue for future research. Past and present
empirical findings point to the conclusion that current “private sector” theories about
strategy processes (e.g., planning improves performance, political decision-making can
be detrimental, interpersonal trust and communication are vital among decision makers,
etc.) are very applicable to NPOs, especially when contextual factors are considered.
What is less clear is whether strategic analysis tools developed for for-profit enterprise
are transferable to the third sector, and if so with how much adaptation. The goals and
objectives of strategy are slightly different between sectors and nonprofit executives
often have less formal training and fewer resources to bring to the table when engaging in
strategic management. Hence, evaluating which tools are suitable to strategy formulation
in a nonprofit context could provide additional theoretical insights into strategy process
and tangible prescriptions for practice.
However, basic data on actual practices is still lacking. Stone et al. (1999) found
that as of 1997 there was not strong evidence of wide-spread adoption of formal strategic
planning in the nonprofit sector. This finding has been neither proven nor disproven
more than ten years later, though it would appear that researchers are under the
impression that formal planning is extremely commonplace. The field is suffering from
the same normative biases as the wider strategy process field. Before providing
organizations with process prescriptions or adapted tools it would be beneficial to have a

47

description of what was already being done. There is a need to gather basic data on the
nonprofit sector’s strategic management processes and their impact. The current study
was designed to address this need, using a convenience sample of children’s mental
health services organizations.

Connecting the State of Knowledge with the Current Study’s Aims
Strategy Formation in Nonprofit Mental Health Services Organizations
It is known that nonprofit organizations began adopting formal strategic planning
in the 1980’s, mainly due to pressures from funders (Webster & Wylie, 1988a) and
increasing diffusion of management and business practices (Mulhare, 1999). Several
large national organizations, such as the United Way of America, Boy/Girl Scouts, and
the Red Cross began requiring or strongly encouraging their affiliates to produce formal
written strategic plans as a way to increase accountability and control (Webster & Wylie,
1988b). Additionally, numerous articles, both in scholarly journals and popular press,
along with management texts, seminars, and the new nonprofit management programs
extolled the virtues of strategic planning, especially those models relying heavily on an
analysis of the organization’s strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT)
(Kearns & Scarpino, 1996; Mulhare, 1999). Hence, by the 1990s there were strong
institutional pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) within the nonprofit sector to engage
in formal strategy formation.
Using a sample of 600 NPOs, Crittenden & Crittenden (2000) found that all of the
organizations engaged in some sort of planning, though it varied widely in terms of
formalization. However, instrumental organizations, such as those that serve community
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mental health needs, were more likely to regularly use formal strategy formation
processes. Findings such as these have added credence to the assumption that formal
strategy formation processes have been widely adopted by NPOs, but actual data on how
NPOs are managing their strategy is wanting. A handful of recent case studies or small
surveys, primarily published in academic journals lacking scientific rigor, have provided
some evidence that NPOs are adapting for-profit formal strategy formation tools to fit
their needs (Bryson & Anderson, 2000; Katsioloudes & Tymon, 2003; Kearns &
Scarpino, 1996; Lindenberg, 2001) and may be using other tactics, such as stakeholder
management tools, more than private companies (Gunn & Williams, 2007).
The nonprofit strategic management literature often argues that NPOs are
sufficiently unique so as to render many formal strategy formation processes developed
in the for-profit sector inappropriate or too hard to apply due to resource and training
issues (Beck et al., 2008; Kong, 2008; Myers & Sacks, 2003). To respond to these
concerns, strategic management tools, such as the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) have been
adapted slightly to meet the needs of nonprofit organizations to better capture the reality
of multiple stakeholders and the relationship between their satisfaction and performance
relationships (Kaplan, 2001; Niven, 2003). Lindenberg (2001) found that in order to
successfully use formal strategic planning in a nonprofit setting, it was necessary to
adjust the model to be mission-focused and participative, and able to capture the
organization’s bottom double-line. Importantly, he also found that the strategy formation
process needed to mirror the organization in terms of complexity, resource intensity, and
staff capabilities. However, these and other internal organizational characteristic have
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not been delineated or explored in a sufficient manner so as to determine if and what
changes must be made to existing processes.
To address the gaps in the literature regarding current strategy formation
processes within nonprofit organizations and how they are shaped by the organizations’
internal context, Aim 2 of the current study is: To describe the organizations’ strategy
formation processes within their internal organizational contexts.
The Relationship between Strategy Formation Process and Intended Strategy
Strategic management researchers have long attempted to demonstrate that the
process by which intended strategy is formed impacts the quality of the decisions made
and subsequently organizational performance. As is depicted in the conceptual model
(see Figure 1 in Chapter 1, pg. 25), it is a long path of many causal relationships between
strategy formation process and organizational performance. Many empirical studies have
examined the first causal link assumed by researchers asserting a process-performance
relationship: the relationship between strategy formation process and intended strategy.
Dean and Sharfman (1996) concluded that characteristics of the strategy formation
process can have a large impact on the quality of the choices made, at least in for-profit
companies. Similarly, after their extensive literature review, Hutzschenreuter and
Kleindienst (2006) concluded that there is consistent evidence that increased rationality
and comprehensiveness (i.e., more formalized strategy formation processes) increases
decision outcome success, especially in more stable environments.
However, contrary to this evidence, preliminary findings from conversations with
several of the current study’s target organizations have revealed that at least two
organizations use widely different strategy formation processes yet appear to have near
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identical intended strategies with respect to their market positioning (Porter, 1996). They
have gone after similar contracts, offer similar services, belong to the same collaborative
boards, etc. The equifinality of the different strategy formation processes suggests that
either the process didn’t matter as much as the external environmental context the
strategy is responding to or that there is something else going on not yet understood.
Some nonprofit researchers have argued that since NPOs exist in more
institutional than technical environments in which social status is often rewarded more
than increases in performance, formal strategy formation may take on a more symbolic
than functional role and thus may be decoupled from other organizational activities (W.
F. Crittenden & V. L. Crittenden, 2000; Stone et al., 1999). This suggests a possible
breakdown in the causal mechanisms between strategy formation process and realized
strategy, in addition to putting into question the link between strategy formation process
and organizational performance within NPOs. To explore this possibility further and test
a crucial causal link in the strategic management model, Aim 3 is: To explore whether
and how the organizations’ external environmental context and strategy formation
processes influence resulting intended strategies. As part of this inquiry, a full
understanding of the organizations’ position relative to its competitors is needed;
therefore, Aim 1 is: To describe the organizations’ strategic positions within their
external environmental context.
Strategy Implementation in Nonprofit Mental Health Services Organizations
Research on strategy implementation is sparse, even within the for-profit
literature (Carroll & Flood, 2000; Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst, 2006). A lot of
information about implementation tactics comes from prescriptive management texts
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(e.g., Bryson, 2004; Kotter, 1996; Proehl, 2001) rather than peer-reviewed journal articles
stemming from empirical analysis. However, there has been a small and consistent effort
by researchers, such as Paul C. Nutt, to identify, categorize, contextualize and explore the
impact of strategy implementation processes (1987, 1989, 1995). Based on a large
number (over 60) of in-depth case studies, Nutt delineated the four most common
implementation processes and showed that certain processes are more successful than
others in installing an intended strategy. Namely, “intervention implementation”, in
which managers actively manage the implementation by working to create and explain
new norms and communicate connections between the intended strategy and performance
improvements, was shown to always be successful when used (Nutt, 1987). Whereas
“edict implementation”, in which managers use their power to implement via directive,
worked less than half the time. Unfortunately, managers typically elect not to use
intervention implementation, favoring instead tactics that demand less of their time and
direct involvement (Nutt, 1989, 1995). Managers actually need a repertoire of tactics to
be successful so they can deftly execute which ever approach is most suited to the
demands of the particular intended strategy trying to be installed (Nutt, 1989).
Miller (1997) investigated which factors, beyond just managers’ behavior, led to
the success of the same strategy in several comparable organizations. The study had a
similar in design to the current study. Initial analysis yielded ten factors related to
implementation success; Miller (1997) defined success as an amalgamation of timely
completion of implementation activities, achievement (i.e., realization) of intended
strategy, and the acceptability of the implementation’s methods and outcomes. A further
case-ordered matrix revealed a consistent pattern suggesting that five factors, labeled
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“realizers”, need to be present and working together in order to ensure implementation
success. Luck, or at least the absence of bad luck, was always needed to realize
implementation success, but is not within the organizations’ control and is controlled for
by the present study’s design. The four realizers organizations can control are: continued
backing from authority figures and those required to implement the strategy, a clearly
defined strategy with high assessability, planning with high specificity regarding required
actions and cultural receptivity to or fit with the implementation process. Essentially,
when implementing a strategic initiative, “having support, being clear about what has to
be done, spelling out how to do it, and operating in a facilitative context all contribute
towards outcomes that are likely to realize expectations” (S. Miller, 1997, p. 589). This
adds credence to formal planning prescriptions in as much as it informs the
implementation by making strategies assessable and specific.
Interestingly, in Miller’s sample, other “enabling” factors, such as implementers’
relevant experience, resource availability and process adaptability, were found to not be
consistently related to successful implementation than the “realizers”. Miller (1997) also
cautioned that just because one strategy is successfully implemented does not mean that
the organization is a “successful implementer”, but rather success is generated on a caseby-case basis that requires organizational leaders to always be working to align the
necessary realizing factors.
Across all circumstances, open and consistent communication and the genuine
involvement of key stakeholders are the two strategy implementation process components
most consistently found to be positively related to implementation success (Bryson &
Bromiley, 1993; Harrington & Kendall, 2006; Nutt, 1989). This reflects the need to
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attend to both the organizational operational changes as well as the psychological
changes within the key stakeholder groups in order to successfully implement new
strategies (T. N. Burke, 2008; O’Donnell, 2000).
Unfortunately, nearly all of the research on the variation and success of strategy
implementation processes have used solely for-profit organizational samples, meaning
next to nothing is known about what nonprofit organizations do to implement their
intended strategies. It is quite possible that the demands of the particular strategies
favored by these organizations and their unique internal context may require particular
types of processes, or that certain compulsory strategies may conflict with deeply held
professional identities and norms (McKevitt, 2000). To begin to fill the large gap in the
literature, Aim 4 is: To describe the organizations’ strategy implementation processes
relative to the intended strategies within their internal organizational contexts.
Relationship between Strategy Formation and Organizational Performance and the
Role of Implementation
Theoretically, the process by which an organization assesses and makes sense of
its environment in order to manage multiple inevitable dependencies is crucial to its
survival (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Empirically, this assertion has been supported.
Numerous studies have found a small, but positive relationship between formalized
strategy formation processes and organizational performance, including some tentative
support within nonprofit samples (W. F. Crittenden & V. L. Crittenden, 2000;
Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst, 2006; C. C. Miller & Cardinal, 1994; Stone et al., 1999).
However, the findings have been criticized for suffering from serious
measurement error (Boyd & Reuning-Elliott, 1998; C. C. Miller & Cardinal, 1994).
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Difficulty and inconsistency in measuring the strategy formation process is typically cited
as the main source of error, but the gap between intended and realized strategy, whether
as a result of mismanagement or appropriate modifications, is also a large source of error
in all models linking strategy formation process with organizational performance.
Therefore, there is a strong need for improved understanding how intended strategy is
implemented within an organization. After thorough reviews of both the for-profit and
non-profit strategic management literature, both Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst (2006)
and Stone et al. (1999) highlighted this need by calling for more research into the
dynamic interactions between variables and more emphasis on implementation. To
respond to this call and to move toward practice and research-relevant insights into
strategic management, Aim 5 is: To clarify causal mechanisms and explore patterns of
how strategy implementation mediates the relationship between strategy formation and
organizational performance.
The difficulty involved in defining and measuring nonprofit organizational
performance, especially with respect to effectiveness, has been well-documented (W. F.
Crittenden et al., 2004; Forbes, 1998; Griggs, 2003; Herman & Renz, 1999; Stone et al.,
1999). The measurement of effectiveness of a publicly-held for-profit organization is
usually simplified to stock price, but performance is more complicated for non-profit
organization as it is more subjective and depends on the defined goals of the organization
and the measuring party. NPOs do not have a single public indicator of perceived worth;
in addition, their goals are often ambiguous, their services often intangible, and they have
multiple and divergent stakeholders who all possess different measures of effectiveness
(Forbes, 1998; Herman & Renz, 1999, 2008). Fortunately, the current study’s reliance on
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a sample of most-similar cases allows for easier across-case comparisons since the
organizations’ activities and goals are fairly comparable. Thus, organizational
performance will be operationalized primarily as financial performance over time,
measured by a variety of relevant ratios (Ritchie & Kolodinsky, 2003; Tuckman &
Chang, 1991), supplemented by the organizational leaders’ own definitions and
measures. Further information regarding the issue of performance measurement is
provided in the following chapter on research design and methodology.

Connecting Literature to Practice
Advancing the field of nonprofit strategy process literature could have a big
impact on practice and the communities NPOs serve. Strategic planning has already been
shown to be related to improved organizational performance in the private sector
(Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst, 2006). If the same relationship can be demonstrated in
the nonprofit sector more organizations would be likely to adopt formal processes.
Furthermore, if evidence to the contrary is found, nonprofit leaders could stop wasting
time on unnecessary formalization. By understanding current strategic management
practices and disseminating information about applicable tools, organizations could more
efficiently and effectively create strategies to enhance stability and sustainability and
serve the public good.
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLGY
The current project employed a mixed-methods comparative multi-case study
design to achieve its five research aims. The approach was ideal for studying such a
multifaceted phenomenon like strategic management. As Stake points out: “When
individual cases respond differently in complex situations, the interactivity of main
effects and settings can be expected to require the particularistic scrutiny of case study”
(2006, p. 28). Combining this particularistic scrutiny of multiple single cases with
critical cross-case analyses facilitated an even more robust understanding of the
phenomenon under inspection. Additionally, given the unknown range of possibilities
and the poor state of measurement (Boyd & Reuning-Elliott, 1998) and theory in this
area, qualitative methods were best suited to achieve the project’s research aims.
The study leveraged a unique cluster of several nonprofit mental health services
organizations that were participating in a study with which the researcher was affiliated
and that had very similar client needs, service offerings, funding requirements, and
historical norms and experiences. This selection of target organizations created a group
of “most-similar cases” that facilitated in-depth within and across-case analysis and was
best suited to examining an anomaly where cases appear very similar, but yet have
unexplainably different outcomes (Gerring, 2007). At the outset of the study, the targeted
organizations appeared to have very similar strategies in response to similar external
environments, but were known (via the researcher’s contact during the other study) to
engage in widely different strategy formation processes, for instance only planning one
year out versus employing the Balance Scorecard method to inform strategy formation
and implementation. Choosing most-similar cases on the dimension of external
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environmental context, thus reduced that variation, allowing for clearer analysis of the
impact of internal organizational context has on strategic management and how strategic
management impacts organizational performance. This focused the study on domains
nonprofit executives have much more control over.
To understand each case in-depth, information from multiple sources from each
organization was interpreted (see Figure 2), including: 1) key informant interviews with
Executive Directors/CEOs (EDs) and Board and staff members; 2) documents produced
in connection to strategy formation and implementation; 3) observations at the
organizations during the interviews and select Board and staff meetings; and 4) all
publically available IRS Form 990 financial filings (typically from 1998, forward). The
majority of the information was collected via multiple key informant interviews, a
vehicle that yielded rich qualitative data essential for case analysis (Yin, 1984). This
information was supplemented and triangulated with data gathered through document
review, observation and secondary financial data. Once the strategic management
processes for each case was thoroughly understood, data was compared across the cases
to draw out larger themes and provide further evidence to answer the study’s research
aims (Stake, 2006).
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Mixed-Methods Comparative Multi-Case Study Framework*
Data Collection and Analysis at each Participating Organization
Interview
Data &
Results

+

Document
Review Data
& Results

+

Observational
Data &
Results

+

Form 990
Data &
Results

Interpretation

Cross-Case Analysis of the Participating Organizations

Figure 2. Research Design Overview: Mixed-Methods Comparative Multi- Case Study
*Graphic courtesy of Madeline Lee based on J. Creswell, M. Lee’s personal
communication, June 26, 2009 and (Creswell, 2003; Stake, 2006)
Additionally, the data collection took place in two phases. The first phase was
primarily focused on understanding the organizations’ strategy formation processes and
intended strategies. It consisted of two in-depth interviews with the organization’s ED as
well as the Board Chair and a senior Staff member. A review of documents produced
during strategy formation over the past 10 years, which, for most organizations
encompassed several strategy formation/planning cycles was also conducted. Since a
longitudinal design was not feasible for the current study, a retrospective ten-year
timeframe was chosen in light of evidence that changes in strategy formation processes
do not begin to impact firm performance for up to four years (Brews & Hunt, 1999).
From the information gathered in the first phase, two intended strategies per
organization were chosen for closer investigation. These strategies were chosen for their
similarities in content and for being responsive to the same cues from the external
environment. They formed the subunits for secondary embedded case studies (Yin,
1984) within all of the organizations (see Figure 3). Given that the implementation
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process varies for different intended strategies, it was very important that data collection
around strategy implementation processes be specific and focused on particular intended
strategies that could be reasonably expected to be connected to organizational
performance. The second phase of data collection was focused on understanding strategy
implementation and organizational performance, as well as how all of the pieces of the
conceptual model fit together in practice. This information was gathered via additional
key informant interviews (two with the ED and two with additional staff members) and
analysis of secondary financial data. Internal organizational context was assessed
throughout the study.
Secondary Embedded Case Study Design (Aims #4 & #5)
Holistic Case Study #1
Embedded Subunit Case Study
Intended
Strategy #1
Strategy
Formation
Process

Implement.
Process #1

Realized
Strategy #1

Embedded Subunit Case Study
Intended
Strategy #2

Implement.
Process #2

Organizational
Performance

Realized
Strategy #2

Holistic Case Study #2
Holistic Case Study #3

Figure 3. Secondary Embedded Case Study Design

Sample
Preliminary Study
At the time of recruitment and data collection I was involved with an ongoing
NSF-funded investigation entitled “Impact of Implementing Evidence Based Practices on
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Organizational Performance” (aka: NSF-IOP; Drs. Peter Hovmand and David Gillespie,
Co-Principal Investigators) that worked closely with 41 mental health services NPOs in
the St. Louis region. At that time, the three-year study was in the middle of several
waves of data collection that included semi-structured interviews with organizational
executives and staff and system dynamics group model building. I was involved with
multiple waves of key informant interviews and group model building sessions, and thus
had established rapport with the organizations that helped facilitate recruitment of the
current project’s target organizations. Preliminary data regarding the organizations’
founding stories, current service offerings and external environment also provided
guidance as to appropriate sampling. In addition, due to my involvement in NSF-IOP, I
was trained in qualitative interviewing and transcript coding and analysis using the same
grounded theory techniques used in the current project.
Preliminary Study’s Sampling Frame
The preliminary study, NSF-IOP (see above) drew its sample of 41 nonprofit
mental health services agencies from a sampling frame of 65 organizations identified as
providers of mental health services and/or supports to individuals with mental illness in
the greater Saint Louis, MO region that had annual budgets of $100,000 or more. For
more detailed information on the sampling frame process, please see Hovmand et al.
(2008).
Current Study’s Target Organizations
The current study used a purposive subsample of organizations from the NSFIOP’s sampling frame of 65 organizations. In order to achieve the study’s aims it was
important to be able to hold the external environment of the organizations as consistent as
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possible in order to focus on how strategic management processes and internal
organizational environment interact to affect organizational performance. Therefore,
cases most similar along the dimensions of client needs, service offerings, funding
requirements, and historical norms and experiences were chosen. Studying most similar
cases allow a researcher to more clearly explore causal mechanisms that contribute to a
particular outcome of interest, in this case intended strategy and organizational
performance, since variation is minimized from other factors thought to potentially
contribute to the outcome (Gerring, 2007).
While all of the organizations in the NSF-IOP sampling frame broadly provide
mental health services, there were several natural clusters of organizations, such as: those
(seven) who began as orphanages at the turn of the last century and now primarily
provide child welfare and mental health (CWMH) services, those (five) who have their
roots in the community mental health center movement in the 1960s, and those (three)
who provide a broad array of services to families and individuals mostly within a
particular faith tradition.
Based on the purpose of the sampling, the seven organizations that started as
orphanages and now operate residential and outpatient mental health services to the child
welfare population in close cooperation with the State served as the primary target
organizations for the current study and yielded enough participants to move forward.
This cluster of organizations was the largest and most similar to one another. In addition,
based on early key informant interviews as part of the preliminary study, it was clear that
despite their similarities, the target organizations’ strategy formation and implementation
processes vary tremendously, and that potential participants were very eager to discuss

62

and learn more about the topic. This subsample was also preferred because I have
previous practice and research experience in the field of child welfare and am therefore
familiar with the environmental context, services, and constraints encountered by these
organizations. This familiarity increased the study’s feasibility by increasing my
legitimacy with the organizations and decreasing my learning curve.
The organizations in the subsample also represent a very common organizational
form found across the country. In nearly every state, if not all, the majority of children’s
mental health services are provided by nonprofit organizations working in close
collaboration with local government child welfare agencies. This interdependence with
governmental entities is just one of the attributes these organizations share with all
nonprofit mental health and human services organizations, regardless of their target
population (Cho & Gillespie, 2006). Others include increased pressure for
accountability, evidence-informed treatments and short-term interventions (Anheier,
2005; Hudson, 2005; Young, 2003). These similarities increase the study’s
generalizability and potential impact on practice.
While data is ultimately needed about strategic management across the entire
nonprofit sector, tapping into the NSF-IOP sample provided a unique opportunity to
leverage an already compiled group of organizations, which increased the feasibility of
the project by decreasing the time and resources required to recruit participants. To make
the most of this connection, the four organizations within the NSF-IOP sample that were
already actively engaged in the preliminary study were prioritized for recruitment in the
current project.
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Recruitment
The Executive Directors/CEOs (EDs) of the prioritized target organizations (those
participating in NSF-IOP) were initially contacted via email, as this is the typical mode of
communication in the preliminary study (see Appendix B, pg. 276, for the email text).
The introductory email was meant to get a sense of the organization’s level of interest in
participating in order to better inform the Institutional Review Board application. All of
the EDs quickly indicated their willingness to learn more about the study. Therefore,
when IRB approval was granted (exempt status), a second email was sent that provided a
study information sheet (see Appendix C, pg. 277) and requested a phone or in-person 30
minute conversation about the study’s purpose and the organization’s strategy formation
process.
I met with each of the EDs from the four prioritized organizations. They were
informed that their participation was voluntary and would not impact their involvement in
any other study. Additionally, they were assured that strict data protection procedures
would be adhered to and that their privacy would be honored at all times. After the
preliminary meeting, it was mutually decided that one organization would not be an
appropriate participant due to a recent merger and restructuring that would have created
confusion about the unit of observation over time and rendered the focused on matters
other than being a research subject. The other three were eager to participate and my
preliminary understanding of their strategy formation processes lent sufficient variation
to allow for recruitment to stop. The organizations’ processes differed in such a way that
they could be placed on a continuum of formalization. Therefore, organizations at the
extremes and midpoint of formalization were chosen and no further recruitment was
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done. The selection process yielded three cases for in-depth study. Upon further data
gathering about the sector, it was found out that of the other three organizations originally
identified in the subsample, two were in the process of possibly closing and the other had
declined participation in previous university-related studies. This information further
solidified the choice to focus on only the three appropriate prioritized organizations.
The participating organizations’ EDs signed a Letter of Agreement (see Appendix
D, pg. 278) outlining their understanding of their rights as a study participant and
responsibilities to not punish key informants in any way based on their answers and/or
decision to participate. As an incentive, participating organizations were promised their
organization’s detailed case report. They were also guaranteed a brief report on the
project’s findings that provided insight into their own practices and trends in the strategic
management within their sector and region.
In order to round out my impressions of the organization and find out about
implementation of specific strategies, I recruited four additional key informants, in
addition to the EDs, from each organization. To recruit these additional informants, I
asked for the EDs’ assistance in identifying potential participants based on the
information I was seeking; they were typically the organization’s Board Chairs and longtenured high-ranking staff members. I then sent each identified person an email that
included the study information sheet and requested an interview. The solicited
individuals were asked to contact the researcher directly in order to ensure their privacy
and they were given the opportunity to choose the location of their interview. All of the
twelve board and staff member informants recruited consented to be interviewed. I
offered to not reveal their choice to participate to the ED, but all of the participants
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clearly had self-identified and spoken to the ED about the study. I did ensure that I
would not directly attribute any quotes to them in my reports. Despite the lack of
complete anonymity, the informants spoke quite candidly.

Data Collection Procedures and Results
The same types of data were collected concurrently at each of the participating
organizations using multiple methods. Table 5 outlines the data collection methods and
data sources that were used to explore the constructs relevant to achieving the study’s
aims. The mixed method approach to data collection provided me with very rich
information with which to construct vivid case descriptions and gain insight into the
organizations’ strategic management processes. The triangulation of data from various
sources, assuming it converges, also increases the finding’s validity.
Data collection across the participating organizations took place over a six-month
period (January through June, 2010). This timeframe provided me with ample time to
develop an in-depth understanding of the cases without placing an undue burden on the
organizations that intensive data collection over a shorter period might. In addition, it
allowed for intervals of data collection to be interspersed with periods of data analysis so
that gaps in the data could be identified and rectified and emerging hypotheses could be
explored with the organizations over the course of the study. The data collection period
did not, necessarily, correspond to the strategy formation cycles within the organization.
This was not an issue, however, given that most of the data collected was retrospective,
covering 10-year time horizon.

66

Table 5. Data Collection: Content, Measures and Sources
Construct

Strategic
Position

Strategy
Formation
Process

Internal
Organizational
Context

Intended
Strategies

Strategy
Implementation
Process

Aim(s)

1

2, 3, 5

2, 4

3

4, 5

Definition
How an organization is
differentiated from its
competition. How well
an organization is
poised to take advantage
environmental
conditions.
What an organization
does to arrive at an
intended strategy.
How organizational
members interact with
one another as well as
more static
characteristics such as
organizational size,
physical plant, technical
expertise, etc.
A plan of action
intended to bring an
organization closer to its
goals.
Actions made to bring
an organization closer to
its goals. Could differ
from the original
plan/intended strategy.

Method
Key Informant Interviews
(see Appendix E)

Data Source

Type of Data

ED, Board & Staff Members

Qualitative

GuideStar database

Quantitative

ED, Board & Staff Members

Qualitative

Organizational Documents

Qualitative/
Quantitative

Observation

Observations at Organization
& Meetings

Qualitative

Key Informant Interviews

ED, Board & Staff Members

Qualitative

Observation

Observations at Organization
& Meetings

Qualitative

ED, Board & Staff Members

Qualitative

Organizational Documents

Qualitative/
Quantitative

ED, Board & Staff Members

Qualitative

Organizational Documents

Qualitative/
Quantitative

Selected items from IRS
Form 990s (past 10 years)
Key Informant Interviews
(see Appendix E)
Document Review (past 10
years)

Key Informant Interviews
(see Appendix E)
Document Review (past 10
years)
Key Informant Interviews
(see Appendix E)
Document Review
(related to chosen
strategies)
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Construct

Aim(s)

Definition

Method
Observation

Organizational
Performance

5

External validation for
internal operations. See
Table 7 for specific
financial measures.
Major indicators
attended to by the
organization.

Data Source
Observations at Organization
& Meetings

Type of Data
Qualitative

Selected items from IRS
Form 990s (past 10 years)

GuideStar database

Quantitative

Key Informant Interviews
(see Appendix E)

ED, Board & Staff Members

Qualitative
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Key Informant Interviews
The majority of the study’s findings stem from the 24 one-and-a-half hour-long
key-informant interviews conducted over the course of six months at the three
participating organizations (O1, O2, & O3; see Table 6, pg. 75). I interviewed each ED
four separate times, and interviewed the four key informants from each of the three
organizations once. The organizations’ EDs served as the main informants and liaisons
for this study, as they have the unique vantage point of someone who is involved in both
strategy formation and implementation, and therefore were the most valuable source of
information. Furthermore, given their position of power within their organization, their
support was essential for the success of the project.
Each ED interview followed a semi-structured interview guide (see Appendix E,
pg. 279) that became more organization-specific over the course of the study as
concurrent data analysis yielded important new areas to explore. The first ED interview
served to orient me to the organization and provide an overview of the sector’s
competitive landscape and the organization’s strategic positioning within it. I also
inquired into which meetings would be best to observe during the study period. The
second interview took place about a month later and focused on the organization’s
internal context and strategy formation processes and key intended strategies from the
past 10 years. The third ED interview followed two months later after the first wave of
Board and staff interviews. It explored the organization’s implementation processes for
the chosen intended strategies and perceptions of performance. It was at this meeting that
the EDs also identified a handful of staff members familiar with the implementation who
were contacted about being a key informant. The final interview gathered information
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about the organization’s capacity in the areas of development and performance
monitoring, asked any final questions and provided the ED with initial hypotheses and
next steps. The interviews were spaced out over several months in order to not overly
burden the EDs and to allow for additional interviews and analysis to take place in
between to inform questions for the next wave of interviews.
Interviews with Board and staff members were used to triangulate data gathered
from the ED, documents, and observations. The interview questions mirrored questions
asked to the ED during the concurrent waves of interviews, but were slightly tailored to
fit the circumstances of the person being interviewed. For example, staff members were
not asked about their leadership style, but rather the management style of the ED, and
Board members were asked to describe the workings of the Board of Directors. For the
most part, there were very few discrepancies between ED accounts and other
organizational members’ opinions. When they did appear in the data, resolution was
sought through additional interview questions and document review intended to gain
insight into the cause of the discrepancy and its potential impact on the study’s
conclusions.
All but one of the interviews took place at the organizations during business
hours; the other interview took place in the informant’s home office, at their request for
convenience. Interviews were digitally audio-recorded and then transcribed by either the
investigator or a reputable third-party company.. Before being interviewed participants
were reminded, via written informed consent (see Appendix F, pg. 291), that their
participation was completely voluntary. They were also informed about the audiorecording and transcribing procedures and asked to sign the informed consent form
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acknowledging their understanding of the above. Many participants were familiar with
these procedures since they were the same used in NSF-IOP. All key informants were
given a unique study identification number that connects to their agency and position.
Upon completion of the study, all recordings will be deleted and the transcriptions kept as
encrypted and password-protected electronic files.
Observations
Over the course of the six-month data collection period, I attended seven different
meetings related to strategy formation and implementation at each organization as
identified and invited by the EDs. Meetings included meetings of the Board of Directors,
Staff meetings, Executive Committee meetings, and strategic planning workshops. Of
course, the observations were at the discretion of the EDs and other meeting participants.
At these meetings, I noted the number and role of the participants and any content or
process information related to the relevant study constructs (see Table 5, pg. 67). I also
noted the physical surroundings and my impressions and reflections, especially with
respect to the internal organizational context and emerging hypotheses. Observations of
this type were a way for data provided by key informants to be triangulated and
augmented. Upon completion of the study, my notes will be kept as encrypted and
password-protected electronic files.
Document Review
Over 85 organizational documents were reviewed for the study. The types of
documents varied by case and availability, but mostly included strategic plans and related
documents, board meeting minutes, internal monitoring reports, annual reports, memos
and emails to the staff, etc. Documents produced in the regular course of management
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are an excellent source of highly specific information that can corroborate and augment
data from other sources (Yin, 1984). The sampling timeframe of the documents was
limited to the past 10 years, which provided enough perspective to detect trends in
strategy formation and implementation processes and determine how much the realized
strategies resemble the intended strategies. I worked with the EDs of the organizations
and their assistants, if present, to identify and secure relevant documents. Additional data
related to organizational and program-specific performance, such as number of clients
served and program occupancy rates, were also requested and provided when available.
To protect the confidentiality of the participating organizations, all photocopies of
documents and notes were kept in a locked file cabinet in a locked room that only the
researcher has access to. Upon completion of the study, all documents will be shredded.
IRS Form 990s
Nonprofit organizations with revenues greater than $25,000 are required to file a
Form 990 with the IRS annually. This form requires organizations to report their assets,
revenues broken out by funding type, as well as their expenses broken down by direct
program versus general and administrative costs. While IRS 990 returns are not audited,
they have been shown to correlate highly with audited financial statements for the items
of interest (Froelich, Knoepfle, & Pollak, 2000). Multiple years worth of forms are
publically-available via the GuideStar database, and have already been compiled though
2007 for NSF-IOP. As much so all of the available IRS 990 data (typically 1997-2009)
was collected. Due to its previous organizational structure and articles of incorporation,
one organization did not file a separate Form 990 until 2004. Therefore, audited financial
statements were collected for the years 1997-2003 from this case. The longitudinal
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nature of the data allowed for analysis of performance trends to be charted in relationship
to the organization’s strategy formation and implementation initiatives.
Data for the variables listed in Table 7 (below in Data Analysis, pg. 80) were
collected in order to allow for the calculation of ratios and measures commonly
considered in research on nonprofit organizations, including: fund-raising cost and
general program expense ratios (Froelich et al., 2000), ratios related to the domains of
fundraising efficiency, public support and fiscal performance (Ritchie & Kolodinsky,
2003) and several measures of financial vulnerability (Tuckman & Chang, 1991). Over
the course of data collection, however, the limitations of using some of these variables to
understand operations were uncovered. For instance, the organization’s Total Revenue is
often highly skewed by wild fluctuations in the stock market, unpredictable wills and
bequests and fluctuating accounting conventions. Therefore, any ratio using Total
Revenue as a denominator became suspect and was determined to be not a good
reflection of relative performance.
Armed with a better understanding of the numbers on the Form 990, I chose a
handful of variables that seemed to more accurately reflect operational realities and that
corresponded to figures the organizational leaders themselves paid attention to when
making strategic decisions. Some of these variables required additional financial
information, such as program-specific revenue and expenses, to be requested from the
organizations. These are also included in Table 7 (pg. 80). Since IRS Form 990 data is
publically available, necessary data protection precautions were minimal. However, in
the spreadsheet where the data was entered and analyzed, the organizations were only
identified with their study ID code.
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Summary of Collected Data
Table 6 provides a summary of the data collected. The vast majority of key
informants were white men who had been affiliated with their organizations for many
years. Of the 15 different key informants interviewed, five were female, and only one
was African-American. The three Executive Directors were white men who had been in
their positions from 12-16 years, all taking the helm in the mid-1990s. On average, key
informants had been at their organization for 14.13 years (Median = 10 years; Range = 237 years) and in their specific position for 7.3 years (Median = 5 years; Range = 0-20
years). This informant pool yielded a wealth of historical knowledge and experience
from which to draw, but relatively little gender or ethnic diversity. However, in my
observation, the lack of ethnic diversity was reflective of general personnel
demographics, as was the male domination of high-ranking staff positions.
Most of the informants had formal training in social work, psychology or
counseling, but several also had backgrounds in finance or business administration. O1
has the most business-related training, with its ED holding both an MSW and an MBA
and one of the senior staff members and board chair also holding MBAs. O2’s ED has a
background in Finance and one of their senior staff members has a Master’s degree in
Management and Leadership. O3’s ED earned an MSW and moved up through the
management ranks within the organization.
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Table 6: Final Data Collection Numbers
Data Type
Interview Data
Total # of Interviews
# Executive
Director Interviews
# Staff Members
Interviews
# Board Members
Interviewed
Observational Data
Total # Formal
Observations
Staff Meeting
Board Meeting
Strategic Planning
Workshop
Document Review Data
Total # of Documents
Reviews
# Formal Strategic
Plan Documents
Reviewed
Performance Data
Years of Form 990
Financial Data
Analyzed
Years of Other
Performance Data
Available

O1

O2

O3

Total

8

8

8

24

4

4

4

12

3

3

3

9

1

1

1

3

3

2

2

7

2
1

1
0

1
0

4
1

0

1

1

2

22

47+*

18

87+

10
(’93, ’99, ’00,
’03, ’04, ’05,
’06, ’07, ’08,
’09)

4
(’98, ’03, ’06,
’10)

4
(’97, ’00, ’03,
’07)

18

1997-2009

1997-2009

1998-2009

Average =
13 years

2004-2009

2000-2009

2002-2009

Average =
8 years

*Mostly quarterly board reports; additional press releases from 1998-2010 were also
reviewed but not counted because O2 was the only organization to provide them, they did
not yield important findings and were quite numerous.
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Data Analysis
Multiple data analysis approaches were used to develop in-depth case studies of
the participating organizations’ strategy formation and implementation processes situated
within their unique internal organizational context. Qualitative data collected from the
key informant interviews was analyzed using grounded theory methods. This information
was supplemented and triangulated by data collected from document reviews,
performance data, observations, and IRS 990s. Cross-case analysis assisted in
developing a richer understanding of the causal mechanisms governing strategy
formation and implementation. Both the within-case and cross-case analyses assisted in
supporting the generation of hypotheses and future measurement domains.
Key Informant Interview Data
Once transcribed, all transcripts were audited for quality and then imported into
NVivo version 8 for analysis using grounded theory methods. Grounded theory was
chosen over other qualitative methods, such as traditional content analysis, because of its
suitability for situations in which there are large gaps in knowledge or ambiguity with
respect to concepts (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). It focuses on generating theory through a
close analysis of the text, rather than confirming existing theories. This does not mean
that the researcher can hope to approach the data in an entirely theory-less manner, but
rather that she must remain open and vigilant to the possibility of emergent concepts and
theories.
Some of the data was preliminarily coded and analyzed using many of the
methods outlined by Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) Basics of qualitative Research:
Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory. Specifically, the process
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began with open coding procedures to discover and develop concepts contained within
the interviews. After analyzing data from several key informants, I began to develop a
codebook by naming and describing the emerging topics and categories contained within
the transcripts. However, upon doing this it became clear that the concepts emerging
very closely mirrored those depicted in the initial conceptual model of the strategic
management process and could reasonably be arranged by Research Aim. Therefore, to
expedite the codebook development process and help organize later analysis and writing,
I moved to a more structured process, described by Miles and Huberman (1994), of
developing and then revising a “provisional list” of descriptive and pattern codes based
on my initial synthesis of extant literature. The utility and validity of this coding
structure was then tested on subsequent transcripts and modified as necessary—
collapsing and expanding codes where needed to move toward more discrete and useful
codes until a robust and exhaustive codebook was arrived at (See Appendix G, pg. 293,
for codebook). Given the overlap in interview questions across various key informants,
only one codebook was necessary. Having a common codebook across organizations and
informants also helped to ensure that cases were described with respect to similar topics
and categories, which assisted in the cross-case analysis.
Document Review Data
Organizational documents were analyzed for their content, form and change over
time. These documents served as a source of corroboration to the accounts given by the
key informants about the organizations’ practices. Each document was thoroughly
reviewed, catalogued and analyzed based on relevant domains grounded in the literature
and that emerge from the key informant interviews. For instance, documents generated
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during the strategy formation process provided insight into the organization’s level of
formalization (written plans, delineated and phased processes, emphasis on quantitative
and/or systematic data collection, etc.) and also revealed what tactics and tools were used
during the process as well as show evidence of stakeholder participation. Documents
generated during the strategy formation process also often contained written confirmation
of the organization’s intended strategies. Therefore, they were analyzed for their level of
formalization (for instance, the presence of a robust monitoring database or reporting
system), manner and frequency of communication, frequency of strategic change, etc.
While many of these measures are subjective, much like the interview data analysis,
every effort was made to hold the descriptions constant across cases and describe the
meaning of the categories and degrees of variation.
Observational Data
Data from my observational notes were analyzed in much the same way as key
informant data using grounded theory. However, the notes were entered into NVivo as
memos where their meaning and significance were analyzed in connection to the other
data sources. In this way the observational data served as both an additional source of
triangulation as well as a source of contextual information to help make the cases come
alive.
IRS Form 990 Data
Table 7 outlines the specific Form 990 variables and other financial variables that
were collected and calculated as well as the final decision about whether or not they were
to be used. Graphs depicting each of the relevant financial variables and ratios over the
past 10 years for each organization were created in order to analyze, describe and
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compare trends in their performance. All financial information is presented in 2009
constant dollars to account for the impact of inflation. Raw financial data were entered
and then adjusted using the consumer price index (all urban consumers, U.S. city
average; CPI-U) provided by the United States Department of Labor
(ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt).
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Table 7: Financial Performance Data Collection and Analysis
Measurement
Source

(Froelich et
al., 2000)

Data
Source

Performance Domain

Form
990

Fund-raising cost ratio

Form
990

Program Expense Ratio

Form
990
Fundraising Efficiency
Form
990
(Ritchie &
Kolodinsky,
2003)

Form
990

Total revenue (line 12) ÷
total expenses (line 17)
Fiscal Performance

Form
990

(Ritchie &
Kolodinsky,
2003) /
(Tuckman &
Chang, 1991)

Calculation
[Form 990 (before 2008)
line]
Fundraising expenses (line
15) ÷ total contributions
(line 1d or 1e depending on
year)
Total program expenses
(line 13) ÷ total revenue
(line 12)
Direct public support (line
1a) ÷ fundraising expenses
(line 44d)
Total revenue (line 12) ÷
fundraising expenses (line
44d)

Total contributions (line 1d
or 1e depending on year) ÷
total expenses (line 17)
Direct public support (line
1a) ÷ total assets (line 59b)

Form
990

Public Support

Form
990

Public Support /
Financial
Total contributions (line 1d
Vulnerability—
or 1e depending on year) ÷
Financial Concentration: total revenue (line 12)
contributions
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Status
Not
used
Not
used
Used
Not
used
Not
used
Not
used
Not
Used
Not
Used

Rationale
Similar to fundraising efficiency below,
but total contributions can be
disconnected from development since
includes government grants
Use of total revenue obscures
operations. Recovery rate a better
measure.
Direct public support if directly
connected to development efforts.
Good measure of efficiency.
Use of total revenue obscures
operations.
Use of total revenue obscures
operations. Not an empirically robust
measure.
Total contributions can be disconnected
from development. Not an empirically
robust measure.
Not an empirically robust measure.
May only be relevant to foundations.
Use of total revenue obscures
operations. Total contributions can be
disconnected from development.

Measurement
Source

Data
Source
Form
990

Form
990
(Tuckman &
Chang, 1991)

Form
990

Form
990
Form
990

Performance Domain
Financial
Vulnerability—Equity
Balance
Financial
Vulnerability—
Administrative Costs
Financial
Vulnerability—
Financial Concentration:
program revenue
Financial
Vulnerability—
Financial Concentration:
other
Financial
Vulnerability—
Operating Margin

Calculation
[Form 990 (before 2008)
line]
End-of-year liabilities (line
66b) – end-of-year assets
(line 59b) (negative assets
considered as positive
liabilities)
Management & General
expenses (line 14) / Total
expenses (line 17)

Status

Rationale

Used

Crude measure of relative net worth,
but best available. Relies on total
revenue, so used cautiously.

Used

Measure of efficiency that doesn't rely
on total revenue. Expenses are much
more connected to operations.

Program revenue (line 2) ÷
total revenue (line 12)

Not
used

Other revenue (lines 3, 4, 5,
6c, 7, 9c, 10c, 11) ÷ total
revenue (line 12)

Not
used

[Total revenue (line 12) –
expenditures (line 17)] ÷
total revenue (line 12)

Not
used

Use of total revenue obscures
operations.

Use of total revenue obscures
operations. Other measures of client
and revenue concentration by program
were more useful.

(Trussel,
2002)

Form
990

Financial
Vulnerability—Debt
ratio

End-of-year liabilities (line
66b)/end-of-year assets
(line 59b)

Used

Useful with days of cash on hand to
measure how well an organization
could weather a financial hardship.

Organizations
/ United Way

Form
990

Days of Cash on Hand

[Securities Investments
(line 54) / Total Expenses
(line 17)]*365

Used

Intuitive measure to gauge how well the
organization could weather a financial
hardship.
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Measurement
Source

Data
Source

Organizations

Orgs

Programmatic Recovery
Rate

Organizations

Orgs

Program Revenue
Concentration

Organizations

Orgs

Annual Reserve Fund
Withdrawal

Organizations

Form
990

Revenue Growth broken
out by source

Performance Domain

Calculation
[Form 990 (before 2008)
line]
Program-specific Direct
Expenses / Programspecific Direct Revenues
Program-specific Direct
Revenues / Total Program
Revenues
Estimated total amount
and/or percent of annual
budget
Program Service Revenue
and Government Grants
(line 1c or 1d + line 2)
Direct Public Support (line
1a or 1b)
Investments and Other
[Total Revenue (line 12) –
above items]
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Status
Used

Used

Used

Used

Rationale
Key ratio used in organizations’
strategic management. Measure of
efficiency and public support.
Key ratio used in organizations’
strategic management. Measure of
diversification and shield from risk.
Key variable used in organizations’
strategic management. Measure of
efficiency and resources.

Key variable used in organizations’
strategic management. Reveals source
of organizations’ total revenue growth.

The analysis of organizational and financial performance data was used to
independently triangulate the ED’s and Board members’ impressions of organizational
performance. The information was also combined with the understanding of strategy
formation and implementation gained from other data sources to identify trends and
correlations to help answer Aim 5 regarding how strategy implementation mediates the
relationship between strategy formation and organizational performance. Specifically,
two intended strategies from each organization were closely examined with respect to
their implementation and the timing of the initiative in order to temporally connect it with
any apparent changes in organizational performance. While this did not provide concrete
evidence of a causal effect, it did shed some light on the causal mechanism underlying
previous empirical findings suggesting that formal strategy formation processes result in
improved organizational performance, including in nonprofit organizations (W. F.
Crittenden & V. L. Crittenden, 2000; Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst, 2006; Stone et al.,
1999)
Individual Case Study Reports Fed Into Cross-Case Analysis
Once all of the data was coded and analyzed, I began to explore how it addressed
the study’s aims, first focusing exclusively on one case at a time to create three detailed
case study reports that synthesized findings within each organization (see Chapter Four).
By systematically interpreting the data using the emergent concepts and causal logic
expressed by the key informants and contrasting it with the conceptual model, I was able
to develop preliminary theories regarding how the various constructs in the conceptual
model of strategic management interact. Transcripts and other data sources were also
revisited to test the validity of these preliminary theories. This iterative process ensured a
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thorough analysis of the interview texts and a continual grounding of ideas in the data.
The individual case study reports were then checked for accuracy by the EDs (a form of
member checking). The vetted case reports then served as the foundational data for the
cross-case analysis.
Cross-case analysis allowed for wider conclusions to be drawn about the patterns
found in each individual case and for an examination of how strategic management
performs in different organizational contexts (Stake, 2006). As Stake comments in his
book, Multiple Case Study Analysis, “comprehension of the phenomenon of inclusion
requires knowing not only how it works and does not work in general, independent of
local conditions, but how it works under various local conditions” (2006, p. 40). By
comparing similarities and differences between the cases, an understanding of the
aggregate emerged. The member-checked organizational case reports served as the
starting point for this analysis. Findings for each major area covered in the case reports
were distilled to their key phrases and entered into an exploratory partially-ordered metamatrix that was further partitioned, clustered and reduced until concise and useful
comparisons could be made across cases on the domains pertinent to the study’s aims
(Miles & Huberman, 1994). Additional theoretically-grounded domains and descriptions
were added to help tie the findings to the literature and advance the analysis.
Throughout the analysis process memos were written to describe coding
development, preliminary theories and hypotheses, as well as research procedures
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998). These memos helped keep the analysis grounded in the data
and serve as a record of the process, which was helpful during the final analysis and
writing stage of the project.
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Additional Organization—An Extreme Case
In addition to the three primary participating organizations, a fourth organization
(called O5 because the fourth organization initially recruited but deemed inappropriate
was coded as O4), was also examined, but was not a full participant. Because O5’s
articles of incorporation are outside of the geographic sampling frame used in the study,
they were not initially approached to participate. However, during the process of data
collection with the study organizations, O5 emerged as an “extreme case”. Exploring an
extreme case can help illuminate findings from more typical cases by challenging what
seems normative and demonstrating what may be possible (Miles & Huberman, 1994).
In speaking with the fully-participating organizations it became clear that O5 is seen as
the leader in Missouri’s children’s mental health services sector, and analysis of their
Form 990 financial data revealed that their total revenues had grown nearly twice as fast
as the participating organizations’ over the study timeframe. Given the aims of the study,
it was deemed highly beneficial to gain insight into whether and how O5’s strategic
management processes are connected to their above-average performance within roughly
the same external environment as the participating organizations; although, because they
fell outside of the original sampling frame, O5 was asked to serve as an exemplar rather
than a fully-participating organization.
O5’s President was approached late in the data collection phase; he agreed to be
interviewed twice and to provide two (2000 and 2007) strategic plan documents to be
reviewed. Publically available Form 990 financial data were also analyzed; no board or
staff interviews or observations were conducted and no additional data were collected.
Because O5 was not a full study participant, a full case report will not be presented
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(although an abbreviated one was written and vetted by the ED for analytical purposes).
Instead, insights gleaned from data collected on the organization will be compared to the
results of the cross-case analysis to add further context to or corroboration with the
findings.

Potential Limitations, Strengths and Contribution
There are several recognized limitations of this study, primarily related to the
nature of case studies and the choice of organizations. First, the inherently subjective
nature of case studies was limited by my use of multiple data sources and member
checking as means of triangulation throughout data collection and analysis as well as
employing grounded theory methods that emphasized testing hypotheses against data in
an iterative fashion.
Second, the sample was confined to one subsector of nonprofit mental health
services organizations within one geographic region, thus potentially limiting the
generalizability of the findings. However, Yin comments that the case study
“investigator’s goal is to expand and generalize theories (analytic generalization) and not
to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization)” (Yin, 1984, p. 21). In so far as the
current study generates new plausible theories or deepens our understanding of strategic
management, it will have been successful. In addition, the limited sampling frame also
provided a unique and rare opportunity to hold environmental context relatively constant,
allowing for a much more in-depth understanding of the interplay between internal
organizational context and strategic management and its impact on performance.
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A third limitation, discovered only during the process of data collection, is the
fact that poorly-performing organizations were not sampled. Given the amount of
upheaval in the children’s mental health sector over the past decade (see following
chapter for more detail), many organizations had gone out of business and a few that
were not prioritized for recruitment because they were not participating in NSF-IOP were
posting significantly poor performance that threatened their viability. The current study’s
sample included those organizations that met the subsector and geographic criteria and
that were performing well enough to feel capable of engaging in multiple research
studies. This may have unduly limited the study’s ability to understand the connection
between strategic management and performance by reducing variation within
performance. The addition of O5 tries to address this; identified by participants as the
market leader, O5’s inclusion, albeit less than full, guaranteed additional variance with
respect to performance that provided an intriguing alternative performance trajectory and
ultimately helped to support the study’s findings.
Despite the drawbacks cited above, as designed, the current study had numerous
strengths that outweighed its potential limitations and resulted in a worthwhile
contribution to the empirical and practice knowledge base. Its reliance on multiple
sources of data increased the findings’ validity and reliability. Also, regardless of the
bias introduced by the sampling frame, the participants’ familiarity with NSF-IOP and
me made recruiting the desired target organizations feasible. The study’s unique mostsimilar cases sampling strategy also enabled the case studies to explore causal
mechanisms, pushing beyond simple descriptions of strategic management practices. Its
focus on causal mechanisms, especially with respect to strategy implementation, has been
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called for by many reviews of the literature (Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst, 2006; Stone
et al., 1999). And it is this focus that hopefully made this unique study capable of
significantly contributing to the literature. Careful and thoughtful within and cross-case
analyses yielded evidence that moves closer to answering some of the most pressing
questions in strategic management today: Does strategy formation process really matter?
Is the “right strategy” or how it’s implemented more important? Are there strategy
implementation best practices? Do external or internal environmental factors shape
strategic management and performance more?

88

CHAPTER FOUR: FACING THE SAME VOLATILE ENVIRONMENT, DIFFERENT
PROCESSES YIELDED SIMILAR ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGIES
This chapter provides the individual case reports for the three fully-participating
organizations. However, in order to put the case reports into context it is necessary to
first describe the external environmental the organizations have been responding to and
helping to create during the past decade. While not a formal aim of the current study, I
had to develop a nuanced understanding of the children’s mental health services sector in
the Eastern part of Missouri in order to fully appreciate the strategic opportunities and
constraints presented to the organizations. Some of this information was available from
historical newspaper sources and other written material, but key informant interviews and
organizational documents served as my primary resource and were essential to
determining how discrete events related to one another and which trends were
particularly important to the sector’s development.
General Organizational Characteristics and External Environment
In keeping with the study’s design, the three participating organizations are
similar in client needs, service offerings, funding requirements, and historical norms and
experiences (i.e., most-similar external environmental contexts). These similarities
allowed for clearer analysis of how internal organizational context impacts strategic
management and how strategic management impacts organizational performance. The
only major structural difference between the organizations is their geographic spread of
programs. One has operations in over a dozen sites around the state of Missouri, whereas
another has operations only in the City and County of Saint Louis, albeit in numerous
physical sites; the third organization’s primary operations are in Saint Louis, but they
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have also had a small program in Kansas City for over 20 years. This difference in
geography has led to unique considerations regarding not only control and
communication processes, but also growth opportunities; however, their differential
geographic presence is also partially a result of divergent realized growth strategies. The
influence of geography will be attended to in more detail in the case reports and crosscase analysis.
Shared Foundation and Massive Transformation
The organizations have remarkably long tenures in the child welfare sector, each
one beginning life as a religiously-affiliated orphanage nearly a century ago, if not farther
back. For more than three-fourths of their existence the organizations were selfcontained home-like institutions for truly orphaned children run by charitable religious
congregations. But over time, paradigmatic shifts in society and the child welfare and
mental health systems have required the orphanages of yore to close or undergo a
dramatic metamorphosis into comprehensive children’s mental health services
organizations providing sophisticated acute residential and after-care services to severely
emotionally-disturbed children involved with the State child welfare and foster care
systems. Most of this change has happened within the past 30 years and has necessitated
wholesale organizational restructuring and fundamental shifts in treatment approaches. It
has also required the building of new capabilities, development of numerous communitybased programs and knitting together of complicated collaborative relationships. In the
midst of this upheaval, the participating organizations have somehow managed to grow
their mission impact, even while some of their competitors had to cut back or close.

90

According to one informant, “about half of the residential beds in St. Louis area [have]
closed since 2005”.
Societal and System Shifts
The sector’s reengineering was in response to massive shifts in society and
government that changed the profile of the organizations’ clients and the economics of
their business. As advances in health, welfare and social policy made orphans less
prevalent by the late-1950’s the organizations began seeing more children from “broken
homes” with serious emotional or behavioral problems that required professional mental
health services. In the mid-1970 and early 1980’s, there was a push to “deinstitutionalize”
mentally-ill adults and children previously being cared for in restrictive hospital settings
and serve them in their homes and communities with the hopes of reintegrating them into
society. This movement, along with treatment restrictions made by new managed care
companies, further increased the severity of mental health issues being displayed by
children coming to the organizations’ facilities. It also placed pressure on the
organizations to develop a supportive presence in the community to facilitate safe and
more rapid discharges.
Privatization and collaboration. In the early-1990s a wave of privatization
began hitting the government sector, resulting in new service opportunities and funding
streams, but also novel contract terms and market dynamics for nonprofits providing
social services like those provided by the organizations. In 1997, the State of Missouri
bid out a contract to private nonprofits to provide “specialized case management”
services to the most severely disturbed children in the child welfare system. The first of
its kind, this contract required the organizations to take on the financial risk of the care of
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the child, but also provided much more flexible funding to treat the child as seen fit by
the care provider. To block threats of outside for-profit managed care companies
entering the state to bid on the contracts, a consortium of children’s mental health
organizations from across the State, including some of the study organizations, formed an
LLP, which I will call “Collaborative Group 1” (CG1), to bid on the contract and act as a
managed care entity that primarily purchased services from its owners. As one informant
put it, “let [CG1] hold the contract, no liability here and…financially they’ll be the
administrative and financial oversight, and yet the owners can make a few bucks. It was
win-win”.
This novel collaborative arrangement allowed for a cordoning off of risk and
responded to the State’s desire to interface with fewer organizations. It also gave the
participating organizations greater lobbying power in the State capitol of Jefferson City.
That lobbying power became essential as the organizations fought with the state over
reimbursement rates, which, in the initial contract, were inadequate, often less than 40%
the actually cost of care when overhead was also considered. To rectify this situation
several CG1 members, as part of a larger advocacy group, sued the State of Missouri to
recover the federally-mandated “reasonable cost of care” (294 F. 3d 1034;
http://openjurist.org/294/f3d/1034). While suing your largest customer is a risky pursuit,
a settlement was eventually reached, resulting in several small ($3-5/day) reimbursement
increases for future contracts and ushering in a new spirit of cooperation between the
State and service providers. Despite the victory, however, organizations still recover less
than 60% of the actual per diem cost of care for their residential treatment services,
services provided almost exclusively to children in the State’s custody. The deficit must

92

be made up each year by development efforts and small subsidies from other profitgenerating programs.
On the heels of a tragic death of a child in foster care in 2002, the State
overhauled and further privatized the child welfare system, including bidding out the case
management of over half of the foster care rolls (Goodwin, 2004). In addition to CG1,
other providers formed consortiums to bid on the contracts, which began in 2005. These
contracts carry more stringent performance and reporting requirements, but still provide
the coveted flexible funding streams and access to new segments of the child welfare
pipeline. The foster care case management contract and managed care consortiums are
also structured in such a way that the majority of organizations providing services have
been able to break even or make a small profit each year for these particular programs.
Client Needs and Services
The push for community-based services, sparked by the deinstitutionalization
movement, continued to intensify and impact child welfare policy. Child welfare
officials had historically erred on the side of safety by routinely placing children into
foster care, but by the late-1990s they were erring on the side of family preservation,
made possible by newly-developed community-based services. Despite population
growth, in 2009, Missouri placed 25.9% fewer children into alternative care than in 2000
(14,257 vs. 17,256) and they moved 1.2% more children out of care (Missouri
Department of Social Services, 2002, 2005, 2009). Some of the key informants felt that
this, indeed, did reflect better community-based services and tools that facilitate
permanency, but others felt a more sinister impact of tightening budgets was to blame for
reductions in census.
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Increased acuity and severity. Whatever the reason, the reduction in the foster
care census (decreased inflow) and the increase in effective community services
(increased outflow) has resulted in what one informant labeled a “sedimentation effect”
in which “the kids that are left to come to [the organizations] are those at the farthest end
of the continuum in terms of acuity, in terms of extreme nature of their behavior, in terms
of their needs”. Another informant used a train analogy in which they only had access to
“the most incorrigible kids” who had fallen off the caboose and therefore the
organizations “rapidly turning into trauma units”. In 1999, his organization served 67
“high-risk, emotionally-disturbed or violent” children; in 2005, that number had climbed
to 217, and it continues to grow. While one could debate whether or not kids are actually
being served better or are being left in dysfunctional homes longer to the point of crisis,
the fact remains that the organizations have had to restructure their programs to cope with
the new dynamics of the system and they are trying to figure out how to meet the needs
of the “highest-end” clients.
Expansion of services to address clients’ needs. To address the needs of
children and families at both ends of the pipeline, the organizations have both increased
resources in their most intensive residential treatment programs (Level 4: secure intensive
program; and Level 3: step-down stabilization program), closing less-restrictive levels of
care, and opened programs that provide more community-based prevention and after-care
services. These community programs include foster care case management services,
after-care and family reunification and parent training programs, and, to varying degrees,
services to older youths aging out of the foster care system (which happens when youths
are between 18 and 21) who need assistance to become independent. Additionally, two
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of the organizations being studied, also run separate special education schools that
educate children residing in their treatment facilities as well as students from surrounding
school districts that cannot be mainstreamed due to severe emotional or behavioral
difficulties. Two organizations have separate counseling centers where they provide
interpersonal therapy to not only children, but also their caregivers and members of the
community. One also runs a day care and Head Start program, which they feel is
essential to the community and offers a first-line of prevention against dysfunction.
Despite the expansion into community-based services, the organizations still
mainly come into contact with only the most severely dysfunctional children and families
and have very little control over the flow of clients through their pipeline. The
informants expressed excitement about the entry into foster care case management in
2005 because it allowed them access to kids, presumably, before they were so seriously
damaged that they required residential treatment. Without fail, all of the informants
expressed a keen desire to create a world in which residential treatment was no longer
needed and children were cared for appropriately in their homes, though all of the
informants also acknowledged how unlikely this future was.
Increased stakeholder demands and technical requirements. All of the
stakeholders, from State agencies and private funders to clients, parents and community
members, “want high-quality, comprehensive, one-stop shopping and they want 24-hour
access and support”. In addition to ensuring quality across a widening variety of distinct
programs, there are demands from payers for more evidence-supported treatments, which
can lead to a quagmire of options stemming from the lack of agreed upon best practices
and paltry funds to implement. All of the organizations are investigating and
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experimenting with how to establish “empirically-supported” treatments in their
programs. Two major paradigmatic shifts have already radically altered how the
organizations approach treatment. Both the “strengths-based philosophy” and “wraparound model” helped move programs that used to be rigidly structured, almost
militaristic, to becoming more child-centered, positive and individualized. The
informants described programs that now adapt to the child, instead of the other way
around, a flexibility partly facilitated by less restricted funding streams provided by the
privatized contracts. These new approaches have led to better outcomes, but have also
required a complete rethinking of what treatment could and should look like and the
development of skills and processes to allow for this degree of tailoring.
Rapid treatment is also expected; children used to stay in residential facilities for
several years; now the average length of stay is four to six months. This has been made
possible by more effective treatment and the network of community supports that can
allow a child to be safely returned to their community with a higher level of need than
before. More and more children also require specialized medical and psychiatric
services, especially ones capable of handling dually-diagnosed children with either
intellectual disabilities and/or substance abuse issues in addition to more typical
emotional disturbances.
Market Dynamics
The children’s mental health services sector in Saint Louis is a classic example of
a mature to declining industry, especially with respect to their core residential treatment
services (Harrigan & Porter, 1983; Grant, 2007). Though the market has consolidated in
the past decade, with two or three organizations simply going out of business and a
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handful of others merging or being acquired, there is still excess capacity in residential
beds. One Executive Director commented, “there are 3,500 residential beds in Missouri,
1,500 are filled. We are a commodity with excess capacity…the marketplace is speaking
and it’s going to be survival of the fittest, the smartest, the most well-healed financially,
or the combination of all those”. As organizations diversify into community-based
services they still have to figure out how to deal with the high fixed-costs and low
recovery rate of residential services. Most feel it essential to continue providing these
“legacy services” in order to fulfill the mission and meet the need, but still lament the
“monster you’ve got to feed”. Additionally, “the monster” still accounts for a large piece
of the organizations’ revenues (40-55%) and represent a very important access point to
potential clients.
While their revenues have grown over the past decade, all of the organizations run
annual operating deficits that have to be made up by donations and reserve fund
withdrawals. This is typical of nonprofit social service organizations, but using Porter’s
Five Forces of competition framework to analyze the organizations’ mature oligopolistic
industry (Porter, 2008) it becomes clearer why they have struggled with profitability.
While there is virtually no horizontal threat of new entrants and substitutes, there are
immense vertical pressures from suppliers (personnel) and buyers (government) that
squeeze the organizations’ potential to achieve a positive margin. In addition, there is
intense competition between like organizations, but the power of these competitive forces
is complicated and possibly diluted by the maintenance of complex network of interorganizational collaborations.
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The personnel problem. Finding and keeping high-quality personnel, especially
in the direct-service ranks, is an enormous struggle for all the organizations. They have
annual turnover rates of 30-60% and in some direct-care positions as high as 90% (issues
of turnover as it relates to performance will be dealt with in more detail in the cross-case
analysis). Organizations are often stuck between a rock and a hard spot. Personnel costs
can account for almost two-thirds of their annual expense, meaning small improvements
in compensation can have a large negative impact on the bottom line. Therefore,
organizations struggle to maintain competitive wages while they also have to absorb large
annual increases in benefits costs and worker compensation claims (one of the side
effects of dealing with more aggressive and dangerous youth). The recent economic
downturn has actually been good for the organizations as alternative employment has
dried up in many areas, but when the economy was better the organizations were
competing for employees with places like McDonalds and the riverboat casinos.
The government’s and other funders’ power. Church donations, once the
organizations’ mainstay, have been dwindling for decades and all of the affiliated
denominations have made formal breaks from the organizations to shield themselves
from liability. Governmental agencies are now the organizations’ primary customer; over
95% of their program service revenues come through the State and local governments in
one way or another. Given the structure of the privatized contracts, the organizations
have routine contact with the government and most informants feel there is a reasonable
amount of cooperation and reciprocal activity. Despite these feelings of good will, the
sheer size of the government and the importance of their contracts give them immense
bargaining power and allow them to exert enormous downward pressures on price.
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The organizations offer very little differentiation among their services, mainly
because they all have to comply with the same strict contract and accreditation standards.
Government contracts are often so specific in terms of approved services that they
seemingly leave very little room for creative interpretation (although this has been slowly
changing), and many contracts are dependent upon the organization being accredited. All
of the organizations being studied hold accreditation from at least one national
accrediting body, such as the Council on Accreditation (COA) or the Joint Commission,
which certifies that the organizations are in compliance with a variety of nationallyrecognized treatment and management standards. Accreditation is a sign of quality and
an essential part of maintaining an organization’s reputation, a key intangible resource,
but it is also exerts coercive pressures on the sector that can result in isomorphism and
less individual bargaining power.
In addition to the commoditization of their services and the fact that the
organizations serve an already marginalized population with little political impact leads
to even less power. As one informant put it, “Kids don’t matter! I mean, they matter, but
when it comes to bucks, highways and old people are going to get the money because
they vote”. Most informants lamented these vertical pressures and their lack of control
over the key dynamics in their main residential treatment business. For example:
Where else can you be in business, sign contracts for serving kids for 50% of
what it’s going to cost you to serve [them] and not even control the intake of those
kids?...[Governmental entities] set the price, when they’re going to send kids, and
when they’re going to throw them out.
Realizing the dismal economic realities of residential treatment, all of the organizations
began primarily focusing on expansion of community-based services. While most of
those services are also funded primarily by State and local governmental entities, they
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offer much more attractive fixed cost structures since they typically do not necessitate
large physical plants and the requisite maintenance staff.
Some of these newer services are also supported by private foundation and local
community health boards. Once relatively easy funding to get, these entities are also
flexing their power, shedding “old time philanthropy” practices in which charitable
notions of trust and do-gooding drove donations and moving toward a more strategic
“social-investment philosophy” that demands demonstrated outcomes and accountability
from organizations. These demands and the performance-based contracts from
government agencies have required organizations to become savvier about how they
collect, analyze and report data, capabilities often not funded as part of the same grants
that require them, thus resulting in further erosion of profits. In addition to the challenge
of finding resources to support data management, the organizations are up against a lack
of agreed upon outcomes and an inability to track clients past their discharge due to
federal privacy regulations. It is very difficult to prove that their treatments work or are
better than their competitors, again reducing their competitive differentiation and
bargaining power around price. The only reward for perceived exceptional performance
is the awarding of additional guaranteed client referrals, or “slots”, but these slots come at
the same cost conditions that are very hard to overcome.
Competition and Collaboration. In the absence of price competition in
Missouri’s children’s mental health services market, organizations compete somewhat on
their ability to control their costs, but almost exclusively on reputation. To keep their
reputation in tact they all strive to provide high-quality services, which they do, as
attested by the fact that they are still in business and almost always at very high (85-95%)
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capacity. They also strive to be a part of various advocacy groups and maintain wellrespected board members with ties to the corporate and government worlds and reflective
of the communities they serve.
The high degree of collaboration within the sector may make differentiating based
on even reputation challenging since the organizations often join forces and make joint
decision and actions. At times they are acting on behalf of their individual organizations,
and at other times they are acting on behalf of the sector as a whole. This can muddle
their efforts to “brand” their organization and leads to difficult conflicts of interest. For
instance, membership in CG1 and any consortium requires Executive Directors to wear
two hats. In order to keep CG1 financially healthy, they recently voted as CG1 board
members/owners to cut reimbursement rates and limit authorization of certain services,
but this directly negatively impacted their organizations who are subcontractors to CG1
and are the one who will have to cope with the new austerity measures. One Executive
Director said he felt that CG1 “manages much tighter than the public sector used to”, but
he felt that that “healthy tension” ultimately benefitted the system as a whole.
It is this tension between doing what’s good for the system and doing what’s good
for the individual agencies that makes competition and collaboration so complicated
within this sector. Fundamentally the organizations are driven by their mission to serve
kids and families, and when the system is part of the problem they are driven by that
mission to intervene, which often requires collaborating with their competitors. In the
case of Missouri’s children’s mental health services organizations, this collaboration has
undoubtedly resulted in better services for clients, but it also created extremely blurred
organizational allegiances and an implicit understanding amongst most of the groups’
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members that certain areas won’t be encroached upon. While this ensures individual
organizational survival, it may stifle competition that could drive the sector even further
toward efficiency and innovation.
Reclaiming Power and Looking Forward
In an environment that, for some, was too overwhelming to endure, the
participating organizations leveraged what power they did have to change the dynamics
of their industry in order to survive. Acknowledging the limits of their power, they also
expanded into more favorable arenas. Privatization and collaborative alliances created
more flexible funding streams, more power to determine client treatment, and a more
unified, influential lobbying block. It also opened access to more referral sources for
both their “legacy” and newer community-based services and fostered reciprocity
between once siloed programs. In another dynamic-shifting effort, the organizations
have worked together to create entirely new funding streams, the latest of which was the
2008 passage of a 0.25% sales tax in Saint Louis County to fund children’s mental health
services (http://www.keepingkidsfirst.org/). Other similar initiatives have been
successful around the state and create nearly guaranteed funding for additional services.
In August 2010, $35 million was awarded to nonprofit social service organizations to
fund new and existing programs. All three participating organizations successfully
applied for multiple grants, totaling over $5M, a fantastic accomplishment in such lean
economic times.
Despite the successes of the past two decades, the market is still volatile and the
organizations have limited options. Their rapid expansion into community-based
services has provided a boon of new funding and client streams, but without an expansion
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of mission, there are not many services to be further developed that would garner
reasonable margins. All of the organizations have or are considering expansion into
services for other segments of the population, such as the elderly or people with
developmental disabilities, but this would require a fairly large shift from current
organizational identities that may be blocked by their boards. The organizations seem to
feel confined to operating within Missouri. Most have dabbled in operations in Kansas,
but the differences in State and local legislation, politics and fundraising dynamics made
the prospect too challenging to justify a continued presence.
While growth for growth’s sake is not the ED’s driving force, continued
expansion and evolution is necessary to keep up with market forces and further realized
economies of scale and scope. If the organizations do not want to greatly expand their
mission or geographic footprint, they may need to consolidate. They could combine
forces horizontally with like agencies or could acquire or develop “adjacent” services,
such as more prevention services. There are mixed emotions among the organizations’
leadership about the need for growth (a topic that will be revisited in the case reports).
However, in order to survive another 150 years in a market where they have little
influence on price, the organizations will need to either further control costs (a difficult
proposition) or differentiate their services by moving into and defending a particular
niche or figuring out how to demonstrate remarkably better outcomes. Whatever they
choose to do, the organizations will continue having to become more “business-like” and
cope with multiple stakeholder demands and challenging cost structures. Only time will
tell what they will do.
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To date, facing the same set of environmental stimuli, the three participating
organizations have pursued remarkably similar global strategies of maintaining
residential treatment beds, but often shifting them to more acute levels of care, and
increasing their foothold in community-based services. This has allowed the
organizations to survive the maelstrom of shifting market forces while many others have
folded. Determining how they individually arrived at and implemented these strategies
and how those actions impacted their performance is the aim of the current study and the
topic of the following organizational case reports and cross-case analysis.

A Note About the Individual Case Reports
As explained in Chapter Three, writing the individual case study reports was a
key analytical step that provided comparable data for cross-case analysis. Each case
report follows the same structure, mirroring the Study’s aims. While all the Aims were
addressed for each case study report, only the rich descriptions of positioning and
processes from Aims 1, 2 and 4 are presented below. This decision was made partly to
save space, but mainly because Aims 3 and 5 require an exploration of causal
mechanisms—how one construct, consisting of many variables, affects another—a task
best achieved via the cross-case analysis, making the individual case report information
redundant and insufficient to draw meaningful conclusions.

Organization #1
O1’s main campus sits tucked away on a leafy hillside in suburban Saint Louis;
running alongside is a railroad track that harks back to a time when orphans used to arrive
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at “Children’s Homes” by train to begin a new life under the auspices of the church.
Long since a sophisticated treatment facility, O1’s administrative offices overlook the
buildings of its main residential programs and school. The organization has three other
program sites in Saint Louis City and County that house their emergency shelter,
transitional living and foster care case management programs. They also oversee
independent living clients in their own apartments scattered around the city.
Internal Organizational Context
All of O1’s informants described the organization as being “strengths-based” and
focused on continuous improvement and accountability. Repeatedly, informants
commented that there is “a tenacious and voracious willingness to look at what’s gone
wrong and how to improve it and not in an accusatory way”. The Executive Director
(ED) reiterated that they “really try hard not to just lapse into organizational inertia…Just
because we’ve done something for 30 years doesn’t mean that it has squatter’s rights if
there’s another way…[to] achieve the mission better. So that whole continuous
improvement piece is embedded in our culture”.
The organization has clear chains of command and levels of hierarchy, but
informants insist that it’s not overly formal or bureaucratic. Throughout all of the layers
of the organization, there are clear job descriptions within which people have the
authority and responsibility to do what is necessary to meet their objectives. With this
autonomy, comes a high degree of accountability. The ED said, “if somebody commits
to something, it better be done and needs to be done correctly and immediately and if
somebody doesn’t there’s going to be immediate feedback about what went wrong and
how to improve that and how to move the process along”. The ED later recounted a
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story of how he had recently held a grievance hearing with a front-line staff member who
had not followed a safety protocol. The ED had to take disciplinary action, but also
hoped that he had turned the meeting into a teaching moment by talking with the
employee and not making it “about gotcha”.
Feedback is highly prized at O1. Organizational members frequently seek out
information about perceived performance and areas for improvement from external
sources, be it from informal conversations or formal market surveys. Informants also
claimed that they have “a lot of mechanisms where [they] get input, and so the input
trickles up so that the senior managers can make a sound decision”. Many of these
decisions are discussed in weekly “Senior Leadership” meetings between the ED,
Associate ED, Chief Financial Officer and Chief Development Officer. There are also
monthly “Leadership Cabinet” meetings that bring together the “next layer of leaders”. I
had the opportunity to observe both types of meetings, and they had different content and
atmospheres. The Leadership Cabinet meeting had a formal agenda and centered on
communication and coordination, with each member reporting out to the group the status
of their program or various initiatives. The Senior Leadership meeting was informal,
collegial and centered on frank discussion and problem solving—the ED sought advice
from the group about pursuing a potential partnership, a Director shared feedback and
concerns about demands from an accrediting body and funders, another shared his
preparations for an upcoming panel on which he would be sitting and hopes for some
good publicity. The difference in tone and content between the two levels of meetings
lends further evidence of O1’s hierarchical, yet collegial environment.
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O1’s current culture is largely the doing of the ED who was brought in by the
Board 15 years ago to make major changes to how the organization operated after its
performance and reputation began to slip under his predecessor. He admits that “there
was a lot of organizational turmoil when I first got here because I was such a culture
shock to the organization and I had a lot of pushback and it took me a long time to find
people who really embraced the notions or at least the operational notions that we have”.
The ED described certain employees who resisted the use of the Balanced Scorecard
methodology and did not want to engage around continuous quality improvement.
Getting to a place where he felt everyone around him was on-board took at least ten
years. Staff members who were present for some of this change claim that the
organization has “become even more data-driven and outcome-driven” and that “not only
[are we doing] our job in a more systematic way, but there's a lot more cross-training
going on…because we really needed to understand all of that in order to be maximally
effective”.
Executive Director: “voracious about continuous improvement”. O1’s ED
was hired because of his penchant for continuous improvement and his training as both a
social worker and an MBA. A self-described “data geek”, in his previous positions he
had embraced a “Management by Objectives” philosophy and continued to educate
himself on newer tools, such as the Balanced Scorecard. From my interviews with him it
is clear that he gets genuine pleasure from the challenges of implementing these
approaches and trying to figure out how to do it better. I found him to be introspective,
articulate and rather cerebral, being less apt to tell stories than to engage topics on a
meta-level. His comfort speaking on a theoretical level may be partly due to his role as a
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professor of nonprofit Human Resources Management at a local university. This position
requires that he remain up-to-date on the latest management texts and theories. When
asked what texts were most influential to how he manages, he cited Jan Calzon’s
Moments of Truth for providing insight into the importance of each point of customer
service, and Hersey and Blanchard’s Situational Leadership theory for explaining how to
match leadership style to the needs of the employee and task.
O1’s ED’s highly-analytical approach to management does not seem to come at
the expense of social engagement. He is very well-regarded by his subordinates and
Board and he takes extreme care in modeling the type of hard-working, conscientious
behavior he would like to see in others. One staff member commented that the ED is
“willing to fall on the sword…[to] say, ‘We did this wrong. We messed this up. Now
what can we do to fix it?’ And I’ve never seen anything swept under the rug”. He also
tries to keep people’s spirits up by being O1’s “Fred Bird” (mascot of Cardinal’s Baseball
team), seeing himself as “a roving ambassador of the culture, of an upbeat attitude of we
can do this, we can carry out the mission, we can be successful”.
He does privately worry that he may not be entrepreneurial enough. Confiding,
that “I’m so worried about, if I make one mistake, I could put a big chunk of this mission
at risk because I’ve seen so many go under. So I’ve tried to be really smart about
growth”. In response, he feels that he has recently hired executive-level staff members
who can help push him to be more comfortable taking risks.
Board of Directors: “the quality and the caliber of the Board Members we
have, and their passion too, is just so contagious”. O1’s Board of Directors is very
large, consisting of over forty members, a third of which the bylaws stipulate must be of
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O1’s historical church denomination. This large size makes some higher-level
conversations difficult, but also allows the luxury of having many skill sets to pull from
when needed. The Board has a strict rotation policy that ensures no Member is on the
Board for more than six consecutive years and the Board Chair is a two-year term. The
Board meets five times a year—four quarterly meetings and an annual retreat where
Board education and planning occurs. The routine quarterly meeting that I observed was
only attended by about half of the board members. It was held to a very tight hour-and-ahalf schedule, though the Directors still seemed engaged and asked good, critical
questions. Toward the beginning of the meeting the group paused for a “Mission
Moment” when a young resident came to speak about the importance of education to
foster youth and her recent trip to the State capitol to advocate for educational credit
transfers. This agenda item seemed very effective in giving the Members a moment to
connect with why they were there.
Since the mid-1990s, O1 has had a string of high-impact Board Chairs who, in
addition to the ED, pushed notions of continuous quality improvement, the Balance
Scorecard Tool, and novel Board governance models. The current and previous Board
Chairs were both affiliated with the Baldrige National Quality Program that promotes
standards of organizational efficiency and effectiveness, hinging on organizational
learning and development. There has been a slow and steady realignment of O1 around
many of these practices, which started with the implementation of a Balanced Scorecard
(BSC) and culminated with the complete restructuring of the Board of Directors. The
reorganization started in 2007 when the current Board Chair began to dismantle the longstanding committee structure in favor of an Executive Committee consisting of Board
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Champions around each of the four BSC pillars of Service Excellence, Organizational
Effectiveness, Community Partnership and Fiscal Responsibility. The Executive
Committee has the authority to charter task forces, consisting of various Board Members,
as needed to accomplish specific objectives, such as overseeing an audit, redesigning the
investment philosophy, etc.
As one informant summed up O1 members’ view on Board committees: “Milton
Berle once said that ‘a committee is where you keep minutes and lose hours’…You don’t
really have a clearly defined goal or outcome but that’s what you’re supposed to be
doing”. Organizational members feel that their new structure is far superior to the typical
committee structure because everyone has a deliverable. With the elimination of most
self-sustaining committees, the Board has gone from “an obstacle to meeting the needs
and the dynamics and the changes that are happening in our business to an enabler”. One
informant did share, however, that some Board Members have “felt less involved in the
new process. Those who aren't part of the executive committee, who aren't pillar
champions, are less [involved]”. Nevertheless, by most estimationsestimationsestimation
the new governance structure has led to several positive changes. It has energized and
reengaged the Board, especially with holding executives “much more accountable” and
being more externally focused on fundraising and advocacy. It has also and it has further
aligned strategic planning and performance monitoring processes.
Strategic Positioning
Uniqueness: “we’ve really defined our niche for older teens”. O1’s informants
believed that their internal culture and non-traditional Board governance structure make
them unique and that their reputation within the community is starting to reflect that.
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One informant said “our reputation for quality of service [sets us apart] and I think that a
lot of that really has to do with that transparency…people trust that if we do something
wrong, that we will try and rectify it, we’ll admit it”. In addition to high quality,
organizational members feel O1 is unique because they try to be a “high-value-add
provider”. One informant put it this way: “there are lots who do the same thing as we do.
We just do it better. Are we the low-cost producer? Probably not. But are we the best
value? Absolutely”. This seemed to be a commonly-held view within the organization;
although it is not clear on what hard evidence this opinion is based.
While there are several other organizations who offer similar services, including
the other study participants, O1 has begun to carve out a niche. The ED explained,
We’re just all about teens in foster care, that’s a really narrow market niche, but
we’re really deep in that arena, we go all the way from a step down from a
psychiatric hospital, to independent living, to alternative school, to foster care to
all that, so we’ve got the ability to flex a lot more within our own system based on
need.
This broad array of targeted services helps support a “buffet-style” service philosophy of
individualizing services to the child’s needs. They also focus on mainstreaming youth
and pushing them toward independence, creating treatment plans and programs that build
needed skills and confidence. Like the other organizations, this fits into their strengthsbased treatment philosophy.
Key strategic initiatives: “it’s all about program growth”. Early in the 1990’s
the winds of change were evident to O1’s leaders, and they began looking at ways to
diversify their program service offerings to not be so dependent on residential treatment.
They made an asserted effort to figuratively “break out the walls [at O1] and not be
confined by the bed space that [they] had so [they] could serve more youth. They
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consciously changed their language, referring to residential treatment as a “legacy
service” in an effort to increase stakeholders’ comfort level with the possibility that it
may not always be provided, given its unfavorable cost structure.
Given the realization that their business model may not be financially sustainable
but that their programs were highly interdependent and therefore not easily cut, O1’s ED
and Board have also focused on improving fiscal stability. In addition to keeping their
occupancy maximized, they tried to “add programs that have a positive margin and keep
overhead low so that the average amount of subsidy for each program would diminish.
So lean and mean”. New programs such as foster care case management and educational
services have been part of this strategic thrust. They have also recently executed a capital
campaign and tried to improve the effectiveness of their development department.
Today their “lean and mean” strategy continues to be a key objective, but they
also have a stated growth strategy with the hoped for result of attracting better Board
members, funders and generally expanding their mission reach. O1’s Board Chair said
“I'd like to see [O1], within five years, double its size, double its budget”. O1’s leaders
have begun to look at developing “boutique programs” for targeted populations that may
have a more diverse funding base, including from private insurance.
Strategy Formation Processes
Current formal process: “highly integrated cooperative effort to understand
the environment”. O1 has a highly-developed “Strategy Development and Deployment”
process (See Figure 4 below) that uses the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) approach pioneered
by Kaplan and Norton (1996). O1’s customized BSC has four pillars—Service
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Excellence, Organizational Effectiveness, Community Partnership and Fiscal
Responsibility—around which planning and implementation are centered.
Strategy Development and Deployment Process
At O1
Environmental Scan & Assumptions:
Previous Performance  Client/Stakeholder  Suppliers
 Competitors  Staff  Customers of Competitors  Other Factors
 Legal, Credentialing, Regulatory Requirements  Economy
 Audits and Assessments  Technology

Inputs

Summarize Inputs for Planning:
Planning

Assumptions and Strategic Themes
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats

Develop:
Verification

Strategies
Objectives
Action Plans
Macro Budgets
Operating Plans

Create &
Revise:
Balanced
Scorecard
Processes
Measures

Determine:
Roles
&
Responsibilities

Implementation
Scorecard Reviews & Analysis
Revise, Monitor, Continuous Improvement
Figure 4: Strategy Development and Deployment Process at O1
From O1’s 2008-2010 Strategic Plan
Every year O1’s senior management group, sometimes with the help of Board
members and lower-level leaders, reviews strategy assumptions and performs a SWOT
analysis by pillar. This analysis is based on information group members have amassed
on their own throughout the year on trends in their respective fields and interactions with
internal and external stakeholders. Occasionally, the group will conduct formal
competitor analysis or market segmentation; they may administer stakeholder surveys
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(like the Board, employees or customers/clients) or bring in outside experts to speak to
them about conditions in the environment. Given the recent economic climate, they also
incorporated worst-case scenario planning into their most recent process.
Once a consensus about the internal and external conditions of the organization
has been reached, the group creates an overarching strategy for each pillar. Despite the
extremely structured nature of the process, the ED admits that the actual strategy
development is still something of an art; citing Cohen, March and Olsen’s (1972)
Garbage Can Model of Organizational Change, the ED explained,
It’s not linear. If it is linear I’m not able to articulate it…For somebody who is
obviously into control, it’s kind of fascinating when you think about it because
it’s really an educated throw of the dice about which arena you pick…So for me it
becomes that sort of educated guess about what’s constant in the mission, what’s
in the marriage or our organizational strengths, community need, contemporary
best practices, emerging trends, very active listening, and, quite honestly, what I
think the board will buy…[the Garbage Can Model is] again a non-linear model
of how things get done, which I think describes a lot… you look for choice
opportunities to persist over time. You carry messages with more people but you
hope that the opportunity for convergence or the probability for convergence
increases over time by virtue of that.
Upon articulating a strategy for each pillar, the senior leadership team then
develops the annual scorecard. An important first step in the scorecard development
process is the articulation of annual “Action Plans and Strategic Linkages” that tries to
connect the pillar’s 3-year strategy to several 1-3 year objectives and outcome measures
that then flow into annual action plans and timetables. This information is the building
blocks of the year’s Balanced Scorecard. The senior leadership team, in conjunction with
their staff and their Board Pillar Champion, take their respective objectives and further
break them down into a measureable performance target with corresponding goals (score
of 3) and tolerance intervals on a scale of 1 (poor performance) to 5 (stretch target).
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Once the organization’s priorities are affirmed, they spend a few months creating
operating and agency budgets, and then the budgets and scorecard are sent to the Board
for approval. Appendix H, on page 295, provides an example of a recent O1 BSC.
In addition to the agency-wide BSC and strategic planning process, a few
departments also follow a similar, cascading process to create departmental goals and
scorecards. While the practice is not yet widespread, there is some talk of trying to push
the process further down within the organization.
O1 engages in their Strategy Development and Deployment Process each year,
but each time with a rolling three-year planning horizon. Most years the previous
planning document is used as a starting point and assessed for needed changes, but every
three years the group does a more comprehensive planning process “from a blank slate”.
All told, informants estimated that the annual process requires a total of about one full
week of their time interspersed throughout the second half of the year. The ED
commented that, “then all the rest of it is monitoring. I guess in my estimation, it might
sound like a lot of time, but it makes life so much easier”. O1 has not used an outside
consultant to facilitate their formal process since 1993. Instead, the process has been
driven by the ED and/or the Board Chair, partly to save money, but mostly because they
both felt that they had a talent for leading the process and had very specific ideas about
what they wanted the process to be.
Process evolution. O1 has been using some sort of scorecard since 2000, but the
tool has become increasingly sophisticated and embedded in multiple organizational
processes, really coming together around 2004 (compare Appendix H to Appendix I, pg.
295 to pg. 296). Before everything gelled, O1’s strategic plan was a list of objectives
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with little structure about how they were connected or system around how to report on
progress. The objectives were built “around a felt-sense of what the organization
needed…but [the ED] didn’t have any sort of formal sense about how to get there, [it
was] just a collection of solitary objectives”. While usually featuring a SWOT analysis
of some kind, the strategy formation process also frequently changed and had “no real
reliability and repeatability”.
The implementation of a robust Balanced Scorecard and aligned planning process
took several years. In the late 1990s, O1 became increasingly focused on continuous
improvement and performance monitoring, especially under the influence of the then
Board Chair, who was an executive at a local hospital that had won the Baldridge
National Quality Award for their efforts to implement an organization-wide BSC. The
Board Chair encouraged the organization to apply for a Missouri Team Quality Award,
which they did and were awarded in 1999 for their reductions in the use of restraints in
their residential treatment programs. O1’s success propelled them into to experimenting
with more process improvement efforts, and when the ED attended a three-day workshop
on Balanced Scorecards given by the current Board Chair in 2002, he felt that he had
found “a rubric that put [all their efforts] together”. Soon after that workshop, the current
Board Chair joined O1’s Board and the ED and he “became a formidable force to be
reckon with”. With a critical mass of people interested in the BSC technique and a
foundational culture of continuous quality improvement laid by the ED’s work over the
previous 5 years, all the conditions were right to make large-scale changes in strategic
management and Board governance.
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In 2002, the ED began tinkering with the crude BSC and making it more rigorous
and holding people more accountable to it. By 2004 he and his team had created a
scorecard that resembles today’s. They then took several years to work out its kinks, like
changing the “Growth” pillar to “Service Excellence” and eliminating the “Quality” pillar
because they felt “like the quality piece is actually much more robust if [they tried] to
infuse it everywhere. By 2007, most of the staff and the Board were very comfortable
with the BSC tool and the current Board Chair decided there was enough support to
reorganize the Board structure and strategic planning process around the BSC’s four
pillars.
Despite the major strides taken in the past several years, the ED is always
thinking critically about the process. He wonders if they are counting the right things and
whether they are choosing “the best metric to measure or is it just because it’s an
expedient one?”. He wishes the process by which strategies and objectives were chosen
could be more systematic and less “an art”.
Content of formal plans. Since 2007 O1’s strategic plan document has had the
same format, a systematization pushed by the current Board Chair. They all have a
message from the ED, executive summary, historical financial information, O1’s
customer integration model, organizational chart, strategic planning process graphic
(shown in Figure 4, pg. 113), a list of the prior year’s major accomplishments, strategy
assumptions and SWOT analysis by pillar, articulation of the pillars’ longer-term
strategies, summaries of the annual action plans and linkages to strategy, financial
forecasts, and previous year’s scorecard.
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While very well-presented and clearly very rigorously created, I felt that the
planning documents lacked a higher-level organizational strategy and articulated
rationale for some of the pillar strategies. It seemed to me that some of the dots had not
been connected for the reader in ways that may be helpful for gaining maximum buy-in
and testing assumptions later on. When asked about this, O1’s ED commented, “It's not
that I lack vision; I think I have a lot of vision but, I'm more about sort of building
collective will and shared vision…it's just about how I sort of move the process. It's the
same way I do advocacy. I mean, I think advocacy should be over here <motions far
away> but, I try to find low-hanging fruit, so, it wouldn't surprise me that the plans look
largely incremental”.
Over the years, the longer-term pillar strategies outlined in the 20+ page planning
documents have not changed very much; for instance, the “Service Excellence’s” strategy
has been mainly focused on program diversification, process management, and
maintaining accreditation. The underlying objectives that appear on the annual BSC have
shifted, however, to shore up perceived organizational weaknesses and respond to
environmental challenges. Each year, each pillar has 3-5 objectives, such as:
•

Service Excellence Pillar (mainly focused on programs)
o Support a culture of continuous quality improvement from an
individual to an organizational level (2005)
o Develop and expand program review process (2009)

•

Organizational Effectiveness Pillar (mainly focused on internal capacity
building)
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o Identify, measure, and begin interventions to promote employee
engagement (2006)
o Redesign work and job structures for meeting service delivery and
key process requirements (2007)
•

Community Partnership Pillar (mainly focused on development and
partnerships)
o Implement the Capital Campaign (2007)
o Create a sustainable development effort (2010)

•

Financial Responsibility Pillar (mainly focused on financial management)
o Provide predictable and stable annual budget performance (2006)
o Synchronize the strategic planning and budgeting cycles (2007)

My other critique of the BSC is that it is still rather siloed, with each pillar being
more or less tied to a department. Eventually, the tool may be more impactful if the
organization articulates and conscientiously implements more complicated crossfunctional strategies at the organizational level and has each department develop its own
targeted balanced scorecard as well.
Views on formal process: “we’ve taken great strides at making it a much
more effective tool and less of an exercise”. Every informant I spoke to at O1
unequivocally supported the Balanced Scorecard and current formal strategy formation
process. This is probably because the ED has worked for over a decade to ensure that the
culture is supportive to this type of approach, replacing key staff members if necessary.
Many also felt that as the BSC has become more institutionalized they have seen positive
results, at least in terms of internal process improvement. Multiple informants expressed
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a sense of comfort and security stemming from the “balanced nature” of the process that
allows them to simultaneously focus on multiple, interlocking priorities and to be reactive
and nimble while also keeping an eye on what they want to be down the road. It helps
the organization avoid “the whack-a-mole problem” of reactively dealing with emergent
issues, a reference one informant made to the carnival game where participants rush to
beat down randomly appearing moles with a plastic hammer. The use of the BSC and the
Board realignment around pillars has also helped the strategy formation process feel more
focused and action-oriented. One informant said, “it's not sort of this quibble, ‘How are
we going to be a better agency? How are we going to improve?’ Its: pillar number one,
let's attack that. What are we looking at? What are we going to do?”.
The annual nature of the process was also seen as an asset that allows for midcourse corrections as environmental conditions warrant. This helps create “a living
document…that’s beneficial for the organization and has a purpose”. The three-year
planning horizon was chosen due to regional custom, but the Board Chair would prefer to
have a five-year planning horizon because his experience had led him to believe that it is
a best practice—all of the Baldrige quality award recipients had a five-year planning
horizon.
O1’s ED is firmly convinced that the BSC and planning process actually helps the
organization manage the rapidly-changing environment and gives their strategies a
greater chance at success. He feels that nonprofit leaders have less room for strategic
error because their margins are often so tight. When asked if the balanced scorecard
helps them reduce that error, the ED responded, “Oh, yes. Absolutely!” He went on to
explain,
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[The BSC] doesn’t inherently make my ability to titrate out of the environment
what the trends are. It’s still an amorphous process. I know that I do know if my
guess [about a strategy] is right much more quickly and it also gives the guesses a
better opportunity of succeeding because I’ve got a great communication tool and
ways of gaining buy in.
Several informants reiterated that one of the BSC’s major strengths was its ability to
communicate so much on one page. It routinely keeps the strategic plan in front of
everyone and helps to communicate how they are doing on accomplishing their goals.
Informants told stories about how this tool has helped the Board be better at oversight,
demonstrated their culture of improvement and transparency to funders, and spurred
action by the staff.
Even with all of the benefits, there was awareness on the informants’ part as to the
amount of effort the process took and the possibility that they spent too much time on the
BSC and planning. There is still some tension around matching the BSC approach to the
organization’s size and level of complexity; partly O1 has had to develop new
capabilities, but they also have scaled back some initial ideas that the Board Chair had
previously implemented with much larger organizations. Without a definitive means to
assess the impact of their processes, the ED wondered out loud several times “how much
of it is sizzle and how much is steak?”. The possibility of having some of these questions
answered was a motivating factor for the organization to participate in my study.
Day-to-day strategy formation: “we developed a new tool”. The need to make
strategic decisions outside of the annual planning process happens “frequently”, usually
due to a fiscal issue or a new opportunity that arises in the environment. O1 has recently
made efforts to make even these decisions more systematic by developing a tool that
ranks potential new initiatives on multiple dimensions, including mission fit, community
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need, organizational capabilities, financial viability, etc. The tool is aimed at reducing
subjectivity and allowing for consistent comparison of opportunities against predetermined criteria.
O1’s “monitoring points” is another tool they have recently created as part of their
efforts to develop trigger mechanisms to rapidly focus the organization’s attention on
potentially concerning areas of their operations before they get out of hand. The
organization chose a dozen performance indicators, such as residential occupancy levels,
days of cash on hand, donations, etc., which they will monitor monthly for deviance from
predetermined tolerance intervals.
When action is necessary, the Board governance structure allows for rapid
strategic response. As an informant explained, “when a blind spot gets us we can act
rapidly. We can have a task force together within a couple of days and charter and get it
going and tackling that issue”. The result of the task force rarely changes the
organization’s strategy since the top-level pillar strategies are rather broad, but the task
force and the Executive committee is empowered to assess a situation and take action,
even before the next Board meeting.
O1’s focus on structure and formalization does not always trickle down into every
decision it makes. There are still some instances where chance and circumstance win out.
For instance, O1’s decision in 2005 to create a service provider consortium, which I will
call “Collaborative Group 2” (CG2), to compete with CG1 to bid on the foster care case
management contract was made “over a beer” between the ED and two colleagues from
other organizations. Because action needed to be taken quickly and the ED felt that the
strategy was a natural fit with their mission and history, he “just sort of made it happen
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without a formal process”. In addition, action was possible in this area because the ED
had been advocating with his colleagues for privatization of foster care for several years.
The details of CG2 were hashed out while the three EDs were hiking in a local State
Park. No business plan was created and minimal analysis was done. They relied on their
established relationships and one of the partners’ assumed capabilities in foster care case
management.
Summary. Even with the understanding that the formation of intended strategies
is still rather subjective, O1 tries to make it as objective as possible by proactively
building around the decision choice multiple formal tools for synthesizing, analyzing and
communicating information and seeking external feedback. Over the past decade, O1 has
thoroughly embedded the Balanced Scorecard into their day-to-day strategic management
and governance processes. This appears to have reinforced the already-present culture of
continuous monitoring and improvement ushered in by the current ED and recent Board
Chairs. Informants do admit that these processes take a fair amount of effort and time
and wonder if their formalization has actually been the cause of their improved
performance or if has just been “smoke and mirrors”.
Strategy Implementation Process
Implementation of the strategic plan: “[the BSC] forces you to be accurate
and honest – you can’t just tell stories”. Each pillar of O1’s Balanced Scorecard has
both a staff and Board champion. They work together to monitor and report on the
progress toward goal achievement in their domain. Progress on each performance target
is scored on its customized 1-5 scale. The raw score for each performance target is also
weighted and then averaged to give an overall scorecard score (See Appendix H, pg. 295,
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for a sample scorecard). Anything above a 3 is considered good. The scorecard is
updated at least monthly, but reviewed and discussed in many meetings throughout the
week.
O1’s Balanced Scorecard was hailed by informants as a worthwhile strategy
implementation tool primarily because of its ability to communicate a lot of information
in a little space and because it helps hold people accountable to accomplishing their
strategic goals. One staff member who has instituted a BSC in two different departments
at O1 explained their strategy implementation philosophy:
One of the key components of good management is not only setting the vision,
but following up and ensuring that that’s the actual path people are taking…if you
don’t ever follow up or call people on it when you see something different, then
what you have is a little bit of drift…and then before you know it, there’s a chasm
between what you say you’re doing, what your program is designed to do and in
actuality what you’re doing…I’m a big believer, too, in everybody having some
idea of what the big picture is and how they fit in…Therefore, people are more
able to use their own creativity in helping solve problems.
This informant felt that the BSC is the best tool for communicating the big picture and
monitoring progress toward stated intended strategies because it was all aligned around a
shared language and visual guide. Informants also felt the BSC helps the Board oversee
strategy implementation because it gives them the ability to sift through all of the
information being given to them and really hone in on the areas they think are most
pertinent in order to apply pressure for change.
Recently the organization began taking steps to formally align incentives with the
BSC, starting with the ED’s compensation being tied to the organization’s performance
on the scorecard. While the senior leaders and their direct reports “live or die by [the
BSC]”, the direct-level staff are not very aware of it, except for in small pockets where
their departmental leader has engaged them in creating one. There is some talk about
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creating individual scorecards for less senior staff, but that level of formalization is
probably several years off. Another modification being considered is to add trending to
the scorecard. One informant supportive of the change explained, “I'm more interested in
the trend than what we did last month…because you can't tell me if that's common cause
or special cause because we don't have – use that level of sophistication or measure…I
don't want to under or overreact”. O1’s leadership seems to always have new ideas about
how to improve their processes, but is aware that “organizational digestion” can only go
so fast and that they have “finite resources”.
Implementation of community-based services growth: “reciprocal – sort of
streams where one program might be growing and another one might diminishing”.
Since at least 1999, O1 has had a formally stated intended strategy of diversifying their
service array. Consequently, O1’s community-based services growth has been fairly
slow and steady over the past decade, and was achieved partly through acquisition, but
mainly through new program creation. In 2000, O1 decided to acquire a floundering
emergency shelter program whose focus on older youth helped solidify O1’s strategic
position and provided access to a new population of clients. In 2002 they applied for and
received Federal funding to begin a transitional living program to supplement their
growing independent living program for youth aging out of foster care. They purchased
and renovated a building and opened the program in 2003. Over the years, O1 also made
a few other forays into community-living programs that did not get off the ground.
One strategy that was specifically stated in O1’s strategic plans was to expand
their school program to additional sites. They formally evaluated several potential
locations, and in 2004 opened a program to educate emotionally disturbed teens in the
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City of Saint Louis. The school had great margins in the first 14 months, but then the
City stopped reimbursing a flat rate per student and only paid for each day the youth
attended. Because of the mental health and behavior problems of many of the youths
being served, this severely cut O1’s revenue, and within two years they had to close the
program. An informant said it was a very difficult decision for the Board, but that “a new
day has come that we got to be smart about what we deliver and what we can afford to
deliver”. In hindsight, several informants felt that the organization should have been
even quicker in their decision to close the school, and this feeling partly drove the
creation of the “Monitoring Points”.
In the same year that O1 closed their City School, they had another large
opportunity fall in their lap. In 2006, organizational leaders attended a meeting held by a
consortium of nine foundations that wanted to fund a program to support youth aging out
of the foster care system until age 25. At the meeting were many local organizational and
government representatives. O1 submitted a letter to express their interest in providing
the services, hoping to be asked for a formal proposal along with other competitor
organizations. However, without any further process, the consortium awarded O1 the
funding before they had even developed a program or submitted a formal application.
According to an informant, the consortium told O1 that they were looking for “an agency
that we could trust, with integrity, and you know, commitment to excellence and we think
you’re that agency and so why should we waste time taking proposals from places when
we know you’re the one we want”. The group also requested that O1 apply for Robert
Wood Johnson funding, which they did and received and were able to launch a program
in 2007 to serve 200 clients. The following year, in 2008, O1 was awarded a Chaffee
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Program grant that allowed them to serve a larger number of older youth, bringing their
total up to about 600.
While the entry into Aging Out was more rapid and easier than they had expected,
all of the informants credited getting the grant to their work on improving O1’s reputation
and institutionalizing continuous quality improvement, which had been a key strategic
initiative for several years prior. For instance, in 2003 the ED brought in a new Director
to help improve the performance of their community-based services where “there was
serious drift from the original mission and from policies and procedures and so things
needed to be brought back in line”. The Director set out to align the actions and culture
of the programs with key success factors in everything from painting the shelters and
keeping them clean and inviting, to having the staff help develop a programmatic
Balanced Scorecard that was then hung on the wall and used as a means to facilitate
communication around performance. They also sought feedback from youth clients and
involved them in designing new programs.
O1 would like to continue to grow and diversify their program array, but,
increasingly, they feel that “rather than wait for something to drift down the river and
pluck it. [They] want to be more intentional about how [they] do it”. As part of their
push toward formalization, and partly spurred by recent market consolidation, the Board
has chartered a Mergers, Acquisitions and Partnership (MAP) task force to look at ways
to expand program service offerings and leverage potential efficiencies within the market.
During most of 2010 the group met regularly to consider a rationale for restructuring,
rank-order criteria of assessing MAP candidates and identify potential candidates for
MAP.
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Implementation of Foster Care Case Management: “we didn’t have
centralized authority and control”. O1 has kept their expansion tightly focused around
their niche of older youth in foster care. However, in 2005 they decided to enter the
foster care case management market in order to gain access to the pipeline of clients and
build skills and connections in the field. Additionally, there was some concern on O1’s
part that they needed to somehow “get in the game” as CG1 and its member
organizations were becoming a more and more powerful government contractor and
lobbying group. As described above, O1’s decision to form CG2 with three other
organizations and bid on the foster care case management (FCCM) contract was very
informal and fairly contrary to their modus operandi. The planning phase of the program
was similar. O1 did not put together a formal business plan and the organizations didn’t
create a centralized authority like the other service provider consortiums had done.
Instead, each organization jumped into providing services, hoping to learn from one of
the partner’s previous experience. When a case was assigned to the consortium, it was
immediately assigned to one of the partners and no oversight body followed up. As a
result,
[Children’s Division] didn’t have a point person really. They felt like they were
working with three agencies all the time…and because there wasn’t really a leader
of all of CG2, everybody was working independently. There were lots of
personnel issues. There was lots of quality issues, lots of ethical issues and so
when they rebid the contract three years later, their contract was reduced
significantly.
O1’s ED admits, “we made lots of wrong assumptions…I didn’t do due diligence like I
could…it really was, ‘Oh, we can do this because we’re really smart people, we all care
about kids’…I mean, we weren’t totally absent of thought, but when I think about what
we could have and should have done…”.
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Even though O1 only had responsibility for half of one case team and about 60
cases out of the total 354 awarded to CG2, O1’s reputation suffered from CG2’s poor
performance. In 2008, after the embarrassment of the contract reduction, O1’s ED
insisted that the partnership be reorganized or else they would pull out of the consortium.
It was decided that a common administration was necessary to organize and monitor the
activities of the three remaining partners, and O1’s ED took charge of interviewing
candidates to fill the new COO position. A COO was brought on in late 2008, and has
since streamlined and coordinated CG2’s activities, dealt with personnel issues and begun
reconnecting with government officials. Informants report that the consortium’s
reputation has been restored and their outcomes are beginning to improve. The CG2 does
not have a BSC, “yet”, but they have developed their own “monitoring points” cued in to
key contract deliverables and financial performance indicators.
Summary. Over the past decade O1’s approach to strategy implementation, like
its formation, has become more and more formalized. They have become increasingly
structured and intentional with how they carry out and monitor the realization of their
intended strategies and even how they process emergent information from the
environment. O1’s experience with implementing FCCM provides some evidence that
thoughtful planning, structuring and monitoring of activities may be necessary for
success, at least in an organization used to these kinds of processes. However, their
experience with the City School demonstrates that even the best implemented strategies
may quickly fall victim to unforeseeable environmental changes.
Conclusion
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The vast majority of O1’s strategy formation and implementation happens within
the rubric of various highly formalized processes and tools, typically aligned with their
Balanced Scorecard. Their novel annual planning process, combined with a larger effort
every three years, has created a consistency in message and efforts, while allowing for
incremental response to changing environmental conditions. There seems to have been a
bidirectional and tightening relationship between the institutionalization of this strategic
management approach and the organization’s internal culture that stresses continuous
quality improvement. They have figured out how to harness the energy put into the
requisite act of “strategic planning” to constantly refine processes and build capacity.
The building of capabilities around breaking down large-scale initiatives into smaller,
measurable tasks that can be actively managed by the administration may translate into a
more accountable and proactive implementation processes across multiple areas of the
organization has the potential to improve quality and performance—a potential explored
in the cross-case analysis.

Organization #2
In a non-descript low-rise office complex in Saint Louis, sits the executive offices
of O2, where most of my interviews and observations took place. O2 is the most
geographically dispersed organization I studied. Their original orphanage was located on
a large rural campus in Southeastern Missouri; when the organization began to expand in
the 1990s, its executive offices were moved to Saint Louis to be closer to major funders
and suppliers. They now have operations in over 19 different sites around the State,
including several residential treatment facilities, a community counseling center, offices
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for their case management and mentoring programs, and a new for-profit residential
facility that treats more financially affluent teens.

Internal Organizational Context
When asked about O2’s internal culture, informant after informant said that it was
“family like”, “friendly and informal” and “supportive of the employee”, with the ED
adding that he tries very hard to run things by consensus. Based on my observations, this
is how things are at the Saint Louis executive offices, but O2’s multiple locations require
the management of different regional cultures, with Saint Louis being seen by one
informant as more “professional and progressive” and rural areas being seen as more
“conservative”. At least at the managerial and executive-level staff across the
organization, the ED tries to foster an entrepreneurial atmosphere without rigid job
descriptions in which open debate, creativity and problem solving are prized. In this type
of environment, the ED said he focuses on hiring “smart and competent people” that he
feels he can trust so he can get out of the way and let them focus on “doing the needful”,
or what needs to get done. Creating a culture where people have the tools and authority
to act as they see fit within bounds is a key way O2’s leaders manage the complexity of
running operations at 19 different sites.
The large footprint of the organization is an asset, but also a challenge. The
growth was organic over several years, but now the ED feels like they have “created a
monster”, and recently they have had to restructure the organization in order to maintain
the necessary lines of communication and control. For instance, they created three
“Regional Vice President” positions to help create accountability and local responsibility
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for hitting performance targets and growing programs. This has helped lessen the strain
of historically intense departmental and regional siloing, though coordination is still a
struggle. One informant said that ten years ago “each residential site operated pretty
much in a vacuum by themselves, they didn’t talk to each other, they could have shared
kids as far as treatment needs and wouldn’t have even thought of that”. This informant
felt that in the last three years “there’s definitely been an improvement” and things are “a
whole lot more fluid” between programs.
One of the ways the ED tries to foster communication and teamwork is in weekly
“Directors’ Group” meetings, one of which I formally observed. These meetings
typically last 2-3 hours and include the heads of all of the major departments, such as
programs, human resources, quality assurance, development, etc. (the meeting I observed
had nine people in attendance); the Regional Vice Presidents also call in from their
various locations at the beginning of the meeting to give an update about their activities
and the status of crucial organizational performance statistics, like residential treatment
occupancy rates and revenue targets by site. At the meeting I observed, people appeared
to speak freely, and openly grappled with important issues such as the expansion of a
program and the decision to seek out accreditation from a new, second accrediting body.
The ED was genuinely interested in the Directors’ opinions, but for the most part did not
have a big presence in the meeting; rather, he facilitated conversation and called for a
vote when needed.
Executive Director: “a warm and understanding person”. People described
the ED as “fun”, “excellent at seeking feedback” and as having “an open-door policy”.
He is quick to give praise; for example, when I reviewed his quarterly letters to the
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Board, I noticed they were peppered with acknowledgements and thanks to individual
staff members. He is also seen as “a delegator”, but one who struggles to balance being
overly involved to maintain control and not wanting to interfere with site operations. He
can be blunt, and has tried over the years to be better about admitting when he is wrong
or out of line. His, at times, passionate responses may be a by-product of his exuberance
and true passion for the mission of the organization. In my interactions with him, I was
very impressed by his ability to sophisticatedly explain the complex children’s mental
health system and convincingly argue for its reform, while at the same time sharing
specific details about what’s going on with the kids in O2’s care. He frequently
recounted stories about clients to illustrate a point and had up-to-the-minute information
about behavior problems and other incidents. Despite the intimate knowledge of
operations, the ED sees himself as a “visionary”, saying “I tend to be more global than
specific and I don’t consider myself a detail person although I like to work with numbers
just because my background”. Before joining O2’s Board in 1973, the ED had a career in
finance. After many years of Board involvement he took the helm in 1995.
Board of Directors: “the quality of our board has gone up significantly”. O2
has 15 Board members from around the State. They meet quarterly for a Friday
afternoon and Saturday morning, and mainly concern themselves with policy setting and
fiscal governance, primarily leaving program development and management to the staff.
They have a typical committee structure, with finance, programs, human resources, etc.,
and spend a large part of their time together in committee meetings, then reporting back
out to the full Board. The organization prepares an impressively large binder of
information for each Board member to review before the meeting; the binder includes
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financial information, quality assurance reports with statistics about clients and personnel
and pertinent current and legislative events.
There is pride amongst the staff about how much information is given to the
Board and how they strive for transparency, but there is also some frustration and
acceptance that Board members still come to meetings not having reviewed the materials
and sometimes fail to engage in meaningful and proactive debate. The organization has
been trying to improve Board diversity and engagement for several years, with some
success. They recently added a “Board Development” committee responsible for
recruiting new members (previously a task left almost exclusively to the ED) and
enhancing their effectiveness as a body. These initiatives have been somewhat
successful, with one informant commenting, “there’s black women and several other
black men, more progressive, younger Board members have come on with a balance of
skills. It’s changed a lot”. The executive staff is also very present at the Board meetings,
with each committee having a staff liaison as an “expert witness” for any issue discussed.
In addition to the Board of Directors, O2 also has several regional auxiliary
boards that help raise awareness and funds and occasionally help with special events.
These boards have had a varying degree of impact and engagement, but their presence
reflects and effort being made to engage local communities and allow them to have a say
in the organization.
Strategic Positioning
Uniqueness: “Tell me the service that you need”. At first blush, none of the O2
informants could tell me what made their organization unique or what made them more
worthy of funding than their competitors. There were typically long pauses, followed up
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by “I don’t know that we are unique” or “[I’m] not so certain that we really have a niche
yet”. However, with further prodding, some commented that the fact that they are “statewide” makes them unique or that a particular program was a potential “distinguishing
factor”. Programs informants cited as unique included O2’s new private-pay treatment
facility and their “small community treatment homes” that have been developed over the
past four years to treat high-need children, often with lower IQs, that have not succeeded
in more traditional residential treatment settings. These Individualized Alternative
Program (IAP) homes are run out of a rented house in the child’s community and use
elements of Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT) with a nearly one-on-one child-to-staff
ratio to achieve results. As with the other organizations, most informants also said that
they “take the kids no one else will take”; although, O2’s informants backed the claim up
by highlighting their willingness to develop programs such as the IAPs.
Despite the informants’ inability to readily articulate O2’s strategic positioning
with respect to service offerings, over the course of my six months interacting with the
organization, it became obvious that they have a very clear strategy for who they are to
the marketplace. They have positioned themselves as the high-quality, yet affordable,
“can-do” organization. Informants shared many stories about how the organization had
jumped at an opportunity to develop a needed program that others organizations seemed
uninterested in and how they were constantly thinking of new ways to solve problems
brought to them by the State or CG1. Eventually, after talking about other topics,
informants would often think back and comment, “If I said we were unique about
something, we’re always the ones who step up first and say, ‘What do you need?’”, or
they would say O2 is unique because of its “willingness to create programs in very out of
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the box thinking and to do it quickly”. In a mature market with very little bargaining
power, they have set out to make themselves indispensible for their rapid and nimble
reaction to fill gaps in services. They are willing to stretch the boundaries of their
organization and take risks to capture new pieces of the market, like they did with the
novel IAPs or when they agreed to provide contracted transportation services to CG1.
Key strategic initiatives: “at least break-even financially”. O2’s strategic
positioning makes it essential to be acutely cued in to its environment. In fact, I found
the boundaries around the organization and its environment to be rather loose. During
interviews, the line was sometimes blurred between actions the organization had taken
and actions CG1 or other collaborative bodies had taken. While a challenging narrative
to keep track of, it speaks to how integral this environmental osmosis is for rapid
response to market cues, and how continued involvement in collaborative efforts has
been one of the key strategic initiatives the organization has executed. Through CG1 the
organization has achieved more flexible funding for its services, a larger advocacy voice,
and technical training in capabilities that can be leveraged by multiple programs. It also
has been able to develop a larger pool of money from which O2 can compete for
contracts.
Growing the pie for everyone with the hopes of getting a larger slice has also been
another key strategic initiative for O2. Over the past decade they have collaborated with
other organizations and invested heavily in getting local sales tax for children’s mental
health services passed around the state. Most recently, a 0.25% sales tax was passed in
Saint Louis County, opening up over $35 million in new funds that was distributed for
the first time in August 2010.
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However, acknowledging the fickleness of funding, O2’s leaders have placed
most of its strategic focus on getting their fiscal ship in shape. When I asked the ED
what the biggest strategy was that O2 had implemented in the past decade he immediately
responded with, “survival…financial survival” . He went on to explain, “for about ten
years [our goal] has been that we don’t develop a program that we can’t at least breakeven on”. This has been a two-fold endeavor—better managing expenses and seeking out
more profitable books of business. O2 completely overhauled their internal accounting
systems to allow them to look at income and expenses by region and program, which
gave local managers better tools to control expenses and executive leadership more
accurate information to judge performance. Now the ED boasts that O2 “squeeze[s]
dollars better than anybody” and he is trying to get his regional leaders to develop
revenue-generating programs. They have also divested over a third of their residential
beds in the past 15 years, revamping the remaining slots to be more efficient and
effective. “Instead of beating a dead horse”, they have developed niche programs to meet
the needs of more “high-end” clients who need small, very tailored treatment programs.
The drive for financial sustainability, coupled with their responsive market
positioning, has led O2 to develop several creative programs that other organizations do
not offer, such as the IAP houses, a therapeutic mentoring program, a transportation
service, and a social venture private-pay residential program. They have even considered
moving outside of their traditional child-focused services into other social service arenas
that would leverage their case management capabilities. Most of the programs O2 has
recently developed have relatively low start-up and capital costs and can be expanded or
contracted to keep pace with demand.
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Strategy Formation Processes
Current formal process. O2 engages in a formal strategic planning process
roughly every three to four years; their most recent process was conducted in 2009 and
was facilitated by a consultant with whom they had worked in the past. During this
planning cycle the Directors’ Group met three times, each for a full day, with about a
month in between. The first day was centered on talent and teamwork development and
took the group through a self-assessment and group discussion process to help them
recognize each other’s strengths and areas for growth. The second day the consultant
introduced three vivid scenarios about what the organization could be like in 10 years,
depending on environmental conditions and their actions. This process was supposed to
get the groups’ creative juices flowing and was used instead of a traditional SWOT
analysis. After a discussion about the scenarios and which one was most favorable, the
group moved into developing a dozen or so “signposts”, or indicators in the environment
that the organization will annually track to gain insight into where the market is going.
The group brainstormed various indicators and chose the most important by consensus,
then determined how best to gather the data. Signposts included measures of government
support, public opinion and client need. At the third and final meeting, the group broke
into smaller groups by department and drilled down multiple goals for the coming threeyear planning horizon. While the Directors’ Group drove the plan creation, they did
bring it to their direct reports for a period of comment, though nothing was substantially
changed.
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The Board of Directors was only minimally involved in developing the formal
plan. I observed part of this process in January 2010, in which the same consultant who
worked with the Directors’ Group to develop the larger plan assisted the Board in
generating their own goals for “board development”. The process lasted three hours,
during which time a brief environmental analysis and the three scenarios were presented
and discussed. The board chose which scenario they most wanted to make a reality and
then what they, as a board, needed to do to help the staff facilitate that. Some of the
discussion was informed by the results of a board assessment survey administered prior
to the planning workshop. In general, it was a very fast-paced, somewhat disjointed
process, but the board seemed to respect the opinion and prompting of the facilitator and
the ED said he received good feedback from several Board members. The following day,
the finalized Board goals were added to the larger staff-generated plan and the Board
reviewed and approved it. Once a strategic plan is produced, more regional, budgetoriented annual plans are created to help guide those programs’ operations.
Process evolution. O2 has been doing some sort of formal strategic planning
since the early 1980’s. Over the years the planning horizon has shortened (from twenty
years in 1998 to 3 years in 2009) and the process has gotten more staff-driven and shorter
in duration (from nine to three months). The Board used to be more intimately involved
in the creation of the strategic plan, but as the nature of O2’s business became more
sophisticated a consultant suggested letting “the professionals” handle the planning and
let the Board have more of an oversight function. Consequently, they now focus on
generating their own goals and reviewing a finished document provided by the staff.
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From speaking to the informants and reviewing previous planning documents, it
appears that prior to this current planning cycle, O2’s strategic planning utilized a fairly
basic SWOT-based analytical process engaged in by the Directors’ Group who then
developed goals by department. In addition, the group used to do a full environmental
scan and review their “Big Hairy Audacious Goal” a la Jim Collins (2005) and/or their
critical success factors. They have always used a consultant and have had two different
ones in the past decade. The ED feels this is essential because “people are much more
open and much more creative when they have a third party” and he would worry that the
organization would “get too inbred” if they did it on their own. It was their consultant
who suggested trying out a new process utilizing scenarios for this cycle.
Content of formal plans. The final result of the recent process was a two-page
document that listed strategic goals by each of the five departments plus the Board. In
previous years the planning document was a longer presentation with more narrative and
background on the planning process and the organization, listing of external conditions,
critical success factors, etc.; but, according to the ED, since the recent process was more
“comprehensive” in the development of the signposts, a shorter plan document was
produced. The format for the final planning document has changed at each cycle. In
general, it appears that the choice of consultant drove a lot about the process and its
tangible outputs.
Despite difference in format and comprehensiveness, all of the planning
documents I reviewed from 1998-2010, ended with the listing of goals and objectives or
strategies by department. In earlier documents there was also an agency vision stated for
the planning horizon. In 2003 the vision was that,
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[O2] will continue to be a leader in the field of children’s services, recognized for
its innovation and cutting edge programs. Partnership, individuality, creativity,
persistence, accountability and excellence will be the trademark of our broad
array of quality services to children and families in need.
This type of organization-wide statement does not appear in the 2006 or 2010 document.
Over the past three planning cycles (2003-2010) the departmental goals have also become
increasingly operational in nature. In 2003 the program department’s goals were to
“redefine residential services, place and position the agency for privatization, increase
non-residential services to include all sites, and increase readiness for unanticipated
opportunity and change.” Each of these goals was followed by a brief rationale for the
goal and then several broad strategies for achieving those goals that reached across
individual programs. In contrast, the program department’s 2010 goals included more
discrete tasks such as, “to develop out-patient services in the Farmington area by January
of 2011” or “to explore developing specialized programs for high need, targeted
populations by 2012.” While the most recent plans’ goals have gained specific,
measurable targets, they seemed to have lost a larger strategic narrative that may have
been useful to provide guidance in daily decision making.
Views on formal process: “I do it because COA and CARF say I have to”.
Despite having a routine strategic planning cycle, this type of formal process holds only
minimal importance to O2 and they seem ambivalent about its utility. The ED “see[s] it
as a nuisance…because things change too fast for me to rely on anything that comes out
of that…long range planning is the next payroll. Short range is what we’re doing
tomorrow”. Despite these feelings, O2 still goes through the motions of formal strategic
planning because accreditation bodies require it of them.
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In general, most of the informants felt that the mission of the organization was
very stable and did not require revisiting and that there was relatively little question as to
where the organization should be heading. They “just need to figure out how [they are]
going to move ahead” and felt that strategic planning does little to assist them in the
endeavor of making “significant progress towards a committed goal”. The ED conceded
that formal planning could be more useful in other industries where leaders control more
of their destiny, but that in his business “if you can do anything better than reactionary,
you are doing real well”. However, in fitting with the organization’s external orientation,
the ED does see strategic planning an opportunity to determine “which way is the
compass going, check the signals…the broad view of the things”, which could help them
stay in front of the curve and be more proactive. Over the years the planning process
seems to have shifted more to serve this purpose. It has also, in some informants’ eyes,
been “uplifting to the people participating [and] identified strengths across the whole
agency”.
As for the recent strategic planning process, most of the participants were initially
skeptical about how the various activities would result in a cohesive plan. In the end,
some were pleased with the process’ result and efficiency, saying “it came together
and…it came together real quick. We didn’t have a lot of people sitting around
daydreaming or pontificating on what they thought”. Another felt that they “actually
achieved more strategy this time than in previous times” and one informant felt
particularly positive about the Signposts and the organization focusing “increasingly on
being better quantified, identifying this outcome, how you’re going to measure it, at what
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intervals and what is your threshold, what’s the criterion that you will know if you have
arrived”.
Others were frustrated, however. One informant said “there should be some
environmental scanning and projections and things that I don’t see…not just reactions to
what is immediately available…let the idea drive what you’re about, not the resource
drive what you’re about”. Some felt the resulting planning document was “severely
lacking” and said that some of the departmental plans were created “in a vacuum” with
some “objectives hav[ing] not been well developed, and there [being] certain things
[they] know [they’re] not going to meet”. To solve this, several informants would have
liked “more time spent like actually developing the plan and…more time on interface,
how my [departmental] plan works into your[s]…and putting it all together”.
Day-to-day strategy formation: “reactive to the availability of the issues as
they arise”. While formal planning may be seen as a perfunctory duty at O2, informants
were quick to point out that that does not mean they don’t “do planning”. The ED
pointed out that,
[We] do it on a much more frequent basis. And when we first became accredited,
this business of “oh, you got to have a five-year plan”—we couldn’t see down the
road six months, let alone five years! And I think [our more frequent planning is]
proven – history has proven that out… four years ago, we wouldn’t have been in
the foster care case management business. It was the furthest thing from our mind
and here we are. And how much we have turned around the business and taken
that opportunity and turned it into actual survivability.
O2’s strategies have been put together incrementally. As one informant put it, “I don’t
see that kind of conceptual long range planning occurring...it’s taking advantage of
opportunities that are perceived by each vice president and the president as it emerges”.
The term “backed into” was used several times to describe how the organization became
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involved in a particular program, often at the behest of CG1. Because they have
positioned themselves as the “can-do” organization, O2 is often the first stop for CG1
when they have a problem, and this pattern has been reinforced by O2 demonstrating
their willingness to take risks and quickly develop a program, as long as “the money is
there”.
Organizational members take pride in this quick responsiveness. Of course, those
actions do, at least minimally, come under scrutiny as to how they align with the strategic
plan. An informant assured me that there is an initial mental screen of whether or not “it
makes sense and fits underneath our plan”, but there is more emphasis on rapid
incremental decision making rather than formal processes. One informant boasted, “we
don’t come up with the great idea and go ‘Oh, let’s analyze it for six months and make
sure there’s no holes in it,’ we just kind of jump in with both feet…we don’t hesitate
when we hear good ideas. We say ‘wow, we should do that’ and then do it”. This
approach has been fairly successful for O2, but is not without its drawbacks. The ED
admitted, “it is also a real risk because you have to be willing to accept failure or less
than actual success when you do that. And you have to be willing to swallow your pride
and say ‘hey, you know I was wrong’”. O2’s culture of frank discussion and creativity
supports this process.
In addition to the ED making “rapid decisions based on the information you
have”, a lot of decisions, including about resource allocation and programmatic
expansion, get made via conversation and consensus in the weekly Directors’ Group
meeting. As I observed, and informants confirmed, “several of the staff will bring things
like that to the Monday [Directors’ Group] meeting or any other time and just say, ‘I’ve
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been thinking about this and this looks like a viable thing that we might do.’ So then we
run it up the flagpole…[and figure out] ‘what are the numbers?’”. There are similarly
routine higher-level staff meetings at each of the sites for staff to have input into decision
making. One informant seemed to feel that because of this informal strategy formation
process, the strategic plan was always changing—“it’s always the evolution of the goals
and issues and budgets”—and that there wasn’t a clear boundary between the formal and
operational plans.
Decisions about mission expansion or policy changes have to be taken up by the
Board and seem to be given more lengthy consideration. For example, the decision to
develop the private-pay residential treatment center was “extensively” discussed by the
Board for nearly a year before moving forward. This discussion usually happens outside
of the formal strategic planning process simply due to timing.
Summary. In the context of a highly responsive and entrepreneurial organization,
formal strategy formation has increasingly taken a back seat to more real-time informal
processes. O2 has most recently chosen to focus their formal planning processes on
gauging the external environment—developing signposts that “should provide trend data
that will point in the direction the ‘winds’ in Missouri and the US are blowing” (footnote
from “Signposts” document provided by the organization) and discussing possible future
scenarios based on those winds. Providing structure to a systematic analysis of
environmental information is a large potential benefit of strategic planning, but some at
O2 would also like to see planning used to better develop and coordinate longer-term,
boundary-crossing strategic initiatives as well. In this respect there is a tension between
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how the ED views planning and the potential benefits some of the staff and Board
members feel the process could have.
Strategy Implementation Process
Implementation of the strategic plan: “by accident”. Given O2’s members’
views on the formal strategic planning process, it’s not surprising that monitoring the
implementation of the formal plan is not given a large amount attention. Several
informants had comments like, “I’m not sure we do a great job on [monitoring plan
implementation], actually; that might be in the area of growth”. The ED said that he asks
the staff liaisons to the Board committees to report their progress on plan implementation
at every meeting, with the thought that this keeps the Board informed and “[the staff]
focused throughout the year on…what they said their goals were”. Staff members,
however, felt that this quarterly review was focused mostly on quality assurance
initiatives, and less on larger strategic initiatives. “Some of those things that are bigger,
broader probably are not really looked at except maybe on a yearly basis.
In addition to an annual official “look-see”, staff did admit that strategic goals are
reviewed informally throughout the course of day-to-day management, but often “by
accident” or in individual supervision around their specific departmental goals. There
was some fear that things could slip off the radar screen without notice “if there’s not a
consistent reviewing going on of [the plan]”. Despite few formal implementation
processes, in general, the informants felt like they’d “done a pretty good job of being
successful at making [their strategic] goals” and they felt confident that things that were
“set in motion actually fit [the strategic plan]”.
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Implementation of community-based services growth: “we’ll see how we do”.
O2’s geographic and programmatic growth in the past decade has been organic, rather
than by way of acquisition or merger. This is most likely because of their strategic
positioning as quick attendants to unmet market needs and the fact that they are required
by the State to try to serve their clients within a 50 mile radius of their home. They have
also benefitted from a few large donations of either physical assets or funds tied to
developing a site in a particular location, pushing them into new regions.
Because they have developed their programs from scratch, they often take a
piloting approach before committing a lot of resources. The ED explained that “the
Board has kind of given us permission to explore any avenue as long as we can breakeven. We think we can, at least for a trial basis, and then we’ll see how we do for three to
six months and then we’ll report back to them and say, here’s how this is going, we think
we want to do it”. This approach to implementation, which was used to develop their
mentoring program, transportation services and IAP houses, allows them to quickly start
a program to meet their customers’ demands and then develop an expansion strategy after
they have more information.
Implementation of Foster Care Case Management: “CG1 is our big
brother”. As per usual with government contracts, O2 was not given very much time,
maybe only 90 days, to get a foster care case management (FCCM) program up and
running. In the summer of 2005, they had to locate office space in both Saint Louis and
Springfield, procure supplies, develop internal procedures and hire and train completely
new teams of staff. Because O2 had been one of the few organizations to bid to be a
subcontractor on CG1’s specialized case management contract in 1998, they had
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developed some capabilities and software systems that put them ahead of their
competition. Even with this advantage, there was still a lot of technical information and
procedures to master. In order to ramp up their staff quickly, O2 relied on CG1’s
comprehensive month-long training that they offer to all their subcontractors. According
to the ED, their reliance on CG1 for help with starting up the program “was not without
problems but it was a lot easier than just having to go out and do it ourselves”.
Essentially, CG1 provided O2 with an efficient technology transfer process and a
blueprint for the program that they simply had to find people to execute.
Hiring staff with the right skills was initially a challenge. At first O2 thought that
hiring former Children’s Divisions employees would be a way to ensure the new staff had
knowledge of the system and the necessary skills. However, they found that the new
privatized contract was a “paradigm shift for the workers”. They eventually came to
prefer training new graduates from scratch because the work demanded that workers
“think out of the box” to creatively take advantage of the flexible funding streams and
meet the program’s permanency goals. Another issue that they encountered was
difficulty with integrating new staff members, who spend their first month training at
CG1, into O2. As time went on, they have developed some tailored training components
to help orient their staff and establish an organizational identity with O2.
Going into the second three-year contract period in 2008, the organization felt
confident in their capabilities and expanded into two additional geographic areas. They
also began to focus on outcomes more seriously and targeting resources to increase
success with permanencies and reduce staff turnover. For instance, they more heavily
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invested in a family finding program and moved their staff into more comfortable office
space.
Even with their expertise, O2, like the other subcontractors, depend heavily on
CG1’s services and oversight. They also benefit from collaborating with the other
service providers. While O2’s individual performance is tracked and reported to
Children’s Division, CG1 is ultimately responsible for their outcomes and therefore has
formal monitoring and supervisory processes in place that encourage sharing of issues
and ideas among their five subcontractors. Financial and client outcomes are reviewed
and discussed in mandatory biweekly supervisor meetings and monthly directors
meetings.
Summary. The through line in O2’s approach to implementing strategies is to
take incremental risks, develop clinical capabilities with an eye toward the future and
take advantage of collaborative networks and efficiencies where possible. Staff is given
the autonomy to implement as seen fit based on conditions on the ground. These actions
are typically taken when needed and not closely tied to predetermined points of action in
the formal strategic plan. When the implementation of the formal strategic plan is
considered, it is often siloed by department and Board committee. This is partly because
of the structure of the planning document itself, but also because there are not routine
processes that facilitate monitoring strategy implementation as a larger group. The
organization’s informal, incremental implementation process fits with the organization’s
internal culture, but some informants did express a desire for more formal monitoring and
felt that they “had the avenues to do that”, but just hadn’t made the effort.

149

Conclusion
O2’s approaches to strategy formation and implementation are quite similar—
informal, iterative, environment-driven actions based on serving the mission—and have
been stable over time. In this type of organization it is difficult to determine where the
processes of strategy formation end and implementation begin. What is clear is that the
characteristics of these processes are part and parcel of O2’s entrepreneurial internal
organizational context and external strategic positioning as the quick responder.
Consequently, formal strategic planning has had little to no impact on O2’s chosen
intended strategies, and is instead seen as a minor hurdle to jump over for accreditation
on the longer sprint toward their end goal of survival and mission fulfillment. O2 has,
indeed, survived and expanded their mission reach when many others have not. The
cross-case analysis will provide insight into whether their approach has yielded superior
performance relative to their remaining peers.

Organization #3
For almost a century and a half, O3 has been serving kids in need on the same
campus on the outskirts of Saint Louis City. Their tree-lined circular drive is dotted with
old brick buildings, some large dormitory-like structures, others smaller 1950’s-style
ranch bungalows. There are also a few formal Victorian homes, like the one in which the
administrative offices are now housed, and some recently-added modern educational
facilities toward the back of their campus. Busting at the seams, O3 has had to expand
beyond their campus and open a satellite office a few miles away where many of their
community-based services, such as outpatient counseling and foster care case
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management, are situated. They also have a network of transitional and independent
living program sites around the County, and since the late-1970’s have had a small
presence across the State in Kansas City.
Internal Organizational Context
Some of O3’s formally stated core values are “integrity, compassion, faithfulness
and dedication, mutual caring and respect, commitment, teamwork, relationship, and
continuous learning”. An informant affirmed, “I think we do live those”, and from my
interactions with members of the organization, I would say this is true. At O3 there
seems to be a genuine respect for people and an emphasis on mission, empowerment and
honesty. O3’s ED expressed a genuine interest in improving the employee experience,
and said that they try to “treat our employees as our customers”. The organization
solicits regular feedback through employee satisfaction surveys and they make continual
efforts to improve the organization’s culture and morale. For instance, several years ago
they increased pay across the board and recently they developed the “Gotcha Program”
whereby supervisors and colleagues can submit a “Gotcha” when they observe an
employee doing a good job even when they thought no one was looking. The program is
aimed at further promulgating the organization’s core values, and the ED is personally
invested, sending individual emails to every “Gotcha” recipient to thank them for their
efforts. Another way the ED is trying to remain connected to the staff and facilitate
communication is by holding quarterly “Executive Director Open Forums” where the ED
shares information about external environmental trends and O3’s response to them and
answers questions from employees. The forums are also a way that the ED gets input
from lower-level employees to help inform his decision making.

151

Openness pervades the executive ranks, as well, where the ED tries to have “a
collegial approach to management” whenever possible. At lower levels, he has been
working on “pushing decision-making further down in the organization… empowering
people to be able to do that”. Fostering empowerment and autonomy has been something
O3 has historically been good at and often benefited from. One long-tenured informant
shared that O3 “[tries] to match our staff’s strengths with their job… allows for an
employee here to be able to use their own creativity in what they do and often times
expand the agency into new areas because of their expertise or their creativeness”.
O3’s dedication and faith in their employees may come from the fact that many of
them have been at the organization for decades, and therefore share a history and bond
that makes them trust one another. One informant described O3 as “very homegrown…from its beginning tried to hire, promote from within”. In fact, the current ED
has been in his position for over 12 years, but started as a direct-care staffer over a
quarter century ago. The ED before him was in his job for 30 years. Other
administrators and front-line workers have similarly long tenures. O3’s ED is very proud
of this fact, saying “it speaks to that there’s something about the agency that people are
attracted to because of the mission and the culture…and they feel good that they are
doing something worthwhile to help other people”. Other informants spoke of a
closeness and level of trust that allowed them to have “a sense of security” that the
management was “using full judgment and all of their experience is being brought to bear
on whatever issue they’re dealing with”. Most also admit, though, that the “hire-fromwithin” mentality could lead to “narrowly-focused thinking”.
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O3 does seem to be struggling with balancing a long history of stability and
tradition with the demands of managing a growing multi-million dollar business. When
pushed, however, they have looked outside their ranks when new capabilities were
needed to meet the increasingly sophisticated demands of the market. For instance, 12
years ago they hired a Performance Improvement Director who was new to the
organization and three years ago they hired a CFO at the urging of its Board. According
to the ED, the “new blood” has helped the organization reevaluate the way they do
certain things and to improve processes. Some of these recent hires have helped the
organization bridge the gap between being a social service charity and a multi-milliondollar business. One informant admitted that the transition had a steep learning curve,
pointing out that:
Those of us in management positions, all come from a social services field…none
of us really have any kind of business background at all, but yet, we are running
whatever it is $10 million…I think we had to learn along the way how to deal
with that.
O3’s growth hasn’t been without other challenges. The increased number of programs
and locations led a few informants to express that they “don’t have quite that sense of
connectedness that [they] used to feel” and one informant described the Kansas City
program as “out of sight, out of mind” and speculated that “eighty-five percent of [their]
constituents don't even know it exists”.
Executive Director: “has high integrity…a very fair-minded person”. In my
multiple interviews with O3’s ED, I experienced him to be approachable, thoughtful,
down-to-earth and quite humble, often quick to point out that his organization still had
room for improvement even when proud of a particular accomplishment. His
subordinates described him similarly. One said “he’s kind of a big boy…he jokes around
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and its fun, but when we have to make some tough decisions around here, I really trust
that [he] always considered what is the best interest for the clients and staff before
making those decisions”. As a boss he was described as “supportive”, “want[ing] to see
people succeed…not a punitive boss at all”, with one informant saying, “he really takes
time with me and I feel like I get for sure what I need from him and it feels great”. The
ED seems to make a good impression when he interacts with lower-level staff, too, and is
considered to be “relaxed [in front of staff] and pretty articulate in terms of describing for
people at large what’s going on in this organization, what we’re doing”.
The ED’s own assessment of his strengths is in-line with staff impressions. He
feels he “really tr[ies] to look for the positives with [his] staff and [he is] really good at
being supportive”. He’s also tries to stay “grounded”, remembering his years on the front
lines at O3 and strives to be empathetic and approachable. These sensibilities could also,
O3’s ED admits, be a weakness because he can sometimes “let people push things to
[him] too much and they look to [him] to have all the answers”. To help with this he has
recently tried to do “some talent management” and bring in new people to build capacity.
Some of these capabilities involve certain business skills and acumen that the ED is
aware is an area for growth for him.
Since the ED has no formal business training (he has an MSW), he has had to
learn a lot about management and finances along the way. While he still feels somewhat
short in these areas, the Board Chair feels that his unique back ground is actually a plus,
saying:
When you have a true clinician, a clinician who understands…but now has the
business side, when you can actually talk with legislators and people doing
budgets and CG1 and say…‘here's what really happens in the trenches and here's
how it works”, I think that actually is our competitive edge. So, that's where our
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home-grown [culture] works. You know, because we have somebody who
understands the system and how it's changed over the years.
In addition to these strengths, some on the Board would like to see the ED play up this
competitive advantage and be even “more external”, focused on fundraising and
advocacy.
Board of Directors: “we've only, in one-hundred and fifty years, had four
board presidents”. Like O3’s staff, O3’s Board of Directors has a remarkably stable
membership. They have no term limits and in the entire history of the organization have
only had four Board Chairs, excluding the current one. In addition, three of these four
were all part of one family group. The current Board Chair took over in early 2010 and
has some desire to implement some change for fear things are getting stale. However, he
sees pros and cons to the Board’s current structure. One potential problem is the
possibility of having “a herd mentality because you tend to put people on the board that
are like-minded so and if they don't go anywhere…you actually can have a limited
thought process”. Although,
There's also something to be said for continuity, not having to, every third
meeting, explain…the complexities of the ever-changing environment…we are
very involved and it actually helps in the strategic planning that we can actually,
in my opinion, be of value add because we actually kind of know what we're
talking about.
Historically, the Board has been very focused on finances, partly due to
philosophy, partly due to the expertise of Board Members who come largely from
banking, insurance companies and small business. The ED says this has been a benefit
because Board members “are very attuned to the financial structures and…they leave the
real child welfare, mental health strategic thinking to management”. However, the ED is
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trying to change this pattern to get the Board more informed and involved in
programmatic decision making as well.
The Board used to meet monthly, but last year moved to quarterly schedule to
take some of the burden off its members. Unfortunately, a scheduling conflict prevented
me from attending the Board Meeting that fell during the study period. I was told by the
Board Chair that they try to keep their meetings to an hour, and that the meetings are
unique in that the members sit in a circle, away from tables in order to facilitate
engagement and discussion. Supposedly, their discussions are “always extremely polite;
there's never any heated discussion”, though they can be “intense” at times.
Strategic Positioning
Uniqueness: “really poised to really take on a bigger chunk of community
based stuff”. O3 is unique in that they have also had a footprint in community-based
services for decades in addition to their strong residential treatment programs. While not
formally their intent, they have created almost a continuum of care model, starting with
an almost half-century old commitment to early childhood education aimed at preventing
family dysfunction, to a well-regarded personal and family counseling center open to
members of the community of all ages. They were also one of the first organizations to
attend to the needs of older youth in foster care, offering transitional and independent
living programs in both Saint Louis and Kansas City since the 1970s. Given this level of
diverse experience and trends in the environment, several of the informants expressed
confidence that the organization is well-positioned to seize future opportunities.
However, the ED acknowledged “that that could change like that <snaps fingers>”.
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Constant change is something O3 has learned how to cope with by being
particularly in tune with its customers, both internal and external. They have had a
unique level of commitment to trying to be the employer of choice, focusing on paying
slightly higher than their competitors, especially in the mid-1990s, and always searching
for new ways to make employees feel valued. O3 also feels that they “go the extra
mile…to meet client’s needs” and that they have exceptional success with some of the
youth they serve. In addition to providing high-quality therapeutic services, O3 has also
set themselves apart by their collaborative, partnership-driven approach to working with
the State and other stakeholders. One informant explained that “there is not at all an
adversarial relationship between ourselves and our funding source, particularly with our
children’s division…the feedback that we get [is]…‘you guys are really kind of unusual
because this is not usually how another agency will approach us’”. Their relationship
with the State has allowed them to know “what’s coming down the pike” and O3 has
positioned themselves as a flexible team-player to be able to take advantage of new
developments.
The other main thing that sets O3 apart from its competition is its reserve fund,
which is five to six times larger than the other study participants’. Access to abundant
resources has put O3 in the enviable position of being able to serve their mission even at
the expense of their bottom line. The ED said of their Early Education and Head Start
program, “we invest heavily from our reserves to support that program, but we’re
working with low-income folks”. Another informant reiterated that at O3 “the dollar is
not always the bottom line…we do look at sometimes ‘is this is what’s best for kids’?”
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He did admit, however, that they “can only do so much probably charity”, but that the
size of the reserve fund definitely alters their thinking about programs and possibilities.
Key strategic initiatives: “You have to have things come in at the top of the
funnel because everything's going out the bottom”. Much of O3’s initial forays into
community-based services happened well before the scope of the current study, but they
have continued to focus on expanding and diversifying their programs, especially those
targeted at children and families in the child welfare system. A major strategic thrust has
been to keep referral streams open and not allow other “gatekeepers” to control their
access to clients or ability to provide services. This has driven the organization’s
affiliation with CG1, the maintenance of their residential treatment programs despite
large operating deficits, and the expansion of their educational and case management
services. These tactics were all in an effort to remain a relevant player in the market and
serve clients at multiple points in the expanding system.
In the past few years O3 has also launched a complete organizational rebranding,
including a name change and new marketing materials. Like many historic religiouslyaffiliated orphanages, O3’s name referred to its church roots. And, like most
organizations, while its connection to various church congregations is strong, very little
of its funding actually still comes from this source and its religious name was beginning
to hinder fundraising and reputation management in other arenas. The decision to change
the name of the organization had been considered for almost a decade, but finally gained
traction during the 2007 strategic planning cycle and was executed as part of the
organization’s celebration of its 150th anniversary in 2008.
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Keeping up with the changing environment has also led O3 to develop many
strategic initiatives aimed at staying up-to-date with new technologies in the area of
information and data management, communications and clinical treatment modalities.
They have introduced a new Performance Improvement Director position that is in charge
of developing and managing outcome measurements and quality-assurance protocols and
they have worked with their staff to increase comfort with evidence-based practices and
usage of clinical outcome indicators and performance data for decision making. They
have also, as suggested above, always had strategic initiatives to improve employee
engagement and retention.
Many of O3’s strategic initiatives have required considerable resources, and O3’s
Board has always been heavily focused on being good stewards of their large reserve
fund in order to provide for sustainability. However, in the wake of two large market
declines, the Board more recently has made “a stronger push for fiscal responsibility”.
About three years ago they insisted on hiring a full-time CFO, one of the first outside
administrative hires in the organization’s history. Before the current CFO came in, O3’s
leaders never “really knew the true cost associated [with their activities] in a formal
way”. This new capability has helped the organization reduce their accounts receivable
and generally reigning in spending in the past few years. However, the Board knows that
“some things are just going to lose money and you have to choose to lose money and be
okay with it”.
Strategy Formation Processes
Current formal process: “boiled-down SWOT analysis [and] really trying to
look at what we do well”. O3 began engaging in formal strategic planning about 25
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years ago, and, with the exception of their 2007 cycle, they have always hired a
consultant to facilitate the process. For the three consecutive planning cycles between
1997 and 2003 O3 hired the same consultant who used a standard SWOT analysis
framework and was very focused on understanding the dynamics of the market. The
somewhat lengthy process involved the participation of only the upper-level management
and yielded long formal reports and detailed action plans.
For financial reasons, and also hoping to expedite the process, O3’s ED led a
streamlined version of the strategic planning process in 2007. One informant said “it was
really a much quicker process. We didn’t sit around and talk a whole lot. [The ED] came
in to it with some ready assumptions about where we were headed, and for the most part,
I don’t think anybody felt strongly enough about differences with him to debate it”. The
organization was approaching its 150th anniversary and community-based services were
continuing to expand, so most of the group, who had very long tenures working together,
felt that many of the initiatives “were just so clear”. The group quickly developed
strategies by “some overall majority feeling of here’s some areas we think we should
focus on” and assigned champions to each to oversee implementation.
The 2007 process was quicker and easier, but also very time consuming for the
ED. Not being able to take on that level of work again, and wanting to go in a new
direction, O3’s ED hired a new consultant for their most recent strategic planning cycle,
which began in April 2010. The ED had worked with this consultant previously during
the creation of the strategic plan for CG1, of which O3 is a founding member, and liked
the man’s practice of coming to the strategic planning workshop having already
interviewed and surveyed multiple staff and stakeholders and synthesized a lot of data.
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O3’s ED wanted a new process that was less burdensome on staff and a consultant that
could drive difficult discussions about internal organizational priorities and shoring up
weaknesses instead of being so externally-focused and market driven. He also wanted to
involve more people in the planning process, including the Board and mid-level
managers. In the past, the process had been “totally staff-driven”.
I had the opportunity to observe O3’s day-long strategic planning workshop in
June 2010. It was attended by 20 senior staff and Board members, including the current
and past EDs and the Board Chair. The group was relaxed and informal, but clearly
focused on the large task at hand. The Consultant briskly led the group through for a
“fast-track development of a 3-year strategic plan”. He explained to me during a break
that he likes to “bring a business approach to the process” that is less “touchy feely” and
more analysis-driven so that the connections between different decisions could be seen.
Before the workshop the consultant had interviewed and surveyed staff and board
members and had worked with the CFO to build preliminary financial models to capture
various strategic scenarios.
Armed with this information, the consultant started the workshop by presenting
the results of his data collection, which included a SWOT analysis and people’s initial
thoughts about strategic directions. The first half of the day was spent confirming and
discussing the analysis and making sure everyone was in agreement about how the
information had come together. The group then discussed how much each program could
be expected to grow or shrink in the coming three to five years. There was a broad
discussion about possibilities, but the group was urged by the consultant to at least “take
a stab at a number” and then the details could be worked out later after they had a chance
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to “run the financials”. The group coupled this discussion with suggesting targets for
programmatic deficit reduction in each program. This was a difficult conversation that
seemed to push people’s comfort levels.
After a break, the consultant articulated several areas needing strategic action that
seemed to have percolated from his analysis. Eventually the group settled on fundraising
and marketing, partnership and alliances, expense management and cost reduction, talent
management, board development, and technology execution; after lunch the group broke
out into smaller groups to flesh out strategic initiatives for each area, which were then
presented to the larger group and revised as needed. The last component of the process
involved revisiting O3’s mission and articulating its vision and “hedgehog concept”.
Several small groups also focused on various programmatic growth strategies. In the
end, the group developed the vision statement of “children, youth and families will be
empowered to be productive community members” and asserted that they were
passionate about improving the lives of the children and families they serve, are best at
quality professional services provided with high integrity by a dedicated staff, through
the engines of contracts, grants, staff, volunteers, board, reputation. After eight hours
together, the group was clearly tired, but was assured by the consultant that they had
made great progress and that he would do a lot of work behind the scenes to pull things
together, run numbers, and help them put together implementation plans and a
presentation for the board.
Process evolution. Over the years, O3 has used a very common consultantfacilitated, SWOT-based, consensus-driven strategic planning process with a three-year
planning horizon. In the recent past they have tried various ways to make the process
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quicker and more efficient. The 1997, 2000, and 2003 planning processes were very
formal and structured, resulting in long documents and strategies that were formally
broken-down “goals, objectives, strategies, and action plans”. The consultant who
facilitated these processes “focused on market analysis”, and, according to the ED, used
“pretty much the same types of things…the same dimensions…the situational analysis
might have changed, but you were still using the same framework”.
While the strategy formation framework and process remained relatively stable
until the most recent process, O3’s ED felt like they have had increasingly better internal
data available to them. He commented, “in years past some of our stuff was anecdotal,
and we thought in our gut this is what we needed to do and why. We’re more data driven
now…And I think that has sometimes improved our ability to make strategic decisions”.
A desire for better information with which to make decisions has also led O3 to try to
make the process, which used to be driven by the “very top management”, more
inclusive, a goal they seemed to have achieved in the most recent cycle where
representatives from multiple organizational constituents, including the Board, were
around the table.
The current process, and the one used in 2007, was chosen because of its
expeditious nature, compared to previous cycles. The ED commented that “the more
we’ve done this, the more my staff and I want to get the meat of ‘what do we need to?’
We want to get to the strategy…we don’t want to sit in the meeting and have long drawnout discussions”. From my observation, the process seemed quite expedient, even
perhaps a little overly so at the expense of people’s comfort levels and engagement.
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Content of formal plans. Because the formal plans between 1997 and 2003 were
prepared by the same consultant, they had the same format and similar content. The
plans consisted of several documents, including a “Strategic Concept Statement” that
contained detailed background information and a comprehensive market analysis that
demonstrated a very clear understanding of the changing market and service trends. Out
of this flowed the rationale for the “Major Objectives and Plans of Action”, or strategies.
The “driving force” and background information supporting the choice of the intended
strategy was provided, along with tactics for achieving them. These cascading
documents were trying to flow through to the implementation stages in order to assist in
monitoring and follow-through. O3’s 2007 strategic planning process, which was
facilitated by the ED, does not seem to have yielded an extensive plan document, but
rather a brief presentation of agreed upon goals.
In the decade between 1997 and 2007, the strategic content of O3’s plans had
several common themes. For instance,
•

Expansion of service array
o Perform general market upgrading—market research will look at
exploring and expanding the current market base and increasing
revenue opportunities in all market areas (1997)
o A number of new services will be researched for possible addition
to the current [O3] service array (2003)

•

Adopting new treatment technologies
o “Design, develop and adopt new treatment technologies capable of
improving treatment efficiency and quality” (1997)
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o “To use evidence-based interventions within each [O3] service
program and evaluate effectiveness of interventions in achieving
expected outcomes” (2007)
•

Improving the quality and usefulness of internal data
o “Implement outcome based measurement for programs and
program administration” (1997)
o “To create systems and environments that increase productivity,
efficiency and satisfaction.” (2003)

•

Enhancing morale and employee engagement
o “To build on staff strengths through effective communication,
development and nurturance” (2003)
o “To develop and implement systematic internal methodologies that
support the positive culture of [O3].” (2007)

Views on formal process: “You at least have to know the interstate you’re
on”. One informant felt that every plan contained “at least a couple of things that were
milestone in nature that were really quite important in terms of [O3’s] development”.
The ED was quick to say that,
Out of our strategic plan have come many things. Our whole community-based
service array that we’ve developed came very much out of a strategic plan. Our
new school came out of a strategic plan. So there are some very concrete things
that the Board had the vision with us, approved, helped us find resources to do
them, and we did it.
Another informant specifically cited the hiring of the Performance Improvement
Director, which was prompted by a strategic planning process, as “monumental” and
“forward thinking”. It was felt that these were all things the organization may have done
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eventually, but not as soon or with as much urgency without a strategic planning process
to galvanize support and action.
While making action more likely, informants did not feel that the strategic
planning process led them to make different strategic decisions, but rather it just got them
to formally “put some things on paper that [they] already knew”. To most, this was still
seen as a useful process with a needed outcome, although as the rate of change within the
sector has increased, the perceived utility of formal strategy formation has decreased.
One informant felt that the plans in the mid-1990s helped position the agency and had “a
bigger impact on the agency” than later ones, which were thought to be “more
reactionary” in the face for rapid change. Several informants worried that longer-range
questions fundamental to the organization’s identity, such as whether or not to continue
offering residential services, were getting lost in the hustle to cope with more immediate
demands. A side-effect of this hustle was also a feeling that recent plans yielded
strategies that were less ambitious and more “sort of a person’s job”.
Help maintaining a balanced focused on short and long-term concerns is one
reason O3 has predominantly used a consultant to facilitate their strategic planning
processes. According to the ED, a consultant “who doesn’t have a chip in the game” also
lends organization and objectivity to the process, which is considered needed because
“it’s very easy to get tunnel vision in this business”. Even while recognizing the added
benefit for having and “outside voice that can help [them] to be able to be a bit more
objective in terms of [their] approach” several informants expressed some frustration
with having to spend “an awful lot of time getting the consultant up the speed”. In
addition, the use of the same consultant and the same process for several cycles seemed
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repetitive and a “little bit brutal” to some. It was thought that the process the ED
facilitated in 2007 was “just as effective” and more efficient, though the informant
admitted that it may be partly because “[they] kind of knew where [they] wanted to end
up”.
Even if here was little question as to the eventual strategic content, strategic
planning was still seen as a useful analytical tool to help manage uncertainty in the
environment, helping the organization to “take things into consideration…and take
control of what [they] can take control of” so that they aren’t “making decisions in a
vacuum”. Most informants also expressed a sentiment similar to this one about formal
planning’s ability to provide boundaries and confidence:
You have to have some road map. You at least have to know the interstate you’re
on; you may veer off onto a smaller road, but you need to get back on the
interstate sooner or later because if you have no roadmap you will probably
unwisely spend money…The strategic plan gives structure to the employees…I
think strategic planning is, in a lot of ways, a great roadmap, but probably a better
morale [booster] in making staff feel comfortable in what they're doing and that
they're respected in the job they’re doing because it’s reflected strategically in
what the overall mission is.
Unfortunately, giving the timing of my data collection, I did not have a chance to
ask O3’s informants about their impressions of the most recent strategic planning
workshop held in June 2010.
Day-to-day strategy formation: “it really is kind of strategic planning that we
are doing all the time, particularly lately when the environment is changing so
quickly”. Outside of their strategic planning’s formal environmental scan, O3 is
constantly monitoring its external and internal environment for signs that action is
needed. In addition to meeting with external stakeholders, O3 regularly surveys internal
stakeholders and monitors over a dozen “key performance indicators” (KPIs). The KPIs
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were developed in 2000 to fulfill the articulated strategy of “define and develop an
administrative metrics scorecard”; indicators include turnover, residential occupancy and
success rates, monthly charitable contributions, the level of family participation in
treatment, the absence of lawsuits, etc.
O3’s Performance Improvement Director has tried to make the collection of KPI
data as simple and helpful as possible—slowly evolving from information that was
already being gathered, making the monthly tracking system more automated, and further
slicing the data down to a more usable programmatic-level. In an effort to make decision
making more data-driven, the ED recently began requiring managers to include an
analysis of their programmatic data in each quarterly report and present plans for how to
address any emergent issues. Pushing managers, who are used to giving “anecdotal”
accounts, to embrace the data has been, and continues to be, difficult, but informants are
hopeful that these new structures imposed by the ED will help normalize data-driven
decision making down into new levels of the organization.
When a KPI hits a critical threshold or environmental conditions require action,
O3’s ED sees the organization’s strategic plan as providing “a framework and an
umbrella” to guide “strategic day-to-day decisions”. For example, he said,
We made a conscious decision two cycles ago to really jump into communitybased services. We didn’t know what that was going to look like…So the global
thing was community-based service…and those decisions were made on an
ongoing basis over the next five years to keep adding to that array…at the time
that we set that goal…some of the services that we provide right now weren’t
even in existence…And then they came up and we said, yep, that fits. You do a
financial analysis that fits with the strategic goal we set, boom, let’s go after it.
These types of decisions aren’t made via a formal process. The ED typically makes a
decision after soliciting opinions from his administrative team and then takes his
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recommendation to the Board for approval. With high-impact decisions, such as whether
to help create CG1 and to later to provide foster care case management services, the ED
and his team may hold special sessions with the Board to discuss the opportunity and
various options in more detail.
Sometimes ideas filter up from staff members, such as recent employee
recognition efforts and other programmatic expansions over the years. Informants shared
that O3’s leadership was very open to considering these ideas and incorporating them
into their strategic initiatives. Other times, the Board may instigate the making of an
important decision, especially when finances are involved. For example, according to the
Board Chair, in the winter of 2009, “a random discussion prior to a Board meeting” led to
a very difficult conversation about the long-term viability of the organization that
included even considering shuttering its doors and using their reserves to start a
foundation. A result of the meeting was to focus on cutting expenses, leading to the
organization to conduct its first-ever round of layoffs. The difficult financial climate has
forced the Board to be more directive with respect to spending and strategic directions of
the organization. For the past few years the Board Chair feels like “there’s probably been
a strategic plan of the month” and the Board has had to go “through a revamping of the
strategic plan” more than once to preserve O3’s fiscal health.
Summary. For many years O3 engaged in a highly-formalized and lengthy
strategy formation process that seems somewhat at odds with the organization’s organic
and informal culture. Rather than seen as a particularly useful generative exercise,
strategic planning at O3 has been seen as a morale-enhancing codification of an alreadyfelt collective sense of direction. The process articulated valued intended strategies, but
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dissatisfied some of its participants, especially with respect to the time commitment and
focus on the market rather than the organization. The ED’s choice of a new consultant
and new process for their 2010 strategic planning cycle was with the hopes of addressing
some of this dissatisfaction. O3’s day-to-day strategic management seems to rely on the
long-tenured staff and Board member’s trust in one another’s opinions and the ability of
the leadership to discern environmental trends and advance necessary strategic decisions
to the larger group.
Strategy Implementation Process
Implementation of the strategic plan: “Here we want to do things well, so
sometimes we just get overwhelmed with all the tasks that are a part of it”. The
highly-formalized strategic planning process O3 used between 1997 and 2003 and that
influenced their 2007 planning included the creation of several documents aimed at
facilitating and monitoring the implementation of the organizations’ chosen intended
strategies. With the help of the consultant, detailed action plans that included milestones
and timelines were created for each objective. Each objective was also assigned a
champion whose charge was to oversee an implementation committee composed of
relevant members of the administrative team. Typically, the committees would meet
every month or every other month to review progress, following a planning follow-up
meeting agenda provided by the consultant. At the end of the planning horizon, O3’s ED
prepared a brief executive summary for the Board reporting on goal achievement.
Overall, O3’s informants were pleased with their implementation and
achievement of their major strategic initiatives. True to his humble nature, O3’s ED said
that they had “accomplished many. But we didn’t knock them all out”. Another
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informant concurred, saying that “you have five goals and really hit on two; that’s not
doing all five as well as maybe we should have, but we certainly moved the organization
forward on a couple of things at each point in time”. Reasons given for less-than-perfect
implementation were varied, including being “grandiose in the planning stages”, as well
as real financial barriers, especially with recent fast changes in the economy.
Several informants also acknowledged that O3 could improve on maintaining
momentum in their monitoring activities. Especially on larger “stretch” goals, O3 has
“not always been good about following the templates…having consistent meetings where
people…put you in the spot. If you don’t go to meetings, well then nobody’s watching it
and it kind of glides, and then time passes”. Inconsistent follow-through was mainly
blamed on “organizational inertia” and the fact that everyone also has their daily
responsibilities to attend to, maintaining focus on the strategic plan is a challenge that has
increased as the administrative team has been stretched by the organization’s rapid
growth. This was another reason the ED preferred having a consultant because they can
help the group maintain that focus.
While the organization has continually made progress on the their strategic
initiatives, the ED has not been rigidly focused on sticking to the implementation
timelines, saying, “what’s important to me, is not as much as that you get it done the
month you say you’re going to get it done. What’s important to me is that we do it
reasonably when you really get it done”. Therefore, occasionally timelines have been
stretched to accommodate people’s needs and to maintain quality, but the ED “feel[s]
overall good about” their strategic plan implementation.
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Implementation of community-based services growth: “We grew from a one
person outpatient counseling office to a $1.5M community-based service array. So
that’s been very successful”. One strategic goal O3 has very effectively executed is
growth and diversification of its community-based services. They have had their fingers
in community-based services for several decades, but have recently expanded
significantly. After making a formal organizational commitment to expanding
community-based services around 2000, O3 has added on a new component to their
community services about every two years as new opportunities arose and the
organization had the capacity to absorb a new program. The once one-person counseling
center has grown into a large counseling and community services department that houses
five different programs aimed at trying to prevent out-of-home placement, including
family reunification services, intensive in-home counseling and foster care case
management. They are hoping to further expand with an innovative after-care program
they recently developed and marketed to both CG1 and a health insurance company that
more efficiently keep kids in their communities.
Building on their reputation and skills in community-based services, O3 was also
awarded two grants from the St. Louis County Children’s Tax Fund, totaling over $1.3
million. Beginning in September 2010, these funds will be used to expand their
transitional living program in Saint Louis and to start a collaborative effort with O2 for
in-home treatment of children and families involved with the court system. An informant
involved in the project explained that O3 chose to work with O2 for the initiative because
“the grant people, they’re looking for collaboration and so I think that we feel like [O2
has] similar values and cultures that we do and that we work with them in foster care
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[with CG1]. So we know them and trust them and like the work that they do”. With the
exception of CG1, this is the first large-scale service delivery partnership O3 has entered
in to.
In addition to developing new programs, O3 has also enhanced existing programs
to meet the needs of the community. In 2005 they began a federally-funded Head Start to
supplement their day care center, and in 2001 they “built a state-of-the-art school” to
replace the old basement-level facility and so they could take in new children from
surrounding school districts. O3 undertook an ambitious capital campaign to finance the
building and is very proud of the complex. One informant confidently stated that it is “a
tremendous feather” in their cap. Unfortunately, with the recent economic problems,
referrals from outside surrounding school districts have slowed and the program was
forced to lay off a teacher. There is hope that things will turn around eventually; in the
meantime, informants felt that the school still helps the organization from a referral
pipeline and reputation standpoint.
Implementation of Foster Care Case Management: “We really utilized
CG1’s capabilities and expertise”. O3 has developed their community-based services
capabilities internally, not looking to acquisition targets and rarely using partners. One
exception to this is their implementation of foster care case management (FCCM)
services where they relied heavily on a wholesale technology, and even sometimes
personnel transfer from CG1. O3 strategically chose to enter the FCCM market in order
to gain access to the pipeline of kids and learn valuable case management skills. The ED
explained that they chose to implement this strategy by partnering with CG1 as a
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subcontractor because, “we could get the right training and expertise to help us get up to
snuff…And secondly, there’s a liability protection”.
Since 2005, O3 has had one FCCM team that has managed 140-190 cases each
year in the Saint Louis area. It took the organization about three months to hire the seven
case managers and one supervisor and get them ready to take on cases. By aligning with
CG1, O3 did not have to develop their own staff training program, which was important
because they had no in-house expertise in the “treatment philosophy, court system…the
data requirements, the contract requirements”. Despite having initial staff training taken
care of, the organization still had to figure out how to work day-to-day with unfamiliar
systems, such as the courts, the Justice Department, etc. The whole “wraparound”
philosophy was also new to O3 and took some adjustment. All of these changes led one
informant who was present for the start-up to describe the process as “complete
insanity…It was hell…it’s something we hadn’t done before, so as an agency, we had a
huge learning curve…We really didn’t have any direction to give a supervisor because
we have never done this before”. O3 ended up taking on a supervisor was actually a CG1
employee to help get things up and running. Once they hired their own supervisor a few
years later, the informant said it felt like “taking training wheels off”. Now O3 has the
experience and connections that they can volley into other programs like the recentlyfunded collaborative effort with O2. They would also consider expanding into other
geographic regions if the opportunity presented itself.
In addition to the benefits stated above, O3 also receives valuable oversight from
CG1. The ED explained that the biweekly directors meetings and regular staff trainings
help O3 keep up their quality and gives them a chance to regularly and objectively look at
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what they are doing. As part of some of these meeting discussions, O3, along with other
CG1 partners, have recently lowered caseloads from 15 to 12 to reduce staff burnout and
hopefully improve outcomes.
Summary. O3’s leadership has been aggressive and yet thoughtful in
implementing their community-based services growth strategy and using their partnership
with CG1 for support when possible. Day-to-day, they are clearly capable of executing
large-scale initiatives. However, sometimes they have struggled to stick to the more rigid
strategy implementation process laid out for them by previous consultants. Like their
formal strategy formation process, there is perhaps a mismatch between O3’s culture and
their choice of strategy implementation process, one that imposes more structure and
formal accountability than is inherent in the organization. It’s not clear if this
formalization needed, however, given O3’s record for getting things done. Is O3 really
suffering from bouts of organizational sluggishness alternating with grandiosity or are
they doing fine and just feeling guilty about not sticking to a possibly ill-fitting process?
Conclusion
Constant environmental change has required O3 to be responsive to day-to-day
conditions, a reality their tight-knit leadership team and Board seem to handle well.
Strategic planning has been an intermittent reality check and way to circle the wagons
and move forward with a renewed sense of purpose. However, O3’s “home-grown” and
informal culture seems to be a bit of a mismatch with their formal strategy formation and
implementation processes. It’s not clear where this stems from, perhaps tradition,
perhaps an attempt to bring “business savvy” to a predominantly clinically-trained
leadership. Regardless of the reason for the divergence, O3’s strategic management
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efforts have yielded good, solid performance during a decade of extreme change and
financial hardship. They have eventually implemented the vast majority of their chosen
intended strategies and stayed within the bounds they gave themselves. The one thing O3
seems to lack is a clearly articulated position in the marketplace. They have a good
reputation as being mission-focused and people-driven and have expanded at both ends of
the child caring spectrum, but their identity still seems a bit amorphous. It is possible that
the cushion of their reserve fund has kept them from having to streamline and determine
their “hedgehog”. It will be interesting to see how their new planning efforts and focus
impact them in the coming years. How their processes have affected their performance in
the past decade is explored in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS REVEALS THE IMPORTANCE OF
ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT AND IMPLEMENTATION
The three in-depth case studies presented in the previous chapter provide rich
descriptions that foster the appreciation of the special situationality of each organization.
This level of understanding is a needed addition to a body of research literature that too
often prescribes processes before generating knowledge about current practices in the
field. However, taking each case individually limits the ability to set the strategic
management processes practiced by the organizations in context and to draw conclusions
about causality, especially with respect to performance. Therefore, a second stage of
analysis was performed in which each case study report, after being checked by the
organizations’ Executive Directors for accuracy, was compared to one another to
aggregate findings, look for meaningful similarities and differences and gain a deeper
perspective on the research aims (Stake, 2006).
All of the aims seek to understand the organizations’ strategic management
processes within the context of their external environment and internal dynamics, with
the overarching question of whether and how the process used to formulate strategy
impacts organizational performance. The previous chapter provided a general thematic
overview of the external environment the organizations have coped with and helped
shape over the past decade. While the current study’s design ensured the organizations’
external world has been nearly identical, the organizations’ internal contexts are notably
different and appear to have impacted many of their processes and decisions and
ultimately their performance over the years, as will be explored in the rest of this chapter.
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Internal Organizational Contexts
The three study organizations are well-functioning and pleasant places with which
to interact. From what I could tell without spending a lot of time observing the
organizations in action, there seems to be little, to no politicking, allowing for a
respectful, open environment in which everyone whole-heartedly pursues the mission of
attending to and empowering troubled children and their families. The informants I
spoke to seemed happy in their positions and genuinely invested in their organization’s
success. Furthermore, each ED has provided consistent leadership in their current
position since the mid-1990s, and most of the Board and staff informants had had
similarly long tenures.
Despite these similarities, highlighting how the organizations’ internal contexts
are qualitatively different is a more useful activity to meet the study’s aims. Three salient
variables emerged from comparing the completed case reports; they are: 1) the aspect of
business the management seems most focused on, 2) the level of formalization within the
culture, and 3) the sense of urgency that pervades the organization. Because these are not
quantitative constructs with an absolute pole, I offer relative comparisons among the
organizations, not concrete values. Table 8 below presents part of the cross-case analysis
matrix, which captured key text segments for each domain and distilled them into
essential characteristics that help distinguish the organizations from one another.
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Table 8: Cross-case Analysis matrix of internal organizational context
Organizational Context
Management
Level of
Org
Description from Case Report
Focus
Formalization
Highest
O1 focused on continuous improvement Processes
and accountability...clear chains of
command and levels of hierarchy...
Feedback is highly prized ...become
even more data-driven and
outcome-driven
Entrepreneur- Lowest
O2 friendly and informal...
entrepreneurial atmosphere without ship
rigid job descriptions in which open
debate, creativity and problem
solving are prized...departmental
and regional siloing... boundaries
around the organization and its
environment seem to be rather loose
People
Moderate
O3 genuine respect for people and an
emphasis on mission, empowerment
and honesty...treat our employees as
our customers…continual efforts to
improve the organization’s culture
and morale…openness...from its
beginning tried to hire, promote
from within

Sense of
Urgency
Moderate

Highest,
somewhat
frantic

Lowest

The leadership of each organization has a clear focus, as evidenced by consistent
themes throughout the interviews and organizational documents. O1 is clearly focused
on the development and improvement of processes of all kinds. O2 is focused on and
achieving financial sustainability through fostering an entrepreneurial spirit amongst its
staff. O3 is focused on how people, both their employees and clients, experience and are
helped by the organization. Highlighting these foci does not necessarily imply that the
leadership neglects other areas, but that there is a through line of concern and attention
that seems to routinely elevate this unique aspect of the organization above others.
Not surprisingly, given their focus on processes, O1’s culture appears to have the
highest degree of formalization, with clear work roles and efforts to standardize
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processes. O2 is most dissimilar, with much more fluid boundaries between levels of
management and more comfort with on-the-fly problem solving. O3 falls somewhere in
the middle, with a moderate amount of formalization, though, as discussed in their case
report, this may be contrary to some of their other cultural attributes that focus on
people’s experiences.
Another seemingly important aspect of organizational context that emerged from
the cross-case analysis was a varying sense of urgency for change. There was a palpable
difference in the way the organizations talked about change and their strategy
implementation. While focus on this concept arose from the cross-case analysis, it is not
new to the business literature and has recently gained even more awareness with the 2008
publication of John Kotter’s book, A Sense of Urgency. After taking stock of his prior
research on organizational performance and change management, Kotter concludes that
“the single biggest error people make when they try to change…was that they did not
create a high enough sense of urgency among people to set the stage for making a
challenging leap into some new direction” (2008, p. vii-viii). He also draws a distinction
between a sense of urgency “driven by anxiety, anger and frustration” that can lead to
frantic action versus a more purposeful sense of urgency driven by “a focused
determination to win”.
While I did not ask specific questions to assess this domain, my multiple key
informant interviews did give me enough information to compare the level of urgency at
each of the organizations. When placed on a continuum, O2 could be classified as having
the highest sense of urgency, often framing the need to change as a matter of survival.
However, O2’s urgency does seem to be somewhat frantic, driven by very real fears of
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financial hardships and frustration with the child welfare reimbursement system.
Compared to O2, O1 and O3 displayed less urgency, though O1 did have some internal
pressure to change, especially with respect to improving processes. O3 has certainly
changed a lot in response to changes in the external environment, but they only recently
seem to be feeling an urgent need to do something more drastic to cope with declining
market returns and disadvantageous programmatic cost structures. It is difficult to say
whether any or all of the organizations’ leaders have inspired “enough” urgency for the
scale and pace of change they advocate. Nevertheless, there was a noticeable difference
among the organizations.

Aim 1: Strategic Positioning
Porter’s Five Forces framework is a well-established approach to analyzing
industry dynamics (Ghemawat, 2005). It asserts that the threat of new entrants and
product substitutions, along with the pressures of suppliers and buyers and competitive
dynamics affect profitability within an industry. From this perspective, the children’s
mental health services sector is not attractive. As the previous chapter’s description of
the external environment detailed, while there is very little horizontal threat of new
entrants or substitutes, the organizations face intense vertical pressures from both
suppliers (personnel) and buyers (government and donors) that severely limit possible
margins. However, the leaders of the study organizations are driven much more by
historical missions than a desire to profit, and therefore are committed to competing for
what revenues are available in a space where client need is still very high. This social
barrier is just one of several common exit barriers that keep organizations involved in
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clearly declining industries (Harrigan & Porter, 1983). Residential treatment’s
interrelationship with the organizations’ other services also creates a strategic need to
remain in the business and the specialized assets of large campuses diminish the
organizations’ ability to liquidate and solely focus on more profitable services.
Because the organizations have little control over price, the nonprofit children’s
mental health sector in Missouri has been able to avoid potentially destructive price wars.
Its strong collaborative spirit has also helped facilitate an orderly reduction in excess
residential bed capacity that, barring any further shocks, appears to be bringing the
market into equilibrium. In reality, there will always be some demand for residential
treatment services. As some of the only remaining competitors in this space, the three
study organizations have obviously successfully navigated the decline in demand. The
question is: which has built the strongest strategic position relative to the residual demand
and other more attractive subsectors? This can be explored from a structural positioning
or resource-based perspective.
Each of the organizations has had to consider the usual generic positioning
strategies at their disposal: compete by diversifying their services and/or controlling their
costs ((Lindenberg, 2001); see Figure 5 below). When targeting the same customers as
their rivals, an organization could differentiate on the basis of quality, or it could choose
to compile a unique portfolio of services based on population needs and geographic
location.
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Porter’s Generic Strategic Positions*
Many
Services

Cost
Leadership
Strategy

Many
Services
or Pops

Differentiation
Strategy

O2

Caught in the Middle
Few
Services

Study Organizations’ Positioning

Few
Services
or Pops

Focused Strategy
Low

High

O3
O1

Low

High
Costs

Costs
*Taken from Lindenberg (2001) as adapted
from Porter (1980)

Figure 5: Study Organizations' Strategic Positioning
Differentiation based on superior quality that garners a price premium (upperright quadrants in Figure 5) is a very common strategy in for-profit organizations. The
potential virtuous cycle of ever-improving sector-wide outcomes makes this strategy very
attractive to many human-services nonprofits. Unfortunately, the structure of most
government services contracts does not encourage this type of activity, and this is
especially true in declining industries. Therefore, it is not surprising that none of the
study organizations are occupying or pursuing this strategic position. In current
contracts, organizations can’t individually demand higher prices for better goods. They
can only compete to get more client referrals, but for the same reimbursement, meaning
they have to find previously hidden economies in order to have an incentive to
significantly out-perform another organization on the basis of quality. Improving
outcomes may advance an organization’s reputation, which may improve its chances of
procuring additional contracts, but, again, meeting a minimum reputational threshold
seems to be sufficient in the current status quo, and the three study organizations seem to
routinely meet it.
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Given the structural dynamics of being a government contractor in a declining
industry, the strategic positions the organizations can occupy while maintaining their
current mission boundaries are somewhat limited. Research has shown that in these
circumstances successful organizations are those who are able to achieve scale
efficiencies or low overhead, and that pursuing a leadership or niche strategy before
divesting may garner the strongest position (Harrigan & Porter, 1983; Grant, 2007).
None of the organizations seem to be pursuing a strong leadership position, but rather
have focused more energy on developing collaborative alliances crucial for negotiating
with the State, their dominant customer.
They all have, however, tried to cut their costs. As would be expected by the
finance background of O2’s executive director and their high sense of urgency, O2 has
been the most successful at driving a wedge between the mostly static State
reimbursement rates and their own costs, as evidenced by their having the highest
programmatic recovery rate (as detailed in the Aim 5 section below). O1 has made some
strides in this area, but informants admitted that cutting programmatic expenses is not as
much of a focus as trimming administrative overhead and improving internal processes.
O1’s informants believe that this strategic focus helps them have the highest quality
services. Unfortunately, as explained above, this may not be an effective way to build
competitive advantage given current market realities. O3 has the lowest recovery rate
and has only recently begun focusing on ways to increase their margins. Their lagging in
this area may be largely to blame on their large endowment that has typically cushioned
them from some of the financial pressures felt by their peers.

184

If O3 can cut their expenses, they would occupy a very similar position as O2, as
both have a wide array of service offerings. However, O2 has built a more robust
geographic reach, expanding their customer base with services in 19 locations around the
state. O1 has chosen a different tactic, trying to move into a niche position focused on
older youth—offering nearly every kind of service this population may need.
Unfortunately, O2 and O3 also offer many of the same programs, such as transitional
living and aging out services; although, O1’s position may have recently been advanced
by its being awarded over $2.2 million from the Saint Louis County’s Children’s Service
Fund, which seems to have prioritized older youth services. This is almost double what
the other two organizations received.
Despite having precariously similar positions within the external market, the three
study organizations could differentiate themselves based on their internal capabilities.
Since most of the organizations’ tangible resources are very similar, it is their intangible
resources and dynamic capabilities that have the potential set them apart. As Barney
(1991) highlighted, for resources and capabilities to create a sustained competitive
advantage, they must be rare, valuable, inimitable and non-substitutable. While the
organizations all possess a suite of capabilities needed to survive in their chosen sector,
such as the ability to generate direct public support, deliver high-quality services, and
adapt to market shifts, none of these are rare, at least not following recent market
contractions that left only the fittest organizations.
The hardest capabilities to replicate or substitute are those that are socially
complex and causally ambiguous (Barney, 1991). Often these lie in cultural differences
that emphasize developing different resources and enable unique ways of leveraging
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them. It is possible that O1’s control and analytical capabilities, O2’s cost containment
and adaptation capabilities or O3’s human resources capabilities may be sources of
sustained competitive advantage. The cross-case analysis of Aim 5 will explore this
possibility further.
Summary
The three study organizations have successfully developed the necessary
capabilities to survive in their sector, but further analysis is needed to determine if their
unique internal capabilities have garnered one organization superior results. What has
emerged from the cross-case analysis is that none of organizations seem to have a
significantly stronger competitive position relative to the demands of the market than the
others. Offering very similar services to similar populations, no one is poised to outpace
the others in terms of diversification, costs or quality. Over the past decade, O2 has
aggressively pursued a cost leadership strategy, putting them in a slightly stronger
position than their peers, but costs can only be reduced so much before quality begins to
dip below accepted thresholds and programs can only be diversified so far before their
mission-focus will be called into question. Furthermore, O3 is pursuing a similar strategy
in hopes of getting out of the undistinguished middle ground, and therefore may erode
O2’s advantage in the future. In this way, O1’s position may be considered advantageous
because they claim to be moving in a different, more focused direction; although, despite
recent advancements, O1 is still dangerously close to being “caught in the middle” with
no real cost advantage and minimal distinctiveness in services.
It is worth noting that the current state of the competitive landscape is likely due,
in part, to the organizations’ failure to formulate a true strategy that has the potential to
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create and maintain sustained advantage. Often when asked about their strategy the EDs
and key informants spoke about operational goals, not ways of doing something different
or differently from their peers (Porter, 1996). This lack of competitive focus can also be
seen in the content of the organizations’ strategic plans and has led to strategic initiatives
that can be easily replicated, offering only short-term advantage. This point will be
further explored in the following section.

Aim 2: Strategy Formation Processes
The three study organizations all engage in episodic formal strategic planning
processes that supplement their day-to-day strategy making. This is not surprising given
the relatively large size of the organizations and the complex environment in which they
operate, both variables Stone, et al. (1999) found to be positively related to the propensity
for nonprofit organizations to engage in formal planning. Although, for the study
organizations, coercive and normative pressures may be more powerful than needs for
coordination and communication; all the EDs mentioned accreditation requirements and a
general sense of professional expectation as reasons they started and continue engaging in
formal strategy formation processes (i.e., strategic planning).
Episodic Strategic Planning
Similar activities. Isomorphic pressures have also seemed to cause remarkable
homogeneity in many aspects of the three organizations’ strategic planning processes.
Citing regional convention, all of the organizations adhere to a three-year planning
horizon. Even though O1 technically revises their plan every year, they still use a rolling
three-year planning horizon. All of the organizations’ processes rely on top-management
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teams, with some attempt to engage or get feedback from lower-level managers. They all
also conduct periodic staff satisfaction surveys that often inform strategies around staff
recognition and retention. For the most part, Board Members are not involved in the nuts
and bolts of the strategic planning processes; rather, they are seen as an oversight body
that needs to be convinced as to the soundness of the plan in order to adequately fund the
initiatives.
Each of the organizations’ formal processes feature similar analytical activities
performed by top managers in the context of three of four group sessions held a month or
so apart. At the core is an assessment of both the organizations’ external and internal
environments via a SWOT analysis based on participants’ experiences and occasional
external research. This analysis produces mainly subjective, qualitative information that
is used as the basis for a discussion about the organization’s current situation and how to
respond. Therefore, across the organizations, the actual strategy formation—identifying
and deciding between strategic choices—seems to be a process of group meaning making
and codification of a felt sense of needed direction. It is more of an act of social creation
than objective science. Many researchers have concerned themselves with how this type
of process can be overrun by political behavior (Butler, 1998; Dean & Sharfman, 1996;
Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992), but from my interviews and limited observations there
appears to be minimal politicking within the study organizations, perhaps on account of
fairly long-tenured executive teams who are comfortable with one another and encourage
open communication.
One thing none of the processes seem to pay much attention to is the competitive
landscape and a discussion around competitive positioning and advantage. It might be
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wrapped up somewhat in a SWOT, but none of the organizations do a similar analysis to
the one presented in the previous section. In 2002, O1 did do a thorough competitor
analysis for each of their main program areas, but they didn’t seem to pull this together to
assess the position of the organization as a whole and it’s not a consistent activity during
their annual planning. Even O2’s more externally-oriented recent process focused on
environmental cues (demographic and market trends), not the movements of competitors
and possible offensive measures.
Similar output. What emerges from the strategic planning process is also similar
across the organizations—medium-term goals and objectives, often connected to a
particular functional department. While the length and format of the strategic plans
differed across organizations, a point to be explored below, I found the type of content to
be consistent and somewhat lacking in cohesiveness and explicit rationale. All of the
organizations formally articulated their handful of chosen intended strategies, but,
especially in recent years, none of them explicitly connected these strategies to the
findings of the SWOT analysis or provided a larger macro-strategy or vision for where
the organization was headed as a whole and how advantage could be sustained.
Interestingly, for the most part, the organizations’ stated intended strategies do not
map onto the strategic positions informants described during our interviews and depicted
in Figure 5 above (pg. 183). For example, O1’a strategic plans show no evidence of their
intention to become a niche player in the older-youth sector. Rather, the strategies put
forth seem rather generic and are very similar to those of their peers—diversify their
program service offerings to not be so dependent on residential treatment and improve
fiscal stability. Even though each Executive Director’s particular operational focus was
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very clear from my interviews, these foci or strategic thrusts seem to reside in the EDs’
minds and are not formally articulated so as to be transparently connected to its
strategies. It is likely that given the small-group, discussion-oriented nature of the
planning process, this is one of probably many assumptions taken for granted and not
seen as necessary to articulate.
The executive team largely responsible for implementing the strategies may not
need this level of dot connecting, but the lack of narrative limits the strategic plan’s
potential as a communication and momentum-generating device, especially among lowerlevel staff and Board Members not intimately involved with the strategy formation
process. Furthermore, not setting down a historical record of the thinking that led to the
chosen strategies and how they are assumed to work together to achieve success limits
the organization’s ability to benefit from the double-loop learning that could be fostered
by formally articulating assumptions and being able to revisit past decisions.
Different levels of importance, frequency and formalization. While the
foundational elements of the strategy formation process are fairly consistent across the
study organizations, the scaffolding that has been built around the decision-making
process differs with respect to its frequency, level of formalization and congruence with
the organizations’ approaches to day-to-day strategy making. Upon analyzing the
divergent characteristics of the organizations’ processes and placing them within the
organizations’ internal contexts, it became clear that the variability in processes is largely
due to the level of importance each Executive Director places on the strategic planning
process (see Table 9).
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Table 9: Cross-case Analysis matrix of divergent strategic planning process
characteristics
SP*
SP*
Use of
SP* Rational/
Plan Document
t
Org Import.
Frequency
Consultant Computation
Format
Revised
No—led by Highest
Consistently laid out;
O1 Highest
every year;
ED and
20+ pages; includes
redone every Board Chair
process diagram,
3 years
SWOT analysis,
action plans and
outcome measures
Every 3-4
Always
Lowest
Brief; bulleted goals
O2 Lowest
years
and objectives by
department
Usually
Moderate
Has changed from
O3 Moderate Every 3
years
lengthy document
with narrative to
presentation of goals
and objectives by
department
*
“SP” stands for Strategic Planning
t
Refers to Hart (1992) and Butler’s (1998) strategy-making modes as described in
Chapter 1.
Not surprisingly, given his focus on process improvement, O1’s Executive
Director places by far the most importance on his organization’s strategic planning
process, compared to the other EDs. He feels that the BSC process helps the organization
efficiently communicate their strategies to internal stakeholders and receive faster
information about implementation, giving their strategies the highest chance at success.
For him, the strategic planning process is intricately tied to nearly every other aspect of
organizational management and governance. In contrast, O2’s ED feels that formal
planning is a nuisance that has to be tolerated to satisfy accrediting agencies. O3’s
Executive’s feelings fall somewhere in between.
Each ED’s views on planning deeply impact the amount of time and resources
he’s willing to dedicate to the process. This is seen in how frequently he gathers his
people together to plan and how formalized the process is. O1’s ED feels the process is
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so important that it warrants a yearly revision of the strategic plan before developing the
following year’s BSC strategies and targets. Additionally, he has chosen to take the extra
time to lead the annual planning and scorecard development processes rather than hire an
outside consultant. O2’s ED always relies on a consultant, citing the need for an
objective outsider, but it also takes less of his time. O3’s ED usually hires a consultant,
but in 2007 he facilitated the process himself in an effort to save money and make the
process more efficient.
Per force of institutional pressures that highly prize formalization and attempts to
rationalize strategy making, all of the organizations’ strategic planning processes are
formalized to some extent; therefore, all the organizations are somewhat adept at the
rational/computation strategy-formation mode described by Hart (1992) and Butler
(1998) and outlined in Chapter 1. However, there is a one-to-one correlation between the
level of importance the ED places on strategic planning and how rational/computational
their organization’s processes have been over the past decade. Devising and installing
systematic procedures takes time and only an organization that places importance on the
process would invest the necessary resources. With the help of his Board Chair, O1’s ED
has worked hard for several years to institutionalize and refine his balanced scorecard and
formal “Strategy Development and Deployment Process” (see Figure 4 in previous
chapter, pg. 113). In contrast, the other organizations have no specific process outlined
and tend to follow the lead of the consultant the ED hires. I judged O3’s process to be
more formalized than O2’s based on key informant reports and documents that more
clearly demonstrated a consistent structure to their process, even when O3’s ED led it in
2007.
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The content and format of the strategic planning document also seem to mirror the
formation process’ level of formation and internal importance. For instance, O1’s
process yields a long, detailed and consistently-formatted 20+-page document every year,
whereas O2’s more skeptical view of strategic planning is reflected in the fact that their
most recent process produced a two-page bulleted list of objectives broken out by
department. Before 2007, O3’s strategic planning document was the most thorough of
the organizations, summarizing market trends and giving some context and rationale for
each chosen strategies. However, O3’s last plan (from 2007) was remarkably similar to
O2’s recent document.
Day-to-Day Strategy Formation
Even though all the organizations have some facility with formalized processes
that the leaders feel are required for strategic planning, their more typical modes of
strategy making differ, reflecting their varying internal organizational contexts and
management foci of their EDs (See Table 10). Like their strategic planning processes,
the organizations wrap different levels of structure around the performance of similar
activities, such as maintaining external relationships to access information, mentally
screening opportunities, “running the numbers”, calling a committee or task force
together, etc. Each organization’s day-to-day strategy formation processes balance the
simultaneous, yet conflicting needs for stabilization and adaptability that often strain
organizational leaders and strategy making processes (Jarzabkowski, 2004; Tushman &
Romanelli, 1985). They also variably match their episodic strategic planning processes’
level of formalization.
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Table 10: Cross-case Analysis matrix of day-to-day strategy formation process
characteristics
Day-to-Day Strategy
SP* and Daily
t
Org
Formation Modes
Recursiveness Adaptability Modes Match
Highest
Lowest
Highest
O1 Rational / Computation &
Transactive / Negotiation
Lowest
Highest
Lowest
O2 Symbolic / Inspiration &
Generative / Expertise
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
O3 Transactive / Negotiation &
Generative / Expertise
*
“SP” stands for Strategic Planning
t
Refers to Hart (1992) and Butler’s (1998) strategy-making modes as described in
Chapter 1.
The way informants described their organization’s day-to-day strategy formation
processes provided one of the best glimpses into how the organization naturally
functions. Informants at process-oriented O1 described creating decision-making tools,
operationalizing goals and increasing accountability. Based on the strategy-making
typologies created by Hart (1992) and Butler (1998), O1’s approach could best be
described as a mix between the rational/computation mode and the
transactive/negotiation mode. Organizational members are very involved in the strategy
formation process and the ED plays a large facilitative role in creating an interactive
process, but they all believe “that predetermined procedures and algorithms can be
applied to generate and analyze solutions, and to implement a choice” (Butler, 1998, p.
39). In this way, they employ tools and practices that create structure and stability and
have the potential to become highly recursive. In fact, there is an ever-tightening
relationship between their strategic planning process and the internal organizational
culture that has led to increasing formalization of day-to-day strategy making activities.
O2 is the opposite. Its blend of the symbolic/inspiration and generative/expertise
strategy making modes results in a highly adaptable process, but one with very little
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repeatability or structure. Its ED promulgates a “common perspective that help[s] guide
the actions of organizational members toward a common goal” (Hart, 1992, p. 334) while
also supporting staff members to experiment and innovate until a pattern of actions
emerges that moves the organization toward that goal. This seems very well-suited to the
organization’s entrepreneurial culture and has little impact on its less important strategic
planning process. The forced formality of strategic planning does not mesh with O2’s
preferred mode of strategy making, but they place little importance on the practice,
making the incongruence seemingly inconsequential.
As an organization with a high level of trust among long-tenured members, O3,
too, relies on a generative/expertise mode of day-to-day strategy formation. But, rather
than using symbols to inspire his staff, O3’s ED focuses a bit more on creating ways to
foster learning and collaboration, such as tracking and reporting key performance
indicators and seeking constant employee feedback. In this way, he also employs a
transactive/negotiation strategy-making mode. This orientation makes O3’s process more
recursive than O2’s, but also less adaptable. O3’s strategic planning process is more
structured and rigid than its day-to-day processes, but there is a moderate level of
congruence between the two approaches, though the organization could more explicitly
connect its KPIs with strategic goals and use them as input for their SWOT analyses.
Summary
While appearing to be very different on the surface and in the language used to
describe them, the organizations’ strategic planning processes are actually very similar at
their core. Ultimately the organizations’ articulated strategies are being formed through a
subjective meaning-making process based on SWOT analyses conducted by top-level
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managers. The process takes the next three years into account and results in a handful of
department-centric strategies. Despite differences in importance and level of
formalization, the organizations’ processes all achieve a base level of procedural
rationality, comprehensiveness and inclusion.
The additional formalization efforts of O1 have increased the frequency and
institutionalization of the practice and the thoroughness of the planning document, but the
only real impact O1’s approach seems to have on strategy formation itself is the practice
of performing a separate SWOT analysis around each of their four BSC pillars. This has
the potential to increase the comprehensiveness of the assessment, but the information is
still used as fodder for a wider discussion about the organization’s direction, and there is
no evidence to suggest that O2 and O3’s SWOT analyses are not as thorough. O1’s
balanced scorecard makes sure that each pillar has an accompanying articulated strategy,
goals and targets, but O2 and O3 also have a broad-range of strategies that hit on the
same areas of programs, human resources, development and finances. The processes also
seem to lack some of the same things, namely an assessment of the competitive
landscape, an articulated macro-strategy, and a document that clearly connects a rationale
to each of the chosen strategies.
Many of the similarities seem to be the byproduct of institutional pressures put
upon the organization through accreditation standards, professional expectations and
information on prevailing practices and some consultant biases. However, there are also
clear ways the organizations’ internal contexts impact their strategic planning processes.
How important the ED feels the process is leads to dramatic differences in the amount of
time and energy expended on conducting, formalizing and institutionalizing the
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process—the more important, the more effort and the more formalization. Not
surprisingly, the level of importance placed on formalized processes mirrors the
recursiveness, and conversely adaptability, of the organizations’ day-to-day modes of
strategy making. There is a question as to the marginal return of formalization above and
beyond what is necessary to ensure a “sufficient” level of comprehensive analysis and
thoughtful inquiry and discussion, especially if it comes at the expense of adaptability,
which is often seen as essential in complex and volatile environments (Jarzabkowski,
2004). My analysis of performance differences below gives insight into whether there is
an optimal level of formalization given the organizations’ current external environment.
The fact that the three study organizations blend together strategy-making modes
is a sign of strength, according to both Hart (1992) and Butler (1998) who hypothesized
that organizations capable of operating in multiple strategy-making modes may perform
better because they would have a better chance of matching the mode with the demands
of decision. While this multilingualism may be advantageous to cope with the demands
of day-to-day strategy making, Lindenberg (2001) found that formal strategic planning
processes need to mirror the organization in terms of complexity, resource intensity, and
staff capabilities in order to be accepted by staff and be as successful as possible. The
level of congruence between the organizations’ day-to-day strategy making processes and
its episodic strategic planning processes may impact how readily people engage in the
process, how confident they feel in its outcome and how much ownership they take over
its implementation. This possible way the planning process could impact strategy
implementation and performance will be explored in subsequent sections.
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Aim 3: Drivers of Intended Strategy
By choosing a sample of “most similar” organizations, the current study was
designed to hold the variation from the external environment constant in order to more
clearly assess how the organizations’ internal contexts and processes influence chosen
intended strategies. It was assumed that differences in strategies could then be attributed
to differences in internal contexts and strategy formation processes. As detailed above,
the cross-case analysis revealed that the organizations have very similar generic
strategies—expand into community-based services to no longer rely on residential
treatment and improve financial sustainability. This has resulted in considerable
isomorphism. However, when analyzed in finer detail, differences do emerge in the
organizations’ micro-strategies and tactics, those goals typically codified in their strategic
plans. These different tacks against the same winds have led to slightly different
positions and performance, but did something about the organizations’ strategy formation
processes help create these differences, as many strategy process researches have
asserted?
Brief Excerpts from Case Reports
I asked each Key Informant how their organizations’ strategy formation processes
impact their choice of intended strategy. In general, they do not feel that episodic
strategic planning helps identify possible strategies. Instead the strategies are developed
in real-time as staff members come in contact with the environment, assess its demands
and actively set out to solve presenting problems, i.e., day-to-day strategy formation.
O3’s ED may have put it best: episodic strategic planning process is an “analytical tool”
that “can affirm or dispute” previously-held ideas, but does not guide the group toward
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novel intended strategies. Almost every informant conveyed that the strategic planning
team usually walks in the door with some clear ideas about what they want the
organization to accomplish in the coming years. Formal planning is just an
institutionalized gut check.
The only way informants feel episodic strategic planning may occasionally impact
their strategies is in creating a setting in which the need for urgent action is more readily
apparent. In this way, decisions already in the works may be sped up. For example,
informants at O2 recounted one instance in 2003 when, based on some of the analysis the
formal process walked them through, the planning group realized how dire residential
treatment’s cost structure was. While they had had inklings for several years that the
market was shifting and what needed to be done about it, the planning process and the
resulting information significantly galvanized support around a large-scale shift in
resources toward developing community-based services.
Similarly, O1’s ED feels that the choice of a discrete intended strategy ultimately
comes down to “an educated guess” or a “roll of the die” based on how the group
understands the environment. Nevertheless, he feels that his formalized formation
processes do help him make “a quicker throw of the die”, which, compounded over time,
could add up to a different strategic trajectory. He said, “I think partly because the
feedback mechanism loop is so clear here [with the BSC] and so much quicker so that it’s
going to adjust my focus on the environment differently. So I know something is not
working here… I think [it affects] not only the speed with which, but also our ability to
more quickly react to emerging [factors]”.
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Revised Model of Strategy Formation
A revised conceptual model of strategy formation based on findings from the
cross-case analysis is presented to demonstrate how similarities and differences in
intended strategies have developed in the organizations (see Figure 6). It encompasses
insights from Aims 1-3. Unlike the initial conceptual model presented in Chapter 1 (see
Figure 1, pg. 25), in this model day-to-day strategy formation is clearly delineated from
episodic strategic planning to make its distinct impact on strategic choices and
relationships with the organizations’ internal and external environments more apparent.
Figure 6 presents only the variables related to strategy formation, one subset of activities
within the entire strategic management process. Relationships for which I found
consistent evidence across the organizations are depicted with a solid arrow. Dashed
arrows depict relationships that were weak, but present in one or more organization.

Revised Conceptual Model of Strategy Formation
Strategy Formation
External
Environmental
Context t

Day-to-Day
Strategy
Formation
Process

Intended
Strategy

Episodic
Strategic
Planning
Process

Internal Organizational Context
Consistent relationship
Potential relationship
t Construct

controlled for during current study’s cross-case analysis

Figure 6: Revised Conceptual Model of Strategy Formation
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Formal strategic planning has almost no impact on strategic decisions. Most
researchers and practitioners assume that formal episodic strategic planning positively
impacts organizational performance by helping optimize the choice of intended
strategies. The logic is that better (i.e., more formalized) strategic planning leads to
better strategies, which lead to stronger organizations. I found very little evidence for the
first link in this causal chain. In the study organizations, episodically engaging in
strategic planning appears to have almost no impact on chosen intended strategies,
regardless of the character of that planning. My findings support Mintzberg’s (1987,
1994; 2001) critiques of planning mandates that conflate planning and strategy formation;
the case studies and cross-case analysis demonstrate a clear disconnect between the two
activities. Strategic planning has essentially become cut off from other strategic
management activities. Only in highly-recursive O1 is there any feedback between the
planning process and organizational culture. As hypothesized by several nonprofit
researchers (W. F. Crittenden & V. L. Crittenden, 2000; Stone et al., 1999), strategic
planning appears to primarily be a symbolic ritual engaged in to satisfy political and
ceremonial pressures like those described by DiMaggio and Powell (1983).
If anything, there was some evidence to suggest the potential for the planning
process to be adapted to explore popular strategies emergent at the time of planning. For
instance, O3’s ED knew he wanted to rein in costs due to concerns about the economy
and their declining endowment fund, so he made sure their most recent strategic planning
process heavily focused on this aspect of operations and got input from participants about
realistic cost reduction targets. In contrast, O1’s process has been so formalized that
emergent strategies seem to have little impact on their strategic planning process. While
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this underscores my findings regarding the level of adaptability within the organizations’
processes, the difference does not seem to impact the formation of intended strategies.
Strategy formed by day-to-day interaction with the environment. In line with
findings from Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst’s (2006) review, most of the informants
interviewed felt that formal strategic planning was less about crafting new strategy than
double-checking, codifying and communicating strategies that had already emerged from
day-to-day operations. The external environment is constantly presenting the
organizations’ leaders with opportunities and dilemmas that then require them to actively
engage in real-time collaborative problem solving to determine the best strategic
response. In this way, the organizations’ day-to-day strategy formation processes
mediate the relationship between their external environment and their intended strategies.
The possible strategies are iterated via a series of decision-making processes until enough
energy coalesces around a strategy that it moves into the implementation phase. The
process may be as simple as “doing a mental screen” of possibilities and going with “a
hunch”, or as formal as convening a committee meeting or task force to more
systematically gather and analyze data.
Each opportunity or dilemma may require a different analytical approach, and
each organization has a unique repertoire of skills they are comfortable using that echo
their internal contexts; these could be considered strategic capabilities. For example, all
of the organizations feel the need to expand their program service array in order to cope
with dwindling demand for residential treatment. But O1, ever seeking more formal
processes, has devised a checklist tool to help them rationalize their decision making,
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while, in keeping with his entrepreneurial approach, O2’s ED expects his staff to create
and pilot novel ideas to see what works.
Based on strategic process research, it would be expected that O1’s process would
yield superior decisions because it is more formalized. Researchers have consistently
asserted that better decisions are made when they are based on comprehensive data
gathering and rational analysis, especially when compared to more political processes
(Dean & Sharfman, 1996; Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst, 2006; Nutt, 2000; Stone et al.,
1999). However, I found little evidence of political behavior in any of the organizations
and what a necessary and sufficient level of comprehensiveness and rationalization is has
never been defined, so whether or not O1’s process yields superior intended strategies is
not clear. Hopefully the cross-case analysis of organizational performance can help shed
some light on this issue.
Organizational mission, alliances and dominant logic bound decision space.
A secondary question of the current study was how much autonomy the organizations
have in creating their own destiny. Some nonprofit researchers have fretted over the
possibility that nonprofit organizations have very little power and are essentially puppets
of the state, especially those like the study organizations that are dependent on a handful
of government agencies for funding, (Akingbola, 2006; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983;
Salamon, 1987). While considerable isomorphism between the study organizations has
been caused by their inability to differentiate on service quality and need to comply with
contractual and professional mandates, I reject the assertion that they lack significantly
more autonomy than any other type of organization. Every sector has its unique
challenges and constraints. Arguing that the study organizations have virtually no power
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negates the work the organizations have done to remain relevant to the marketplace and
innovatively meet the needs of their clients and customers. It also masks the free will
each of the leaders possesses in leading their organization.
I think the homogeneity in organizational form and strategy stems as much from
internal, cognitive factors as external structural ones. Initial appraisal activities, such as
monitoring internal and external trends and mentally screening possible strategies, are
extremely influential steps in the strategy formation process (Janis, 1977). It is through
these activities that top executives and Board members determine which environmental
cues are important enough to warrant being brought to the attention of the group.
Unfortunately, these activities are inevitably highly subjective and constantly vulnerable
to biases, above and beyond the use of heuristics, which could negatively impact the
knowledge about strategic threats and opportunities and possible responses.
Formalization is often seen as a way to shore up these vulnerabilities, but in talking with
informants I identified three very strong and consistent forces that seem to shape the
organizations’ decisions that formalization alone may not overcome. Most often these
forces serve to create similarities between the study organizations, but occasionally they
cause divergence.
The first factor causing isomorphism is the organizations’ nearly identical
histories and missions that create a perceived boundary around what paths and identities
are possible. All of the Executive Directors told stories of how at different points in the
past decade they had a desire to expand their services into more attractive sectors, such as
gerontology or disabled adults, but found their Boards resistant to change. This pressure
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is not unique to these types of organizations, but is very strong because of their long
histories and the strongly-held mission-driven identity of their constituents.
Additionally, the complicated social web and dual identities the organizations’
leaders occupy due to their involvement with collaborative alliances seem to hinder their
ability to aggressively pursue a differentiated market position. Be it because of
“Gentlemen’s Agreements” or belief in the power of the collective over the individual,
there seems to be real hesitancy to approach collaborators as competitors. These
collaborative groups have also promulgated a certain “groupthink” about how to respond
to market shifts such as privatization and contract management that has led the
organizations toward similar strategies and tactics.
How differences in intended strategies seem to arise is from the dominant logic
held by the Executive Directors and, by proxy, their top managers. As explained above,
the management of the three study organizations have different levels of urgency and
operational foci—O1 on processes, O2 on entrepreneurship and O3 on people—
developed by years of experience and personal preference. While all of the informants
had remarkably similar (and I believe accurate) understandings of what external and
internal stakeholders were demanding of them, their varied dominant logics of how and
why things work led them to choose slightly different paths and speeds of change.
Reliance on one’s dominant logic can be a helpful heuristic, but can constrain
organizational learning and strategic performance in changing environments by filtering
out seemingly irrelevant or contradictory information that could provide helpful feedback
about the organization’s strategy (Bettis & Prahalad, 1995). Depending on the strength
of the dominant logic within the organization, unlearning old patterns and dismantling
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ineffective structures in order to learn new, more adaptive strategies may be extremely
difficult (Bettis & Prahalad, 1995). This is one of the reasons why theorists typically
urge a balance between recursiveness and adaptability within organizations
(Jarzabkowski, 2004).
Summary
Results from the cross-case analysis clearly demonstrate that strategic planning
has very little impact on the intended strategies of the study organizations and that it has
become a ritualized practice perpetuated to meet more institutional than strategic ends.
Instead, strategy is formed through the activities the organizational members perform on
a daily basis when confronted with cues from their environment. The nature and
outcome of day-to-day strategy formation processes are inextricably linked to the
organizations’ internal context, especially their members’ collaborative identities and
dominant logics. The three study organizations all have similar abilities with respect to
environmental scanning and have therefore all chosen similar strategies, but with urgency
around different focal points. In light of this finding, a refocusing on characteristics of
the strategists, rather than the strategic processes is necessary in order to better explain
differences in organizational performance.
A recent, and increasingly prominent, “strategy as practice” stream in strategic
management literature has come to the same conclusion (Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst,
2006; Jarzabkowski, 2004; Jarzabkowski et al., 2007; Mintzberg, 1987; Morecroft, 1999;
O’Shannassy, 2001; Regnér, 2008; Sminia, 2009; Whittington, 1996). It argues, like my
cross-case analysis suggests, that intended strategies are created through micro-processes
(strategizing) embedded in day-to-day management activities that are impacted heavily
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by practitioners and “who they are, how they act and what resources they draw upon”
(Jarzabkowski et al., 2007, p. 11). Upon its design, the current study focused heavily on
discrete strategic management processes, partly because that’s what could be explored in
retrospect and partly because of my own dominant logic that formalized processes have
the power to assist in decision making, transform organizational contexts and build
capacity. The resulting evidence challenges this assumption and suggests a longitudinal,
real-time case study where strategizing could be described may have yielded more
insights.

Aim 4: Strategy Implementation Process
Strategy implementation has been sorely overlooked by strategy process
researchers, resulting in only a thin body of empirical literature to help frame my crosscase analysis and findings. Several studies have focused on how increased stakeholder
involvement, especially by upper-level management, can lead to greater implementation
success (Alperstein, Sainsbury, & O’Grady, 2008; Bryson & Bromiley, 1993; Harrington
& Kendall, 2006; Nutt, 1987). However, the flat hierarchy and collaborative tenor of the
current study’s participants led to there being high stakeholder and management
involvement across the organizations with very little variation. Therefore, I let my crosscase analysis be guided by the more nuanced “key realizers” delineated by Miller (1997);
see Chapter 2’s “Strategy Implementation in Nonprofit Mental Health Services
Organizations”), namely, continued backing from authority figures and those required to
implement the strategy, a clearly defined strategy with high assessability, planning with
high specificity regarding required actions and cultural receptivity to or fit with the
implementation process.
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To analyze the study organizations’ strategy implementation, I ranked their
implementation processes along the four key “realizers” as well as the success of the
implementation. In keeping with my previous cross-case analyses, I ranked the
characteristics of the organizations’ processes against each other, not against any fixed
theoretical maximum or minimum. For the most part, the organizations were fairly
successful at implementing their intended strategies, but differences did emerge. To
clarify, in this section “success” refers to implementation success, not overall
organizational performance. I am using Miller’s (1997) definition of success as an
amalgamation of timely completion of implementation activities, achievement (i.e.,
realization) of intended strategy, and the acceptability of the implantation’s methods and
outcomes.
Implementation of the Strategic Plan
Among the study organizations, the level of formalization found in the episodic
strategic planning process (ranked above) is synonymous with how assessable and
specific their resulting strategies are (see Table 11).
Table 11: Cross-case Analysis of Strategic Plan Implementation
Strategic Plan Implementation Realizers
Cultural
Org
Backing
Assessability
Specificity
Receptivity
Highest
Highest
Highest
Highest
01
Lowest
Lowest
Lowest
Moderate
02
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
03

Success
Highest
Moderate
Moderate

The level of backing the plan’s implementation gets from key organizational leaders is
also in lock-step with how important the entire planning process is viewed by the
Executive Director. Therefore, in both the creation and the implementation of the
strategic plan the same interplay of subjective importance and formalization is seen. The
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parallel is not surprising since the more formalized strategic planning processes practiced
by O1 and O3 devote a fair amount of energy to implementation planning.
However, when it comes to strategic plan implementation, the assumed
connection between formalization and performance breaks down. According to
informants and my analysis, O2 has achieved moderate success at implementing the
strategies articulated in their strategic plans over the past decade. This is despite having
the least assessable strategies and least specific implementation plans. I believe this is
because their planning process, more than the other organizations’, simply codifies what
members are already doing so the initiatives already have sufficient backing, and, in their
rapid-fire and adaptable culture, a low level of assessability and specificity may be
sufficient for success at the program or department level where implementation activities
occur. It seems that O2 has developed implementation capabilities that do not rely on
formalization, but perhaps informal relationships and decentralized monitoring instead.
In contrast, O1 relies heavily on formal and centralized monitoring of their
strategic plan implementation, an endeavor that receives constant attention from
executives and Board members. At its core, O1’s Balanced Scorecard is a formalized
implementation tool. As explained above, their BSC has very little impact on strategy
formation, but what it does do is make O1’s strategies highly assessable and highly
specific. Every year the scorecard objectives have to be operationalized to the point that
targets and tolerance intervals can be set. Detailed action plans are then created. All of
this “strategic planning” prepares the organization to formally monitor their progress
toward each specific objective at least monthly, helping to coordinate activities to ensure
the highest possibility of success.
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All of this effort has paid off. O1 appears to have the highest success at
implementing their strategic plan. In fact, they have gotten so successful at achieving or
exceeding their targets in recent years that I suggested to the ED that perhaps they need to
raise their expectations and the ED agreed (and told me I sounded like a Board member).
While O1’s rigorous formalization appears to have resulted in superior plan
implementation success, it is not clear from this phase of the analysis if a) the strategies
were the right strategies needed to impact organization performance and b) if more than
moderate implementation success was needed to produce superior performance.
Implementation of Community-Based Services Growth
Changing external demands over the past decade necessitated the study
organizations to all adopt the strategy of significantly growing their community-based
service array to shore up the financial losses and declining census of residential
treatment. According to informants, organizations that did not respond to these pressures
have been forced to close their doors or are facing serious financial hardship. In the
implementation of this strategy, O2 has certainly achieved the greatest level of success.
As will be demonstrated in the section about organizational performance below, O2 has
built the most diversified portfolio of service offerings and has grown their revenues from
community-based services the most each year between 2004 and 2009 when comparable
data is available.
All of the organizations’ community-based services growth strategy had
comparable and somewhat low, levels of assessability and specificity. It has largely been
an opportunistically implemented strategy for which the organizations did not seem able
to formally plan (see Table 12), partly because most of the tactics were chosen and
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implemented outside of strategic planning episodes, and possibly because it was the best
approach. While contrary to some of Miller’s (1997) findings, there is some anecdotal
evidence to suggest that in cases where a strategy requires a large-scale paradigm shift,
like the one needed to mobilize resources away from residential services, much initial
planning is wasteful and leaders should instead just set clear priorities and let actors
adjust implementation as necessary (Alperstein et al., 2008).
Table 12: Cross-case Analysis of CBS Implementation
Community-Based Services Implementation Realizers
Cultural
Org
Backing
Assessability
Specificity
Receptivity
Moderate
Moderate
Low
Moderate
01
Highest
Low
Low
Highest
02
Moderate
Low
Low
Moderate
03

Success
Moderate
Highest
Moderate

It is possible that the implementation of this strategy could have been more
formalized; in fact, O1 has recently tried developing a program development checklist
and has pulled together a task force to formally assess potential mergers, acquisitions and
partnerships. But, for the most part all of the organizations implemented this strategy in a
way that favored O2’s entrepreneurial culture and comfort with low levels of
formalization. Their higher cultural receptivity to an “on the fly” implementation
process, coupled with extremely strong backing and focus on growth by the
organizations’ Executive Director and other leaders set O2’s strategy implementation
ahead of its peers’ with respect to community-based services growth.
Implementation of Foster Care Case Management
Developing foster care case management (FCCM) services was essentially an offshoot of the organizations’ strategy to grow community-based service offerings, but
special attention was paid to FCCM implementation because it was the most distinct and
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comparable strategy the organizations had realized during the study period. Entry into
the FCCM business had strong backing by all of the organizational members I spoke to.
Unfortunately, O2 and O3’s relationship with CG1 skewed their “natural” independent
behavior, allowing them to rely on the assessable and specific steps required to be a
subcontractor and removing much of the variation in processes. However, while O3 had
to rely on CG1 for staff, O2’s prior experience providing similar services made them
more comfortable with the implementation process and not as dependent on CG1 for
guidance, allowing them to more quickly become independent and seek expansion
opportunities (see Table 13).
Table 13: Cross-case Analysis of FCCM Implementation
Initial (2005-2008) FCCM Implementation Realizers
Cultural
Org
Backing
Assessability
Specificity
Receptivity
High
Lowest
Lowest
Lowest
01
High
Moderate
Moderate
Highest
02
High
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
03

Success
Lowest
Highest
Moderate

The cross-case analysis of FCCM implementation also clearly shows the
detrimental impact of O1’s deviation from their typical formalized implementation
processes. O1 engaged in little implementation planning or monitoring at the outset,
perhaps due to the influence of their collaborators or the speed with which action was
necessary. The organizations all had just 60-90 days to get services up and running.
Perhaps O1 had too much confidence in its abilities to implement strategies based on
previous successes. Whatever the reason, unlike in O2, O1 had not developed informal
implementation monitoring capabilities so it took a year or two for leaders to realize
FCCM implementation was not being adequately achieved. By 2008, O1’s ED strongly
advocated for changing the implementation approach, and was able to quickly and
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successfully correct the situation by aligning the necessary “realizers” via the hiring of a
centralized authority who is aligned with the organizations’ formalized culture to oversee
implementation.
Summary
The cross-case analysis of the organizations’ implementation of various strategies
yielded several interesting findings. First, the formalization of the strategic planning
process seems to impact the implementation of the resulting intended strategies much
more than the formation of their content. Therefore, as Miller’s (1997) research findings
would hypothesize, more formalization across the board does result in more successful
implementation of the intended strategies, as long as they are articulated in the strategic
plan. However, for less formally articulated strategies, like those formed by day-to-day
strategizing, a more complicated picture emerged that supports Jarzabkowski (2007)
“strategy-as-practice” viewpoint that argues strategy implementation, like formation, is a
highly-contextualized process made up of many iterative micro-activities.
Successful implementation seems predicated on the process’ congruency with the
organization’s established ways of doing things, but this congruency is constrained by the
nature of the strategy itself. Some strategies (like many of those articulated in a strategic
plan) benefit from assessability and specificity, while others (like long-term growth)
cannot be so formally operationalized and require different monitoring capabilities.
Ultimately, it may be up to the organization to develop multiple routines to successfully
implement varied strategies. O2 and O3 seem to have developed implementation
capabilities that do not always require formalization. Since O1’s processes are usually
formalized they may not have developed other practices to ensure implementation
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success when implementation plan specificity is low. In this way, O1’s alignment around
their BSC tool may focus energy on the scorecard objectives to the detriment of
monitoring other activities in other ways. This demonstrates that there isn’t necessarily a
formula for implementation success. A contingency approach is perhaps more advisable
in which the specific demands of the strategy are assessed and the implementation
approach most likely to meet those demands is chosen. Organizations would need to
develop multiple implementation capabilities to do this successfully.

Aim 5: Strategic Management Processes’ Impact on Performance
A cross-case comparison of the study organizations’ performance over the past
decade is necessary before making claims regarding how their strategic management
processes may help explain the findings. The following analyses present quantitative
operational, clinical and financial indicators of performance gathered from Form 990
filings and organizational records. While the organizations’ reputations are also critical
indicators or performance, there is no reliable measure, and, according to informants, all
of the organizations have strong standings in their community and are known for high
service quality and good management.
All of the financial data is reported in constant 2009 dollars. As would be
expected in a decade that saw two recessions and a major shift in treatment paradigm,
many of the numbers are highly variable year to year. To help gain an accurate picture of
performance over time, I provide multiple measures of central tendency and use annual
rate of change instead of raw growth rates to measure growth.
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O3’s fiscal year begins October 1st. Therefore, their Form 990s do not perfectly
span a calendar year. For analysis purposes, their 1997 return, which encompasses
financial data from October 1997-Spetember 1998, was entered as 1998 data, and so
forth. In the cross-case analysis this may lead to O3 looking slightly out of sync with
market trends.
Performance on Discrete Indicators
Clinical outcomes. The organizations started as orphanages, and residential
treatment services are still at the core of their budgets and identities. O1 and O3’s
residential services, both housed in the Saint Louis region, are of roughly equal size (5559 beds) and have been steady in size and occupancy for the past eight years.
Historically, O1 has had a slightly higher and more stable occupancy rate than O3, but
they have both maintained rates above 90% (See Table 14). O2, on the other hand, has
struggled to keep occupancy above 85% and their capacity has fluctuated over the past
eight years. Most of O2’s beds are outside of the Saint Louis area, spread around the
Eastern and Southern regions of the state in mainly rural areas. This regional dispersion
makes it harder to keep up occupancy since most referrals come from the Saint Louis and
other major metropolitan areas and there is an effort to serve children within 50 miles of
their home per contract regulations. While O2 is the only study organization to have
shuttered beds, in the past few years they have increased their capacity and occupancy by
starting their small Individualized Alternative Program (IAP) homes.
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Table 14: Cross-case Analysis of Residential Treatment Inputs and Outcome (2002-2009)
200220022009
2009
Relative
Mean
Median
Org
2009
Mean
Median
Std Dev Annual ∆ Annual ∆
Residential Treatment Beds
59
59
59
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
O1
99
81
79
11.5%
2.8%
0.0%
O2
55
55
55
0.9%
-0.3%
0.0%
O3
Average Occupancy
91%
94.2%
94.6%
2.0%
-0.6%
-1.1%
O1
91%
85.6%
85.0%
4.3%
0.4%
-2.3%
O2
90%
92.2%
90.7%
3.3%
0.1%
-1.0%
O3
t
Success Rate
68%
68.5%
68.0%
6.6%
-5.3%
-5.3%
O1*
t
80%
85.8%
86.5%
4.3%
-1.6%
-2.4%
O2
64%
70.4%
69.5%
10.2%
1.3%
-3.0%
O3
*Data only available from 2004-2009
t
I suspect that O2 measures their success rate differently from its peers.
O2’s success rate with their residential treatment clients is consistently 15-20%
higher than those reported by their peers. This is most likely an artifact of different
measurement because if this was a true and sustained outperformance one would expect
O2’s occupancy to also be the highest, even in an environment where quality and price
are fairly decoupled. All three organizations define “success” as moving to a less
restrictive setting, but how they arrive at that determination is unclear. Taking O1 and
O3’s success rates at face value, they appear to be fairly on par with one another. O1’s
success rate has fallen over the past eight years, perhaps because they have tried to focus
their services on older youth who typically have more severe and longer-term needs that
make “success” more difficult to achieve.
All of the organizations have also provided foster care case management (FCCM)
services since they were privatized in 2005. O2 and O3 have had similar permanency
rates since 2006—a median of 30% a year (See Table 15). Over the same period of time,
2006-2009, O1’s median permanency rate was only 24.8%, with an extremely poor start
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of only 9% in 2006. All of the organizations are trying to reach the contract target of
32% of kids being moved into permanency each year. O1 has yet to reach this mark.
Table 15: Cross-case Analysis of FCCM Permanency Rates (2006-2009)
Org
2006
2007
2008
2009
Mean
Median
9.0%
28.2%
22.8%
26.8%
21.7%
24.8%
O1*
26.4%
24.6%
35.4%
34.9%
30.3%
30.7%
O2
22.0%
31.3%
27.6%
32.3%
28.3%
29.4%
O3
*Note: Total CG2 rates, not just O1; based on Calendar year estimates from the
organization
Personnel outcomes. Over the past seven years, O2 has employed more people
than its peer organizations. Its workforce has grown an average of 22.1% a year,
presumably to keep pace with its expanding programs (See Table 16). However, some of
these workers are part-time paid mentors, a position unique to O2. A breakout by part
and full-time workers or FTE was not provided by the organizations, making a true
comparison impossible; numbers are consistently reported within the organizations,
however. O3’s workforce size has remained relatively consistent, despite its first (small)
round of layoffs last year. O1’s workforce contracted after the closing of their second
school site and other reorganizing activities. Recently all of the organizations have
described allowing unfilled positions to remain vacant as a cost-saving measure.
Table 16: Cross-case Analysis of Personnel and Turnover (2003-2009)
200320032009
2009
Relative
Mean
Org
2009
Mean
Median
Std Dev Annual ∆
Employees
177
189
200
13.5%
-3.1%
O1*
285
208
208
38.2%
22.1%
O2t
184
182
184
3.0%
0.2%
O3
Turnover
24.0%
35.7%
38.0%
17.8%
-6.2%
O1
69.0%
66.3%
66.3%
11.5%
3.4%
O2
28.0%
30.6%
30.0%
17.6%
2.2%
O3
*Data only available from 2005-2009
t
Includes both part and full-time employees
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Median
Annual ∆
-2.6%
5.3%
1.1%
-5.2%
3.4%
-0.5%

All of the organizations’ Executive Directors spoke about how reducing employee
turnover is a constant focus due to the negative impact it can potentially have on service
quality. Research has documented annual turnover rates as high as 50% at child-serving
agencies, especially among front-line childcare workers who have to constantly interface
with very disturbed and often aggressive youths (G. A. Aarons & Sawitzky, 2006;
Glisson, Dukes, & Green, 2006). Until this past year, O3 typically had the lowest
turnover rates, hovering around 30%. Since 2003 O1 has had a median turnover rate of
38.0% (see Table 16), but has successfully decreased it by over 5% each year, to a low of
24% in 2009. In contrast, O2’s turnover rates have been almost double that of their peers
and have actually increased over the past seven years. By virtue of their more rural
locations, O2 does face more hurdles when having to attract and retain well-qualified
personnel. Additionally, according to all the EDs, front-line staff have the highest
turnover rates and O2 simply has more front-line workers because of its size. These
caveats, however, do not fully explain O2’s comparatively very high turnover rates.
Revenues. The organizations’ total revenues have barely kept pace with inflation
over the past dozen years (See Figure 7 and Table 17; all financial data presented in
constant 2009 dollars).
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Figure 7: Cross-case Analysis of Total Annual Revenue
However, as stated previously, total revenue figures are not very reliable measures of
operations or management in organizations that rely primarily on program service
revenues that can be masked by volatile and somewhat arbitrary reporting of income
from private contributions and stock investments. Therefore, Table 17 breaks down the
organizations’ total revenues by Form 990 line item.
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Table 17: Cross-cases Analysis of Total Revenues by Source 1998-2009 (Constant 2009
$M Dollars) based on Form 990 Data
199819982009
2009
Relative
Mean
Median
Org
2009
Mean
Median
Std Dev Annual ∆ Annual ∆
Total Revenues
$8.76
$10.0
$9.9
15.8%
0.6%
-1.0%
O1
$9.02
$7.3
$7.2
16.4%
3.2%
-3.1%
O2
$7.23
$8.9
$8.7
19.0%
1.6%
-2.4%
O3
Program Revenues and Grants
$7.17
$7.2
$7.4
14.7%
2.3%
6.5%
O1
$7.72
$4.4
$4.0
31.7%
6.8%
3.9%
O2
$6.87
$5.2
$4.9
15.3%
4.6%
3.1%
O3
Direct Public Support
$1.67
$2.4
$2.3
29.8%
5.2%
1.4%
O1
$0.93
$2.0
$1.8
48.1%
12.2%
-14.7%
O2
$0.80
$2.3
$2.2
37.8%
1.4%
-1.0%
O3
Investments and Other
$(0.08)
$0.5
$0.5
133.9%
-63.7%
-39.9%
O1
$0.38
$0.9
$0.8
45.6%
-3.2%
-19.1%
O2
$(0.43)
$1.4
$1.3
83.0%
7.1%
-13.4%
O3
O1 has garnered the steadiest and most consistent increases in direct public
support, receiving double the amount of contributions than its peers in 2009. On average,
however, over the past twelve years O1 and O3 have reported roughly the same levels of
contributions. O2 has had lower public financial support. As for investments, O1 has
seen extreme variation (133.9% relative standard deviation) but a sustained decline in
their income declared from investments. O2’s returns were more stable and bigger than
O1’s, but O3 really outperformed all of the other organizations. While they still saw
some losses, O3’s median investment income was two to three times as much as their
peers. This is because, as will be demonstrated below, their investment portfolio is
almost six times as large.
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When revenues from program service fees and grants are analyzed on their own,
all of the organizations posted moderate gains above and beyond inflation (see Table 17
and Figure 8).

Annual Program Service Revenue by
Organization
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Figure 8: Cross-case Analysis of Annual Program Service Revenue
Across the twelve years, O1 and O2 had a similar mean/median annual rate of growth,
but O1’s growth took place in the first half of the study period and O2’s in the latter half.
On average, O1 has had the largest program service revenues of the three organizations,
but after two years of program contractions, O1 was edged out by O2 in 2009 to become
the largest. O3 has had smaller, but respectable and steady growth over the past twelve
years.
All of the organizations were recipients of new Saint Louis Country Children's
Service Funds, which were awarded in August 2010. The EDs were ecstatic at the
opening of a new and robust funding stream and reported in the Fall of 2010 that their
programs were up and running and exceeding expectations. O1 was the big winner of
these funds, being awarded over $2.22M for four different programs servicing older
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youths. O2 received almost $1.47M, the bulk of which is for a program they are
collaborating on with O3, who was awarded $1.37M. With these new funds, in 2010, O1
should exceed $9M in program service revenue for the first time, and O2 will probably be
right behind them.
Bridging deficits with reserve funds. In addition to programmatic revenue, all of
the organizations make annual withdraws from their endowment / reserve fund each year
to cover operational deficits. However, all are also trying to rein in this practice. Using
audited financial statements, I estimate that O1 withdrew rough $310,000 in 2009 and
$215,000 in 2010 to cover expected loss from operations. The ED commented that in the
mid-1990’s, O1 was withdrawing about 15% of the fund a year for operations.
According to O2’s ED, the amount they withdraw from their endowment has varied every
year and has sometimes topped $1 million and has sometimes been only a few hundred
thousand dollars. Over his 15-year tenure, “[O2 has] used $25 million that could have
been put aside in endowment for programs because [they] were focused on the mission
and not the financial end of it. And the Board willingly wanted to do that”. If necessary,
they are allowed to dip into the corpus of the fund.
Given the size of O3’s reserve fund (see below), they have had the luxury of
taking large sums of money to cover operational deficits. For instance, O3’s ED shared
that one year they had a “$10.8 million budget [and] $2.1 million of that budget comes
from our reserve fund. That’s our deficit… that’s 27% of our budget”. O3’s ED and
Board know that this is not sustainable in the long-term, and have begun to make some
tough decisions to decrease their deficit to preserve their reserves. In my final interview
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with the ED in June 2010, he shared that O3 had recently been able to get the percentage
of their budget covered by the reserve fund withdrawal to 19%.
Program growth and efficiency. Table 18 provides more context for the
program service revenue trends depicted in the second half of Figure 8 (pg. 221)—i.e.,
O2 and O3’s growth and O1’s contraction. By 2004, when comparable data is available,
O1 had already grown by a third by acquiring an emergency youth shelter and expanding
their educational services. O2 and O3’s program service revenues had been relatively
stagnant, if not declining. Coincidentally, though, it was in 2004 when these patterns
began to reverse themselves and O1 became stagnant and then contracted and O2 began
to rapidly expand their community-based and foster care case management (FCCM)
services and create innovative new small residential treatment homes (See Table 18).
Much of O2’s expansion happened outside of the Saint Louis region, markets O1 and O3
have not moved into yet and therefore could not exploit.
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Table 18: Cross-case Analysis Program Finances 2004-2009 (in Constant 2009 dollars)
based on organizational data
Direct Program Revenues c
Medians
Median
Clients*
Direct
2004Annual
(% ∆
Program Direct Cost
2009
Growth
from
Expense
Recovery
Org
2009
Median
Rate
2004)
/ Client
Rate
Residential Treatment
170
-0.8%
$28,107
84.4%
O1 $3,437K $3,783K
(1%)
274
10.8%
$15,257
85.7%
O2 $4,397K $3,561K
(-16%)
147 a
1.8%
$16,392
71.3%
O3 $2,806K $2,673K
(5%)
Community-Based Services
664
-5.8%
$6,436
84.5%
O1 $2,489K $3,802K
(42%)
739
$614K
$483K
30.4%
$847
91.5%
O2
(487%)
1060
6.9%
$3,701
78.8%
O3 $3,368K $2,935K
(-36%)
Foster Care Case Management b
64
$516K
$375K
18.8%
$7,042
102.9%
O1
(5%)
362
37.1%
$5,659
105.5%
O2 $2,512K $1,656K
(85%)
155
$841K
$586K
19.9%
$3,773
110.9%
O3
(28%)
TOTAL c
1023
1.0%
$9,243
83.9%
O1 $6,442K $7,754K
(16%)
1255
20.7%
$4,985
89.3%
O2 $7,523K $4,937K
(173%)
1222
5.6%
$6,165
76.7%
O3 $7,015K $6,098K
(-15%)
* Includes duplicates (clients served in more than one program)
a
Includes Transitional Living Program clients in Saint Louis
b
Data only available from 2006-2009
c
Based on operational data provided by organizations and differs slightly from Form 990
data
Operating programs outside of the Saint Louis metropolitan region may be a
reason why O2’s direct program expenses per client are lower than their peers. It can be
assumed that personnel and other costs may be lower in other areas of the state.
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However, in the case of community-based services, where O2’s expense per client is
astoundingly lower, personnel costs alone cannot explain the difference. Unlike
residential treatment or FCCM, community-based services can range anywhere from the
capital-intensive, 24-hour care of transitional living facilities to the one-on-one meetings
in the community between a mentor and a child. The cost structure of each program
varies dramatically and cannot, with the available information, be analyzed in detail.
What is known is that O2’s community-based services growth is concentrated in lowerinvestment programs, like mentoring and transportation. O1 and 03’s service arrays are a
mix of residential-like services to older youth and education, with O3 also running a large
counseling center.
Differential cost structures cannot, however, explain why O1 spends almost twice
as much as their peers to treat each child in their residential care. It is possible that
differences in cost allocation and accounting standards among the organizations could
explain O1’s consistently higher expenses per client across all the programs, but it is
unlikely that it can explain the two-fold difference in residential treatment costs. When
provided with preliminary data similar to that above, O1’s ED was very surprised by the
residential treatment numbers and said he would “definitely look into it.” He commented
that some of the difference may be because O1 maintains lower staff:client ratios and
higher educational requirements for front-line workers (in an effort to ensure high
quality), but admits that these alone could not explain the two-fold discrepancy.
Oddly, despite O1’s higher expenses per client, they recover more of those
expenses in program service revenues than lower-costing O3. This adds further evidence
to the hypothesis that the organizations are accounting for things differently. Even with
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additional private funding, it is very hard to believe that O1’s residential programs are
successfully getting paid twice as much as their peers with nearly identical contract with
the state. Overall, O2’s recovery rate has been consistently higher than its peers, more
than 12% higher than O3’s. Although O3 has been most successful at recovering their
expenses in their relatively-new FCCM program, proving there are capable of controlling
expenses relative to income.
Administrative efficiency. O2 did not separate fundraising expenses from
management and general expenses on their Form 990 until 2002. Therefore, only eight
years of comparative data were available across the three study organizations. Over that
period, the organizations have had relatively similar administrative overhead as a
percentage of their total expenses (See Table 19). However, in recent years, all of the
organizations have cut their administrative costs, especially O2 who dedicated just 7.1%
of their expenses to administrative costs in 2009. However, O2’s costs have also been
the most volatile.
Table 19: Cross-cases Analysis of Management Efficiency (2002-2009)
200220022009
2009
Relative
Mean
Median
Org
2009
Mean
Median
Std Dev Annual ∆ Annual ∆
Administrative Costs as % of Expenses*
10.1%
10.8%
10.4%
1.3%
-25.8%
-3.8%
O1
7.1%
10.5%
11.7%
2.6%
-43.4%
-7.0%
O2
9.7%
11.0%
10.9%
1.2%
-5.0%
0.2%
O3
Fundraising Efficiency (Return for each $ spent)
$3.1
$4.6
$4.2
23.1%
1.3%
-2.7%
O1
$1.6
$3.3
$3.1
65.6%
19.2%
-52.4%
O2
$2.2
$3.5
$3.5
36.8%
12.1%
15.8%
O3
*Note: Until 2002, O2 lumped together administrative and fundraising expenses,
therefore meaningful comparisons could only be made on eight years of data
O2’s fundraising efficiency has also been much more volatile and slightly lower
than its peers, perhaps due to the organizations’ cutbacks and restructuring of the
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department. O1, on the other hand, has consistently raised at least $1 more than its peers
for every dollar it spent on fundraising.
Debt and liquidity. O3’s massive reserve fund translates into an unrivaled
position with respect to debt and liquidity (see Table 20). In 2009, O3’s reserve fund
balance was four times O1’s and eight times O2’s. Historically, O3’s reserves have been
five to six times larger than its peers, leading them to have the lowest debt ratio and
highest equity balance and days of cash on hand. They have also managed their funds
well, making their balances half as volatile as O1 and O2’s. Despite large losses in the
recent market collapse, O1 has managed to recover more quickly than O2, increasing its
equity balance and decreasing its debt ratio. As of 2009, O2 was in the weakest debt and
liquidity position, but had a reasonable track record when compared to O1 over the past
twelve years.
Table 20: Cross-cases Analysis of Debt and Liquidity Position (1998-2009)
199819982009
2009
Relative
Mean
Org
2009
Mean
Median
Std Dev Annual ∆
Debt Ratio
9.2%
10.9%
11.8%
25.3%
4.5%
O1
29.6%
26.9%
28.3%
17.2%
0.4%
O2
7.9%
3.9%
4.7%
69.1%
78.3%
O3
Equity Balance
132.3%
112.4%
99.8%
26.8%
0.7%
O1
92.5%
135.4%
136.0%
14.5%
-2.5%
O2
326.7%
369.0%
369.4%
19.0%
-1.4%
O3
Total Investments / Reserve Fund Balance (Constant 2009 $M dollars)
$4.4
$5.2
$4.7
31.2%
-3.9%
O1
$1.9
$4.1
$4.5
37.9%
-5.0%
O2
$16.4
$23.8
$24.0
16.5%
-2.6%
O3
Days of Cash on Hand
162
198.7
161.6
44.2%
-4.1%
O1
72
226.5
248.4
43.5%
-6.5%
O2
643
997.1
963.7
23.5%
-4.6%
O3
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Median
Annual ∆
-0.2%
-2.6%
6.1%
-0.9%
-5.3%
4.7%
-10.4%
-10.7%
1.9%
-10.0%
-16.3%
-3.5%

Overall Organizational Performance
It is extremely difficult to assert that one of the three study organizations has
performed the best or worst since they have all excelled and struggled in different areas.
By and large, all of the organizations are providing good quality services, though the
sector could benefit from standardizing outcome success and direct program expense
measures and O1 needs to improve their foster care permanency rates. However, taking
everything into consideration, I believe O1 has the strongest overall performance, with
O2 a close second, but for different reasons. This is not to say that O3 has had poor
performance, but their performance doesn’t stand out from its peers, except with respect
to their large reserve fund balance. O3’s performance has been mixed: they have grown
with the help of expanded FCCM contracts, but they were the only organization to reduce
the number of clients served in community-based services and they continue to have the
lowest expense recovery rate and weakest competitive position. Despite contractions,
they still have a relatively large footprint in the community and a highly-diversified
portfolio of programs. This could be a strength going forward, though it could also
weigh them down and inhibit strategic focus.
O1 stands out for their stability on a number of indicators, as well as for their high
residential occupancy rates, decreasing employee turnover and strong fundraising results.
While their 2008 and 2009 revenues were disappointing, they have had a dramatic
bounce back in 2010 and 2011, according to their ED. O1 seems to have achieved at
least some of the balanced performance their Scorecard strives for and they have built a
strong foundation for sustainability. In contrast, O2 stands out for their highs and lows.
They have seen extreme growth in clients served and have dramatically cut costs and
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increased their rate of revenue recovery, putting them in a strong competitive position, at
least for now. However, they have also struggled with consistently high and increasing
turnover rates almost double their peers and on many of the indicators they have also
posted the most volatile performance over the past 12 years. O2’s efforts to increase
revenue and decrease costs have definitely been realized, especially in the most recent
years, but the possible consequences—high turnover and low fundraising—could
eventually limit growth. Furthermore, their rapid expansion into many different program
areas across many regions of the state may prove an increasingly difficult management
and coordination task.
Informants’ Views on Formal Processes’ Impact on Performance
O1’s ED is confident the BSC has improved certain areas of operational
performance, but is dubious about how much their strategic planning processes directly
impact global organizational performance. However, he does feel that it has helped
solidify O1’s reputation for being well-managed and that the process has created “a locus
of control and support that makes [O1] much more planful and feel much more in charge
of where [they’re] going. So rather than just being totally blown about by the winds of
change and get seduced into trend surfing…[he] feels reasonably in charge”. It also helps
him and his staff remain accountable and focus “on outcomes rather than means”, which
has, in his opinion, led to better morale and decision making.
In a final reflection, none of the informants at O2 felt that their formal strategic
plan helped guide their achievements. For example, one informant mused that, “we’ve
set goals that really pulled us along, but that may be because of leadership pulling us
along, rather than leadership with a plan which we were focused on…I think those
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personalities have pulled us along more than a strategic plan… I don’t think we’ve ever
had well-developed strategic plans in which we really regularly focused and measured
and moved towards those”. Instead the movement has been incremental, personal, and
informal. In each interaction and decision over the past 15 years, O2’s leader has been
driving home the message that “quality of care is important. However, we can’t do it
independent of cost”.
At O3, like at O2, informants did not feel that their formal strategy formation
process impacted their performance. Instead, most cited their reserve fund for allowing
the balancing of priorities without having to go into survival mode, unlike many of their
counterparts. They have been able to remain relentlessly focused on their mission and
employees, using their reserve fund to “get through the humps” and not close programs
just for the bottom line. One informant said the reserve fund has allowed them to, “do
what we feel is right, then figure out how to pay for that later”. Despite the latitude their
reserve fund has afforded them, several informants at O3 highlighted how much of their
performance is driven by external environmental conditions that they have very little
control over. One remarked, “eighty percent of what happens to us is not governed by us
yet, if the state runs out of money tomorrow, it doesn't really matter…there's so many
things that can change after we make a decision”.
Unpacking the Planning-Performance Link
From all of my analysis, it appears that the key strategies the three study
organizations have pursued over the past 12-years were well-aligned with the demands
from the external environment; therefore, if the intended strategies were well
implemented it stands to reason that the organizations would see concomitant
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performance gains. For this next link in the causal chain between strategy formation and
organizational performance to be supported, the patterns of differences in realized
strategy (i.e., how successful implementation was) would need be mirrored by differences
in organizational performance. The performance information presented above does show
such patterns, especially in the case of FCCM. O2 aggressively pursued this strategy and
implemented it very well. The result was client growth seventeen times that of O1’s, and
revenues growth twice as much as both O1 and O2’s. In contrast, O1 initially tripped
with their implementation and saw relatively poor outcomes and a reduced contract.
The goal of Aim 5 was to clarify causal mechanisms and explore patterns of how
strategy implementation mediates the relationship between strategy formation and
organizational performance. This Aim was developed in response to many empirical
studies that have linked formalized strategic planning with improved organizational
performance with a prescriptive if/then logic that fails to provide insight into why or how
the relationship exists and often omits the crucial mediating variable of strategy
implementation (W. F. Crittenden & V. L. Crittenden, 2000; Hutzschenreuter &
Kleindienst, 2006; C. C. Miller & Cardinal, 1994; Stone et al., 1999). Findings from the
current study resulted in a revised conceptual model of strategic management (see Figure
9) and some beginning hypotheses about what may be behind the planning-performance
link, at least in non-profit organizations.
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Revised Conceptual Model of Strategic Management
Strategic Management
Strategy Formation
External
Environmental
Context t

Day-to-Day
Strategy
Formation
Process

Strategy
Implement.
Process

Intended
Strategy

Realized
Strategy

Organizational
Performance

Episodic
Strategic
Planning
Process

Internal Organizational Context

t Construct

Delayed relationship
Consistent relationship
Potential relationship

controlled for during current study’s cross-case analysis

Figure 9: Revised Conceptual Model of Strategic Management
Strategic management, as related to organizational performance, is often studied
as a black box. The current study attempted to open it up, and revealed that formalized
strategic planning has a fairly insignificant impact on chosen strategies, and therefore
performance, and that variation in implementation processes has a strong mediating role.
The cross-case analysis summaries for Aims 2, 3 and 4 presented above explain most of
the relationships depicted in Figure 9 and why they were modified from the initial model
in Figure 1 (Chapter 1, pg. 25).
One other modification to the model relates to time delays. Not only is there a
time delay between realizing a strategy and seeing its impact on performance (a time
delay depicted in the original model), but the study revealed that there can also be a
significant time delay between beginning to implement a strategy and it being fully
realized. This is mainly the case for larger-scale strategies, like program diversification
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or growth that often get formed via day-to-day strategizing as opposed to strategic
planning. Surprisingly, given the field’s assumptions about strategic planning, formal
planning seems to generate more operations-focused goals that can realistically be
accomplished in a relatively short period of time. This may be a function of the
shortened, three-year planning horizon, or it might be another indication of the
perfunctory, codifying nature planning has assumed.
In highlighting the nominal role of strategic planning, the model begs the question
of what impact formal planning could possibly have. O2 and O3 engage in episodic
planning mainly because of coercive mandates, but O1 has figured out how to harness the
process for good. O1’s strategic planning process has actually positively impacted their
performance, but in a more circuitous way than is usually hypothesized. Their
deployment of the Balanced Scorecard does not optimize their decision making within
the confines of episodic strategic planning, but rather has been used as a catalyst for the
building of analytical and performance monitoring capabilities that has in turn influenced
their strategic choices and implementation. O1’s use of the BSC as a planning tool has
helped its leaders communicate a rationale and urgency for change and increased its
members’ comfort with formalization and data. It has also expanded the organization’s
definition of performance beyond just growth and aligned their governance structure to
provide better oversight. O1’s approach to day-to-day strategy formation and
implementation has then been steeped in this transformed culture. Feedback of this kind
appears to be rare in organizations for which planning is seen as an obligatory one-off
exercise. Most likely, another organization wishing to have a similar cultural
transformation could do so without using a Balanced Scorecard tool, but it has certainly
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helped O1 improve their performance. This point also highlights the fact that while O1’s
capabilities may currently be rare and potentially valuable, they may be imitable, though
the social complexity of the capability may make this difficult.
The revised conceptual model leads me to posit that the statistical relationship
frequently found between engaging in strategic planning and improved organizational
performance (Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst, 2006) may be spurious, both being caused
by an organizational culture that is sensitive to and accommodating of external
environmental demands. This type of culture helps ensure that the organization complies
with the strong pressures to plan and facilitates its choice of the “right’ strategies via dayto-day strategizing. It is these well-aligned strategies that cause performance gains and it
is variation in implementation and poor measurement that causes troublesome variance in
predictive models. The causal mechanisms of good performance appear to involve
person-centered rather than process-centered variables. Yes, strategy formation and
implementation processes are important to understand, but not as static yes/no checklists
of process components so common and bemoaned in empirical strategy process research
(Boyd & Reuning-Elliott, 1998). The dynamic inner-workings of the organizations’
leadership, culture and routines, broadly their dynamic capabilities, need to be paid more
attention.

Lessons Gleaned from O5
As explained in the Methods chapter, toward the end of the data collection period
it became apparent that a piece of the story regarding the performance within this
subsector of children’s mental health organizations was missing. O5, was cited by an ED
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at one of the study organizations as the “800-pound gorilla”, the major competitor of the
study organizations. Analysis of their publically-available Form 990 financial data
revealed that their growth over the preceding twelve years dwarfed that of the three
primary participating organizations, clearly an extreme case.
Given the aims of the study, it was deemed essential to gain some insight into
O5’s strategic management processes since their trajectory provides a window into what
may have been possible. O5’s ED agreed to be interviewed twice and to provide the two
strategic planning documents produced during the study timeframe. While not presented
here, a full case report was written and reviewed by O5’s ED for accuracy. This
analytical step helped make the quality and completeness of the findings from O5
comparable to those from the other organizations. Some highlights are presented here to
supplement the findings from the full cross-case analysis above.
Executive-driven Culture Urgently Focused on Growth and Influence
O5 has been run by the same energetic and charismatic Executive Director since
1999. The ED is a trained clinician with an MSW and a background in adolescent
treatment. Since taking the helm he has transformed the culture from being “very
militaristic” to being focused on empowerment, quality and growth. According to the
ED, the organization’s culture is moderately formal; there are clear roles and lines of
authority, but he tries to also maintain a certain level of flexibility and responsiveness,
begging and borrowing different tools and management trends as he sees fit to meet the
current organizational needs. From my interactions with him and from the stories he told
while being interviewed, I surmised that O5’s ED has a laser focus and sense of urgency
for change, but this is coupled with patience and political savvy that allows him to
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identify the right time to move to make his strategic initiatives successful. He is a shrewd
politician, and compared to the other Executive Directors seems to exercise his executive
authority more frequently, though he does value and seek out feedback from staff from
all levels of the organization.
Like all the EDs, O5’s ED is “absolutely driven” to improve the lives of children,
but he goes beyond just the kids in Missouri to having a desire to impact national child
welfare policy. He shared that this passion was stoked by attending the first ever Surgeon
General’s conference on children’s mental health issues in 2001. He was appalled at the
fact that the country had never had a conference on this “significant and serious
problem”, and came away from the meeting convinced that his sector had to do a better
job advocating on behalf of their clients and demonstrating measurable outcomes that
other professions would take seriously.
He ultimately wants to put children’s mental health issues on the radar screen of
politicians and average Americans. In order to do this, he recognized that the
organization had to be of a size to be taken seriously. Therefore, O5
…made a conscious decision early on when [the ED] took over that we’re going
to have to expand and we figured we needed to get to a certain size in order to
really influence the child public policy piece…if you’re just always a small apple
player, then anybody can come in and tell you how you’re going to treat kids and
how much money they’re going to give you to treat them and so it was a
conscious decision to expand and so that’s when we went out on.
Over the past twelve years they pursued many of the same operational strategies as the
three study organizations, but with a unique macro-level perspective that guided an
overarching vision of becoming a game-changing organization. O5 is the only
organization that has pursued a leadership strategy, one of only a handful of competitive
strategies that can yield sustainable advantage in a declining industry (Harrigan & Porter,
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1983). They have systematically acquired competitors and continually raised the stakes
for those remaining in the sector.
Several years ago O5’s ED accurately predicted which administrative capabilities
would be required in the future he wanted to create. The organization has found creative
ways to build capacity in the areas of data collection and management and now they are
reaping the rewards and hoping to change the rules of the game in his favor by
advocating for a more “performance-based mental health system”. O5’s ED feels that “if
I’m not performing then I shouldn’t get the kids, but if I am performing, then I should get
the kids,” compared to the current system where “a sister agency can promote anecdotal
data…but they can have a lot less staff and they can have a lot less quality.” The ED
doesn’t shy away from being competitive. He truly believes he provides a superior
product that should be rewarded and feels that some of his peers are afraid of change and
simply didn’t do their homework to build the increasingly necessary capabilities. He
commented, “We did the hard work, now it’s time to put some folks out of business who
didn’t do the hard work and spend the money and their blood, sweat, and tears to do it.”
Outstanding Performance
As was explained above, O5 was approached toward the end of the study period
and therefore only a limited amount of data was gathered. Only publically available
Form 990 financial data and annual reports were collected and analyzed; therefore, a
comparison of O5’s performance across all indicators is not possible. However, what is
available reveals a pattern of consistent outperformance.
Strong strategic position. When compared to the study organizations, O5’s
strategic position could be seen as similar to O2’s with respect to costs, but much more
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aggressively in front on service diversity. O5 serves clients from nearly every county in
Missouri with a diverse array of programs including residential treatment, parenting
training, foster care case management, homeless youth services, therapeutic recreation,
and day care. O5’s scale and scope make them rather unique among their peers and gives
them considerable clout. The ED said, “I think [our continuum of services is] very much
respected, and so I think in Jeff City and decision makers’ offices that they very rarely
will make a decision that will affect the child welfare industry without talking to [O5]
first and see what our thoughts are. Now that’s a very good position to be in.” In 2009,
O5 merged with a Saint Louis-based children’s mental health organization was very
similar to the three study organizations. With this move, O5 became a more direct and
stronger competitor of O1, O2 and O3.
Large client growth and consistent service diversification. According to their
990s, O5’s residential treatment programs served 3,039 kids in 2009 and touched over
9,600 families’ lives. Since 1998 the number of kids they serve has grown by over
500%, with much of their growth coming in 2001 and 2002 on the heels of a large merger
in the central region of the state and a revamping of their largest residential treatment
facility. Their recent Saint Louis merger increased their client population by 33% in
2009. Based on calculations from figures in their recent annual reports, O5 has
dramatically diversified their programming in the past few years. In 2006 only 28% of
their clients were being treated in community-based services (not including FCCM). By
2009 that percentage had increased to 47%.
Steady revenue and investment growth. O5 has seen tremendous and steady
total revenue growth over the past decade. Even when accounting for inflation, O5’s
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total revenue has grown, on average, 6.8% (median = 4.3%; SD = 15.6%) every year
since 1998. Of the organizations studied, O5 was the only one to achieve positive
median total revenue annual growth between 1998 and 2009 when their financial figures
are put into constant dollars (see Figure 10).
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Figure 10: O5 Total Annual Revenue Compared to Study Organizations'
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Figure 11: O5's Annual Program Service Revenue Compared to Study
Organizations'
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O5 posted program service revenues of $25.4 million in 2009, up an astounding
109% from 1998 revenues in constant 2009 dollars (see Figure 11). O5’s revenues and
raw 12-year growth rate dwarf those of the other study participants (M = 56.0%; Range =
22.5% - 86.1%), which is why it was felt essential to speak with the ED about their
strategic management and performance. Annual growth of O5’s direct public support has
been volatile (SD = 73.0%), but overall very strong (average = 21.9%; median = 12.9%).
On average, O5 posted $3.5 million (median = $3.0 million; SD = $1.53 million) in
revenues from direct public support each year.
O5 has never run a negative operating margin or dipped into their endowment to
fund general operations. While their reserve fund has been used to fund major capital
investments, such as the purchase of property, according to the ED, “[The endowment is]
there for perhaps a rainy day, we’ve never had to use it for that...[O5’s] board has never,
never allowed me to do [withdraw for operations].” This may be a bit of a misnomer,
however, since the organization does use the majority of its annual direct public support
and investment income to balance their budget. The legal and filing separation between
the two entities makes the line clearer, but I did not find out how O5 decides how much
goes into revenue versus the endowment each year.
O5 does have a large reserve fund, which is primarily managed by its separate
501(c)3 mentioned above. Together, both that entity and the services organization have
held an average of $27.8 million (median = $27.2 million; SD = $4.2 million) in
securities over the past 12 years, slightly more than O3. Despite volatile declared
revenues from investment activities, O5 is the only one of the study organizations to have
posted a positive average annual growth rate of its investment holdings (4.4%; median =
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6.0%; SD = 12.7%) in the 12 years between 1998 and 2009. This strong investment
performance has resulted in a healthy debt and liquidity position.
Highly efficient operations. O5’s management and general expenses accounted
for 8.0% of their 2009 expenses. In general, O5 has maintained its overhead at between
7-8% (SD = 2.0%) of total expenses for the past 12 years. Compared to the other
organizations studied, O5 has a lower and more consistent overhead. O5’s ED
commented that the organization’s leadership has made “a very conscious decision that
we’re going to be as streamlined and as efficient and as effective as we can be”. The ED
“pays very close attention” to administrative expense ratios and never lets it exceed 13%
of total revenues. He also hired a CFO from the for-profit world he credits with finding a
lot of efficiencies and harnessing technology to streamline operations. One area in which
O5 is not as efficient as its peers is in fundraising. While they have recently been
successful at increasing the return on every dollar spent fundraising, their average amount
raised per dollar is still almost 35% less than O1, the most efficient fundraiser.
Balanced performance. Overall, O5’s performance over the past decade has
been stupendous, rapidly pulling away from its main peer group in terms of size and
impact. O5 has doubled its program service revenues, even after taking into account
inflation. They have balanced aggressive program and geographic expansion with solid
progress in the areas of development and IT infrastructure and have sound fiscal and
investment management, demonstrating an understanding of the need to build strong
administrative capabilities to support programmatic activities. The organization seems
poised to grow even bigger in the coming decade, with plans to expand outside of the
State’s borders and possibly into new demographics.
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Strategic Management at O5
Because I did not do an in-depth study of O5’s strategic management I cannot say
with certainty what caused their unparalleled performance. However, my conversations
with O5’s ED did generally confirm the relationships and pathways depicted in the
revised conceptual model of strategic management presented in Figure 9 (pg. 232). For
instance, their strategic planning process is used mainly as an implementation planning
tool and has little to no impact on their intended strategies. In fact, their process does not
rely on a SWOT analysis, but rather starts with the ED’s strategic goals for the planning
horizon and then seeks consensus-building and implementation steps around these ideas.
As would be expected from the model, O5’s performance seems to be connected to their
distinct internal organizational context and approach to implementing key strategies, both
of which are extremely competitively-oriented.
As was explained above, O5 has a very high sense of urgency and is focused on
growth and influence. Their urgency is not frantically driven by perceived uncontrollable
environmental demands, but rather by a desire to amass enough competitive advantage so
that they can drive trends in the sector and ultimately impact State and National child
welfare policy. The ED has created and fostered this culture. Since making the
conscious decision to grow over a decade ago, he has developed a long-term vision for
the organization and has consistently and passionately communicated it and motivated
people to execute the strategies necessary to achieve it.
O5’s vision is unique among its peers. Its members have articulated a macrolevel competitive positioning strategy that guides all of their other strategic actions. In
contrast, the study organizations lack sweeping visions of how they are going to create
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sustained competitive advantage. They don’t seem to have the palpable sense of manifest
destiny that O5 does. If they have a vision statement, it is typically a rehashing of their
missions, focused on their clients. O5’s formally articulated vision provides direction as
to where the organization, not its clients, should be headed; it takes the competitive
dynamics of the sector into consideration and provides a forward-looking organizing
principle to guide day-to-day strategizing. I have no doubt that the study organizations’
EDs have very passionately-held visions of where they would like their organizations to
be in the future, but it is not clear how much the competitive realities of the sector have
informed these hopes and dreams.
The competitive-orientation at O5 has influenced their implementation processes.
The ED is much more comfortable than his peers with shaking up the status quo and
consolidating the sector when advantageous. For example, even though O5 has had the
same broad intended strategy of program diversification and growth, instead of growing
programs organically like the study organizations, O5 has methodically followed a
pattern of merging to eliminate regional competition and then augmenting communitybased services from these regional bases. This tactic leveraged existing regional
networks and expertise to hasten organizational growth while solidifying their
competitive advantage.
While there are other differences between O5 and the other study organizations’
contexts and strategic management processes, the throughline that seems to really set
them apart and impact their performance is their comfort with thinking in competitive
terms and their constant awareness of the bigger picture. Thinking about the bigger
picture, be it within a particular region, the State, or the Nation, has helped O5 stay
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focused on the long-term vision of growth and administrative capability development that
has helped them feel more in control of where they are headed. All the organizations
struggle with the fast-paced change and unpredictability in the external environment. O2
has decided that they therefore can’t plan very far out, whereas O1 is attempting to plan
and monitor as much as possible. O5 accepted the uncertainty and developed a strategic
vision that is allowing them to control more and more of it by becoming a dominant and
influential player in the sector.
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CHAPTER SIX: IMPLICATIONS AND NEXT STEPS
The current study was undertaken to document the strategic management
processes in several nonprofit organizations in order to explore whether and how
variation in strategy formation impacts performance. It also tested the assumption widely
promulgated in the literature and among professional groups that structure and
formalization is a key aspect of success. By using a unique most-similar multiple case
study design, noise caused by external environmental factors was virtually eliminated,
allowing me to focus exclusively on how variations within internal processes and
contexts may explain different performance trajectories. What I found flies in the face of
much of the current prescriptive literature and calls into question the strategic planning
industry.
The most significant finding is that episodic strategic planning does little to
inform strategy content. Instead, strategy formation is an organic and continual process
in which organizational leaders use their experience and best judgment on a day-to-day
basis to incrementally craft their strategy. Many executives and a few researchers
(namely Mintzberg) have been saying this for years, but have been drowned out by
consultants eager to work with organizations and academics eager to impose structure on
an inherently messy process. What seems to matter to an organization’s performance
more than the comprehensiveness or formalization of a process executed every three
years is having a culture that urgently and continually inspires action and that is capable
of implementing a variety of strategies that support a long-term vision aligned with
external demands and competitive reality.
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Internal organizational context’s centrality extends into the causal mechanisms
underlying the documented link between formal planning and organizational
performance. The findings suggest that this is a spurious relationship, with both the
independent and dependent variable being caused by a receptive, semi-formal, yet
adaptable culture. These same organizational attributes help foster implementation
success, a key mediating variable between choosing the right strategy and seeing its
positive impact on performance. While the current study did not make as much progress
as hoped for in delineating key implementation process components and relevant
domains of variation, its findings did solidify implementation’s importance as a variable
of interest. They also supported the idea that the best process is contingent upon the
demands of the chosen strategy. Therefore, an organization needs to have multiple
implementation capabilities, rather than always relying on certain routines.

Implications
For Organizational Leaders
The participating organizations have stayed afloat through many changing tides.
Their success can be credited, in part, to their openness and engagement with the external
environment that fosters effective real-time strategy formation. Their strong missiondriven and collaborative spirit has also seen them through hard times and helped them
create lasting and significant sector-wide change. Struggling organizations would do
well to emulate many of the participating organizations’ traits. Despite their many
strengths however, the study’s findings did point to several key areas that, if improved,
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may further strengthen the organizations’ competitive advantage and lead to more
sustainability across the sector.
Most importantly, the organizations’ approach to strategic planning needs to be
augmented to actually support the discovery of novel strategic insights, namely by adding
a more externally-focused long-view competitive analysis to their planning processes.
Performing a SWOT analysis offers very little new understanding. Simply by being
active managers the participants are intimately aware of their strengths, weaknesses,
opportunities and threats. By the time they sit down around a table to engage in strategic
planning they have already deftly identified their possible actions and chosen the
seemingly best one in real time because the market demands rapid response. Instead of
focusing on doing an organizational assessment, the organizations could benefit from
doing an industry assessment similar to the process in Aim 1. The time already
ritualistically set aside for planning could be a perfect chance to pull back and get the
20,000 foot view of the competition and create a broad strategic vision of how the
organization is going to gain and maintain advantage. This would shore up a key
weakness for the organizations and bring strategic planning back in line with its name
and original purpose. It also meets the desire some informants expressed to have more
expansive visioning conversations.
Integrating competitive analysis into the planning process should not, necessarily,
come at the expense of other current processes. Even though I did not find clear
performance benefits flowing directly from engaging in strategic planning in its current
form, there may be several reasons to still do so. First, strategic planning is still required,
or at least expected, by many stakeholders. The institutional pressures to “plan” are high
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and will likely be so for the foreseeable future. Second, because of these pressures,
engaging in episodic strategic planning may now be a prerequisite to operating at all. I
did not study an organization that does no planning (if one exists), and therefore cannot
say that not planning is actually a viable option. Thirdly, while strategic planning is
clearly not the venue in which most flashes of strategic insight or creativity happen, it is
quite possible that some sort of episodic group process it needed for moving nascent or
emergent strategic ideas into the mainstream where they can become full-fledged
intended strategies worthy of implementation planning and monitoring.
The second area that the organizations could strengthen is their repertoire of
implementation capabilities. The findings suggested that implementation processes are
not one-size-fits-all. Tailoring them to the needs of the strategy yields better success and
therefore better performance (assuming it is a well-aligned strategy). Each of the
organizations has a preferred approach, varying based on the degree of formalization,
which they seem to apply to almost everything. Having a suite of implementation
routines (formal monitoring, piloting, ways to capture informal feedback, etc.) and
devising a process to identify which is best suited to the task at hand would increase the
organization’s chance of success.
However, since implementation success was also found to be related to how well
the implementation process matched the organization’s internal context, the organizations
need to ensure that they develop a culture that can comfortably handle a variety of modes
of operating. This is a process that is symbiotic with developing a wide repertoire of
implementation skills and can be done in a variety of ways. O1’s institutionalization of
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the Balanced Scorecard is an example of how an implementation tactic can be used to
foster a particular type of culture.
O1 has successfully created a highly formalized, well-aligned culture, but they
have stumbled in areas that have required more informal actions. Their experience
highlights an area for possible improvement for all of the organizations, learning to be
simultaneously adaptable and recursive. The study organizations have coalesced around
one mode or the other. O1 has prized recursiveness, while O2 has prided themselves on
being adaptable; O3 has been somewhere in between. All of the organizations’
approaches have had some success, but it seems that simultaneously and aggressively
occupying both spaces is even more advantageous. As O5’s ED said, “it’s not an
‘either/or’, it’s an ‘and’.” O5 has been both innovative and controlled which, when
coupled with a clear and bullish vision, allowed them to surpass its competition and build
a strong foundation for future growth. Mastering this seeming dichotomy is a feat of
leadership and requires constant vigilance against becoming too tightly coupled with any
one philosophy other than dogged pursuance of the strategic vision.
On a brief side note: the organizations’ hesitancy about engaging in overt
competitive action, or even thinking, is understandable given the history of the nonprofit
sector and the very real necessity to collaborate in order to have a viable voice in talks
with the government and pool scarce resources. However, it may only take one
competitively-oriented organization, such as O5, to shake up the status quo within a local
ecology of organizations. The reality of this implores the organizations to develop a
comfort level with the notion of competition and integrate it into their culture so they are
not caught off-guard and forced to play catch up using rules not in their favor. The
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tension between collaboration and competition is yet another duality organizational
leaders will need to master.
For Accreditation Bodies and Funders
Nonprofit organizations often engage in formal strategic planning partly because
they are mandated to do so by accreditation bodies and funders; but, possession of a
strategic plan does not seem correlated with much. “Good” organizations go through
strategic planning because they have the capacity to do so and because they pay attention
to external demands. My findings suggest that COA and other bodies should further
examine the evidence supporting their requirement for a strategic plan and consider how
to measure and reward the development of a broad suite of capabilities (such as fiscal
management, data collection and reporting, etc.). Perhaps accreditation organization and
funders could develop sector-wide performance or organizational capability measures.
Performance measures are now more easily tracked and benchmarking could be a useful
service they could provide to their organizations. Helping organizations operationalize
and build capacities in multiple areas related to performance would be much more useful
than forcing them to plan in a ritualistic way.
For Measurement and Research
As stated in Chapter 1, researchers are still trying to develop relevant and
sensitive measures of strategy formation (W. F. Crittenden, 2000; W. F. Crittenden & V.
L. Crittenden, 1997; W. F. Crittenden et al., 2004; Katsioloudes & Tymon, 2003). Using
current measures, such as checklists of activities or tools, would not have revealed the
major and important differences between the study organizations. They all do very
similar things—SWOT analysis, limited financial forecasting, budgeting and resource

250

allocation, hold retreats, etc. Fundamentally, the study’s findings drive home the fact that
measuring components of the episodic strategic planning process is not very helpful.
Rather, the important work of strategy formation gets done in day-to-day thinking and
actions, which are unfortunately very difficult to measure. Going forward researchers
need to acknowledge this reality and creatively face the challenge of measurement
instead of relying on ill-fitting, siloed notions of planning.
The budding stem of “strategy-as-practice” research offers some promising ideas
and foci that should be fully embraced and integrated by mainstream strategy process
researchers. This paradigm’s elevation of internal organizational context and the
individual actions of the strategist is important, but needs conceptual refinement and
measurement tools. My analysis of internal culture was somewhat crude partly because
of a lack of robust measures. Further developing theories and measures of organizational
context would be a worthwhile step on the quest to understand what drives superior
performance.
A key underpinning to progress in theory and measurement development will be a
concomitant refinement and expansion of the language available to describe
organizational culture and strategic management processes. Throughout the data
collection, analysis and especially writing phases of this study, I often found myself
having to resort to simplifications, overgeneralizations and linear descriptions that do not
fully capture the complexity of what happens in the organizations. My understanding is
more nuanced and dynamic than I was able to formally commit to paper, in large part
because of the limitations of the written word and the static and stale terminology used in
this area of research. Adoption of terms such as “strategic management” and
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“strategizing” in place of “strategic planning”, with all its formalized implications, is a
good step, but more needs to be done to push the boundaries of language to allow for
more clarity and room to describe reality.
In addition to advances in language and measurement about strategy formation
and organizational context, the field also needs to develop a much better understanding of
strategy implementation. According to the current study’s findings, these two variables
are the keys to explaining the causal mechanisms undergirding the planning-performance
link so many studies try to demonstrate (Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst, 2006). Strategy
implementation research is in its infancy. The current study tested an existing framework
developed by Miller (1997) to explain implementation success, but most of her variables
had an inconsistent or nonexistent relationship to the success of the study organizations’
strategy implementation. Clearly much more research is needed on this front.
In general, there is a need to move away from thinking about strategic
management as a series of monolithic processes organizations move through, toward an
organic contextualized interaction between leaders and their environment. Strategy
process researchers have begun to pay lip service to these ideas, but few have altered
their research designs to be aligned with this new appreciation. Focus on context and
contingencies do not lend themselves to standardized measurement development, but
rather call for more in-depth case studies, especially longitudinal, in-situ case studies.
These are very time consuming and do not lend themselves to the typical funding and
publishing cycles of academia in social work or business. In the interest of true scientific
progress, organizational researchers need to advocate for resources and recognition for
case studies. Furthermore, when embarking on a case study researchers should give more
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thought to designing studies so that hypotheses can be tested as opposed to just providing
description.
On a final note, while the current study focuses on non-profit children’s mental
health organizations, I did not find any evidence to suggest that their strategic
management processes were shaped by their nonprofit designation. There is an
assumption in a lot of literature, which I myself was guilty of, that nonprofit management
is somehow unique from their for-profit brethren. This assumption should be empirically
explored. It is quite possible that the true difference lies in the size and resources of the
organization and not their 501(c)3 status.

Limitations
Several factors limiting the generalizability of the findings based on the study
design and sampling were previously mentioned at the end of Chapter Three. These were
namely the basic nature of case studies, the narrow sector and geographic scope of the
sampling and the bias toward well-performing organizations. Over the course of my
analysis several other limitations were discovered. First and foremost, studying
processes retrospectively is extremely challenging. Detail was clearly lost. While key
informants tried their best to recall components of the process or their motivations and
impact over the past decade, many struggled. This seemed particularly true for
information about implementation processes, possibly because these actions are so
enmeshed with their daily routines and job descriptions that they do not rise to the level
of importance or distinctness to form strong memories. Interviewing multiple key
informants and collecting of organizational documents did help fill in some of the gray
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areas, but richness was definitely compromised. For this type of detail, studying process
over time, in situ, would be the best approach, and researchers must find a way to do this
despite its time and resource intensity.
In addition to recall bias, selection bias may have also limited my findings.
Because I had to rely on the Executive Directors to identify and reach out to potential key
informants, I may not have received complete information, especially about the
organizations’ internal contexts. I tried to elicit unbiased feedback from the people I did
speak to by promising anonymity and reassuring them that there would be no
repercussions to their decision as to whether or not to be interviewed. Only interviewing
high-level staff members also hindered my ability to fully vet my impressions of the
organizations, but given the content of the interviews and the limited data collection
window, this couldn’t have been avoided. And, again, the mixed-methods design of the
study, which included observations, tried to ensure the most robust data possible.
Lastly, my reliance on publically-available Form 990 financial data limited my
ability to fully understanding the organizations’ fiscal and operational management. The
forms do not provide information about withdrawals from reserve funds, nor does it
explain how the declared investment and direct public support is used. In addition, there
were clear accounting differences between the organizations that led to difficulty
comparing expenses. Collecting operating budgets would have been much more
enlightening, but may have been an undue burden on the organizations given the twelveyear timeframe.
Despite the limitations cited above, the current study met its aims by providing
detailed accounts of strategic management in several similar nonprofit children mental
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health organizations. The study’s strength was in its use of multiple data collection
methods, its large interview base and its most similar cases sampling strategy that
allowed for a cleaner exploration of the causal chain between strategy formation and
organizational performance. The decision to speak to the most successful organization in
the sector, the extreme case, also strengthened the study’s findings by glimpsing what
was possible within the confines of the external environment the organizations all shared.

Conclusion
The current study set out to shed light on current strategic management practices
within nonprofit social service agencies with the hopes of determining what aspects of
their processes could explain their performance over time. Its findings document the
sophisticated and varied approaches of dedicated and seasoned professionals who have
successfully navigated very challenging environmental conditions. The findings also
begin to unpack the connection between strategy formation and organizational
performance, highlighting the need for contextual understanding and research capacity to
study fluid, ongoing processes as opposed to confined episodic ones. They urge
organizations to revamp strategic planning and place even more importance on
competitive thinking and cultural stewardship. Imagine a robust nonprofit sector where
each organization is maximizing their competitive advantage, prompting their colleagues
to become even more innovative and high-quality and their payers to value their
contributions. With effective and aggressive strategic management this could be a
reality. The whole sector, especially the clients it serves, would benefit tremendously.
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APPENDIX A: SUMMARY OF SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED ARTICLES ON STRATEGY FORMATION IN NPOS
(1997-2010)
Article
Research Question(s)
Method and Sample Key Findings r.e. Strategy Process in NPOs Quality Theme
(W. F.
Crittenden,
2000)
Nonprofit and
Voluntary
Sector
Quarterly

(Krug &
Weinberg,
2004)
Nonprofit
Management
and
Leadership

(Mara,
2000)
Nonprofit
Management
and
Leadership

(Maranville
, 1999)
Nonprofit
Management
and
Leadership

What differences exist, when
comparing financially
successful to less financially
successful organizations, in
the relationship between
strategic processes, sources
of funding, and growth and
financial strategies?

Two mail surveys (3 years
apart) of 31 NPOs in two
major metropolitan areas
and six case studies via
structured interviews

Traditional modes of strategic management (focused
on product offerings, financial acumen, marketing, and
diversification) appeared to be related to good
performance. Less successful organizations appeared
to lack key strategic management attributes regarding
direction or execution. Strategy process and
performance are interrelated over time.

Fair

Process/
Context

What is the utility of a novel
three-dimensional (mission,
money and merit) portfolio
modeling tool to NPOs
making strategic decisions?

Case studies reduced to
field notes from
consultative relationships
with eight North American
museums, art galleries and
aquariums.
Article labeled as being
“From the Field”.

All three components—mission fulfillment, monetary
contribution, and quality—are useful to NPOs making
strategic decisions. The process of using the modeling
tool helped stimulate discussion, uncover managerial
assumptions, refine measurements, and increase
learning.

Poor

Tools

What is the acceptability and
utility of a strategic planning
process incorporating the
Policy Delphi group
technique and situation
structuring software when
implemented in a small
NPO?

Single case study; author
was the director of agency
during planning process,
followed up by two key
informant interviews 8.5
years later. One hospice in
Virginia.
Article labeled as being
“From the Field”.

In general, planning participants were pleased with the
efficiency and speed of the process, and appreciated the
mix of group and individual work. The process yielded
a coherent set of organizational goals for the next 5-10
years. Upon revisiting the organization after 8.5 years,
the author found that the organization had achieved
almost all of its goals. Key informants felt the
planning processes triggered a series of other actions
that led to the positive outcomes.

Poor

Tools

What strategy process mode
does an NPO externallycontrolled by its funder
primarily rely upon when
creating strategy? Does a
theory-based typology of
strategic management modes
capture the organization’s
practice?

Single 6-month case study
(observation, interviews,
document search) of a
YWCA in Salt Lake City,
UT from full-time
participant-observer stance.

NPOs facing complex deterministic environments need
complex configurations of the three main strategic
management modes: traditional, spontaneous, and
dialectical. The configuration is based on the
organization’s culture and history. Formal strategic
planning (traditional mode) was seen as a “bridging
mechanism” to connect with the external environment
(i.e., funders and donors). Strategic planning helped the
organization gain more control over its destiny and

Poor-Fair

Process/
Context
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Article

Research Question(s)

Method and Sample

Key Findings r.e. Strategy Process in NPOs

Quality

Theme

draw boundaries around activities.

(Medley & Is Kurt Lewin’s model of
Akan, 2008) planned change applicable to
Nonprofit
Management
and
Leadership

(Nutt,
2000)*
Journal of
Management
Studies

(Parker,
2007)
Journal of
Management
Studies

Retrospective case study of
one job assistance program
in the Southeast, US.
Article labeled as being a
“Case Study”.

Lewin’s key stages of planned change (unfreeze,
change/move, and refreeze) reflect the process of
organizational assessment and development necessary
for staff participation in strategic planning and
effective implementation. The steps can support other
traditional strategic planning activities, especially when
applied to the preplanning stage.

Poor

Conceptual

What approaches are used by
decision makers to uncover
alternatives in public, private
and third sector
organizations? How
successful were the
approaches preferred by each
sector?

Key informant and
supporting interviews and
questionnaires, plus
document review to
understand the alternative
generation process in 376
US organizations (private,
public, and nonprofit).
Two-year follow-up
interviews to determine
success of chosen
alternative.

Six alternative generation approaches were identified
using modified grounded theory: Existing solution,
innovation, benchmarking (simple or integrated) and
search (simple or cyclical). There are sector-based
differences in preferred alternative generation
approaches and strategic decision success. NPOs used
benchmarking and existing solution more often than
other approaches, but had better decision success when
they used search approaches (soliciting proposals from
third-parties to address need). NPOs had the highest
complete adoption rate after two years, but their
decision took longer than in private organizations. The
power of “internal experts” can make effective
alternative generation difficult in some NPOs.

Good

Process/
Tools/
Sector

To what extent are strategies
engaged from a commercial
versus service orientation?
To what degree is strategy
formally developed,
monitored and debated in the
nonprofit boardroom? How
do directors of state-based
nonprofit organizations
distinguish between and
balance their strategic and
operational monitoring
responsibilities? How do
directors strategically
manage their strategic role in

Two-year longitudinal
qualitative case studies
using complete member
research methodology of
two large, nonprofit, statebased chapters of national
professional associations in
Australia.

Both boards switched back and forth between
commercial and service orientations. There was a
degree of decoupling between formal and informal
planning processes, especially when formal planning
responsibility resided with the national association.
Boardroom strategizing occurred through informal,
interactive, ad hoc dialogue rather than via a formal
strategic planning and control system. Strategic issues
were most often brought to the attention and pushed
forward by a champion. There was more of a focus on
operational plans presented by the CEOs. Boards
continually struggled with focusing on strategic
management rather than micromanagement.

Poor

Process/
Context

understanding effective
change in an NPO during its
strategic planning process?
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Article

Research Question(s)

Method and Sample

Key Findings r.e. Strategy Process in NPOs

Quality

Theme

What is the level of
consensus between CEOs and
board members regarding the
board’s level of involvement
in the strategic management
process? Is the level of
agreement related to outcome
measures (financial
performance and board
satisfaction while controlling
for prior performance)?

Mail-in close-ended survey
targeting CEOs and board
members. Usable sample
of 358 Credit Unions in
NY and MA—506 total
questionnaires and 97
CEO-board member pairs
for consensus analysis.
Article labeled as a
“Research Note”

In all stages of the strategic management process, the
board views its participation at higher levels. Board
members are more satisfied when the organization’s
performance record is strong and when there is higher
consensus regarding their level of involvement in
strategic management. The higher the consensus about
the board’s involvement in monitoring strategy
implementation, the lower the odds of financial
soundness. Models only accounted for 9% of the
variation in board satisfaction and 25% of the variation
in organization financial performance.

Poor-Fair

Process

Do actions taken by a
collaborative alliance
influence the strategic
behavior of its members?
How? Do existing models of
strategy formulation
accommodate a collaborative
environment?

Cross-sectional case study
of a multi-sector
collaborative alliance to
assist welfare-to-work
participants in St. Paul,
MN. Relevant sample
included interviews with
11 members of eight
organizations (4 human
service NPOs, 2 churches,
a public agency, and a
university) involved in the
collaboration, one
foundation staff member,
and secondary document
reviews.

Collaboratives increase the complexity of the decisionmaking environment by increasing uncertainty and
density of relationships. The effects on strategic
decision making of organizations participating in
collaborations appear to be subtle, unintended and
often significant (sometimes fundamental shifts in
operating domains). Despite this, collaborations had
virtually no impact on organizational strategic planning
activities, which were seen as an internally-focused
process of which the collaborations could be seen as an
aspect of implementation. The decoupling of strategic
planning from collaborative activities may help NPO’s
retain decision-making authority. Current models of
strategy formulation processes may assume an
environment that is more static and apolitical than is
the case.

Fair

Context/
Process

a national association?

(Siciliano,
2008)
Nonprofit and
Voluntary
Sector
Quarterly

(Stone,
2000)
Nonprofit and
Voluntary
Sector
Quarterly

*Included in Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst’s (2006) review.
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APPENDIX B: INITIAL RECRUITMENT EMAIL
Dear EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
Last MONTH I interviewed you and a few members of your executive staff as
part of Peter Hovmand’s study on implementing innovations. During the interview we
discussed YOUR ORGANIZATIONS STRATEGY FORMATION PROCESS.
I am now a fourth-year PhD student at the Brown School of Social Work
beginning my dissertation. I am writing to you today to gauge your interest in possibly
being part of my study. For my dissertation I plan to conduct in-depth case studies of the
strategy formation and implementation processes at several child welfare mental health
services organizations in Saint Louis. The goal of my study is to describe the variety of
processes being used and assess their impact on strategic decision making and
organizational performance.
Over the course of six months, starting in mid-January I would interview you 3-4
times and request to speak to a handful of Board and staff members. I would also request
to review relevant agency documents and to observe relevant meetings, at your
discretion, of course. In return for ORGANIZATION’S participation, you would receive
a detailed case report of the organization’s strategy formation and implementation
processes and their possible relationship to performance, as well as a summary of the
wider study’s findings that would put ORGANIZATION’S practices into context and
give you a sense for the trends and impact of strategic management processes among
your peers. Your organization’s participation would be kept strictly confidential.
I know that ORGANIZATION may have multiple research commitments on top
of your usual executive duties. However, I would greatly appreciate the opportunity to
document and analyze ORGANIZATION’S unique strategic management practices. At
this point I am simply writing to assess your level of interest in learning more about the
study. I can give you more information upon IRB approval, probably within the next few
weeks.
Thank you in advance for your consideration.
Sincerely,
Jennifer Schurer
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APPENDIX C: STUDY INFORMATION SHEET

Strategic Management in Nonprofit Mental Health Service Organizations: Understanding
Processes and Impact on Performance
Jennifer Schurer, MSW (Principal Investigator)
David Gillespie, PhD (Faculty Sponsor)
STUDY INFORMATION SHEET
In the face of heightened scrutiny from stakeholders, changing technologies and tightening funding
streams, the strategic management of nonprofit mental health service organizations is an increasingly
difficult task. Leaders of these organizations spend considerable time creating and executing strategies to
meet the demands of their environments and are often pressured to use highly formal processes to do so.
Unfortunately, there is very little guidance as to “best practices” or evidence of the utility of formal
strategic management processes. This project will make in-depth case studies of the strategy formation and
implementation processes of several nonprofit mental health service organizations in the St. Louis region.
Its findings should yield a detailed understanding of the variety of strategic management processes
currently being used by these organizations as well as the impact these processes have on organizational
performance. This understanding could lead to better models and measures, as well as feedback for the
organizations about what is possible, useful and why.

Method
•
•

Multiple mixed-method case study with 3-5 nonprofit mental health service agencies in St. Louis
region operating in the same subsector
Data Collection Time Frame: January 2010 - June 2010

Benefits of Participation
•

•

Receive a detailed case report regarding your organization’s strategic management as well as a
brief report on the project’s findings that will provide insight into trends in and the impact of
strategic management processes within your subsector
Contribute to new knowledge about strategic management processes within mental health service
organizations and the wider nonprofit sector

The Role of Participating Organizations
•
•
•
•
•

Organization completes a letter of agreement on agency letterhead (sample language will be
provided)
Executive Director/CEO participates in 3-4 key informant interviews over the course of six
months (1.5 hours on average)
Up to 2 members of the Board of Directors and 2-3 Staff members each participate in 1 key
informant interview (1.5 hours on average)
Provide organizational documents related to strategic management for review
Invite researcher to observe meetings related to strategy formation and implementation

For More Information, Please Contact
Jennifer Schurer, MSW
David Gillespie, PhD

314-249-7361
314-935-6674
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jschurer@wustl.edu
davidg@wustl.edu

APPENDIX D: LETTER OF AGREEMENT
Jennifer Schurer
The Brown School of Social Work
Washington University in St. Louis
One Brookings Drive
Campus Box 1196
St. Louis, MO 63130
[DATE]
Ms. Schurer,
[AGENCY NAME] will be participating in the research project entitled Strategic
Management in Nonprofit Mental Health Service Organizations: Understanding
Processes and Impact on Performance you are conducting at the Brown School of Social
Work at Washington University in St. Louis.
After reviewing the Study Information Sheet describing the research protocol, I
understand that our organization’s involvement in the study is voluntary. [AGENCY
NAME] will inform our employees (including line staff and managers) and board
members of their eligibility to participate in the study’s interviews. Organizational
members will not be required to participate and their identity will not be known to us—
their participation will be completely voluntary and they may withdraw at any time
without penalty. Employees’ participation and information shared study will not be used
to evaluate their performance as an employee of this organization.
We understand that [AGENCY NAME]’s status as a study participant will not be public
knowledge and that the information shared with the researcher in interviews, agency
documents and observations will be kept confidential.
I understand that the study will be conducted following ethical guidelines and principles,
and that the privacy and confidentiality of employees’ and board members’ responses
will be protected. This means that the researcher will not provide me with data that could
be linked back to the individual identity of the key informant.
Therefore, as [JOB TITLE] of [AGENCY NAME], I agree to collaborate with you
research and grant permission to conduct the study at this agency.
Sincerely,
[NAME]
[JOB TITLE]
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APPENDIX E: ED INTERVIEW GUIDES
Wave 1 (used for all organizations)
Introduction
Collect Letter of Agreement
Explain the voluntary & confidential nature of interview
Collect Consent Form
Turn on recorder
Interview Questions
Competitive Dynamics
In order to understand your strategic management practices, it is important to know how
you think about the dynamics of your sector. By sector, I mean the children’s mental
health services, especially targeted to the child welfare population.
1. Let’s start with: who are your customers and what do they want?
2. How does your organization satisfy those wants (of the customers)?
3. Who else is competing for your customers?
4. Are there any viable substitutes for the types of services you provide?
5. How difficult would it be for a new organization to enter your sector?
6. What do you think are the key success factors in your sector?
7. How are you different from your competitors? What makes you a unique
organization?
8. How well positioned or competitive do you feel your organizations is?
PROBE:
Why? How has this changed in the past 10 years?
9. How do you collaborate with your competitors? How does that impact what you do
and how you do it?
10. Do you see the government as suppliers of resources or buyers of your services?
What about private funders?
11. In for-profit companies there is a lot of focus on creating value for the owners or the
shareholders. In your mind, who are the “owners” of your organization? What value do
they seek?
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12. Over the past ten years, what have been the three most important external factors
(economics, policy, technology, demographics, etc.) to impact your organization and how
you do things?
13. In the coming ten years, what do you foresee being the most important external
factors (economics, policy, technology, demographics, etc.) that will impact your
organization and how you do things?
Strategy Process Introduction
With our remaining time I want to ask some questions to begin our conversation about
how you create and implement your organization’s strategy. We will by no means cover
everything today, so please know we will go in a lot more depth in our next interview.
1. In your own words, how do you define strategy?
PROBE:
Can you give me an example?
2. Over the past 10 years, what have been the most important strategies, either successful
or unsuccessful, that your organization has tried to implement?
3. In the coming 10 years, what strategies do you foresee to be the most important for
your organization to implement?
4. How does your organization form its strategy?
PROBE:
Does the organization use a particular model or tool in the process?
5. How satisfied are you with this process?

Wrap-Up
Remind of project time frame and stages (through June, 3 more ED interviews)
Remind that next interview will ask for Board and Staff contacts
Request needed organizational documents
Inquire about meeting observations and schedule
Thank for time and openness
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Wave 2 (used for all organizations)
Introduction (5 minutes)
Check in r.e. needed organizations documents
Inquire about upcoming meetings for observation
Turn on recorder
Interview Questions
Organizational Culture (15 minutes)
So far I have learned a lot about the external environment [ORGANIZATION] is coping
with. However, it is also important that I have a better sense for [ORGANIZATION’S]
internal environment since that is where most of the activities I am interested in take
place. So let’s take a few minutes to discuss [ORGANIZATION’S] organizational
culture.
1. How would you describe [ORGANIZATION’S] internal culture?
PROBE: How hierarchical is it?
PROBE: How formal is it?
2. If your employees had a motto or slogan for what it was like to work at
[ORGANIZATION], what do you think it would it be?
3. Has the organization’s culture changed much in the past 10 years?
PROBE: How?
PROBE: What caused the change?
4. Is organizational culture something you actively manage?
PROBE: What do you feel is your role in creating or maintaining this culture?
PROBE: What factors contribute to the organization’s culture?
Strategy Process (45 minutes)
The rest of our time today is going to be focused on how [ORGANIZATION] creates its
strategy. This could mean strategic planning, but it could also be much more broad and
loose. I am trying to understand how you arrive at the decision to pursue a particular
strategy.
1. First off, there are many ways to define strategy, so I am interested, in your own
words, how do you define strategy?
PROBE: Can you give me an example?
2. Can you walk me through how [ORGANIZATION] typically creates its strategy?
What is the process?
PROBE: Does [ORGANIZATION] use a particular model or tool in the
process?
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PROBE:
PROBE:
PROBE:
PROBE:

What information is gathered and how?
Who is involved in the process?
What type and how much resources does the organization dedicate to
the process?
What is the product of the process?

3. How often does [ORGANIZATION] engage in this process?
4. When did [ORGANIZATION] begin using this particular process?
5. Why did [ORGANIZATION] choose or develop its current strategy formation
process?
PROBE: Who suggested the process? Where did they hear about it?
PROBE: What was expected from it?
PROBE: What were seen as the pros and cons of this particular process?
6. How often are major strategic decisions made outside of this process? Why?
PROBE: Can you give me an example?
PROBE: Is there a specific process that [ORGANIZATION] uses in these
instances?
7. In the past 10 years, when and how has your strategy formation process changed?
PROBE: What caused you to change the process?
PROBE: What were the consequences of the change?
8. Do you think your strategy formation process affects the content of your plans? How?
PROBE: Do you think you would have chosen the same strategies if you used a
different planning method?

Strategy Content (15 minutes)
The last questions focus on specific strategies. These strategies may or may not be the
strategies I focus on for the second phase of data collection regarding implementation,
but the information will help me choose the most promising ones for further exploration
1. Over the past 10 years, what have been the most important strategies, either successful
or unsuccessful, that [ORGANIZATION] has tried to implement?
PROBE: When did [ORGANIZATION] decide to pursue [the STRATEGY]?
PROBE: What were the main factors driving the choice of [the STRATEGY]?
2. In your estimation, how successfully did [ORGANIZATION] implement the strategy
of [STRATEGY]?
3. What was [the STRATEGY] expected to accomplish? Did it?
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Wrap-Up (10 minutes)
Ask for Board contact information for interview and preferred contact process
o Looking for members actively involved in the strategy formation process
Thank for time and openness

Wave 3 (Sample from O1)
Introduction (5 minutes): 11:00-11:05
Make sure you have two copies of revenue and ratio graphs
Turn on recorder
This is our third interview, and it marks the half-way point in my data collection. Up
until now I’ve been asking general questions about [ORGANIZATION] and its strategic
planning processes. Now we’re going to switch gears a bit and start talking about a
specific strategy and [ORGNIZATION’S] performance. However, before I do that I had
a few questions that came up from my review of your strategic planning documents and I
wanted to give you some preliminary feedback about what I’ve found so far.
Interview Questions
Questions from my Organizational Document Review (15 minutes): 11:05-11:20
I’ve catalogued and read through all of your strategic planning documents from 1993 to
the present. They were very interesting. Thank you for sharing them. My questions are:
1. Am I right in understanding that in the past decade you have not used a consultant
specifically to facilitate your strategic planning process?
2. Can you tell me a little more about your stakeholder surveys? How are they created?
How are the administered? How many people respond?
3. Are there stand-alone strategic plans for 1999-2006? I only seem to have a one-page
summaries from 1999-2003 and then four-page strategic overviews from 2003-2006.
4. The FY 2007-2009 plan has a much different layout and is much more extensive than
previous “strategic overviews”.
Why was this change made? Are you pleased with it?
Was the same amount of work being done, just not documented, or does the new
layout reflect a more systematic process?
5. I now understand that you revisit and revise your plan every year, but that you use a
rolling 3-year planning horizon. Does this mean that every year the process is the same
or do you still punctuate the process with more extensive overhauls every few years?
(i.e., Do you start from scratch every year and if not do you ever?)
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My initial thoughts about your documents are:
I have been surprised that most of the content in the documents across all of the
organizations are fairly operational in scope, rather than articulation of biggerscale longer-term strategy.
o Do you have any thoughts on why this is?
You have changed your process considerably in the past ten years, more so than
any other organization.
o It makes intuitive sense to me and I like the layout and the alignment the
BSC forces
o I’ve yet to come to any conclusions about the cost/benefit of this approach
Around the same time [ORGANIZATION] began using the BSC, it also became
much more focused on process improvement, data and systematization.
o Did one drive the other?
It may be helpful for you board if your “Major Accomplishments” were also
broken down by pillar.
Drivers of past performance changes (20 minutes): 11:20-11:40
In addition to looking at your documents, I have also entered and analyzed financial data
from your 990s. I wanted to talk with you a bit about what’s driven your growth over the
past decade.
SHOW REVENUE GRAPH
1. Looking at this graph of annual revenue by source, can you talk a little about what you
think has caused the change over time? (“Other” could be special events, sale of assets,
etc.)
PROBE: What’s caused the growth in program service revenue?
PROBE: Can you link your growth in program service revenue with any
particular strategies?
PROBE: Is the bump in direct public support in 2007 from you capital
campaign?
PROBE: Have there been any major events, either internal or external that you
think helps explain these numbers?
SHOW RATIO GRAPH
2. Looking at this graph of key financial ratios, can you talk a little about what you think
has caused the change over time?
PROBE: Ideally, what would you want these ratios be?
PROBE: The other two organizations I am studying have struggled to keep their
program expense ratio smooth. [ORGANIZATION] has been able to
do this fairly well. Why do you think this is? What happened in
2007?
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3. Are there any other financial or performance indicators that you think I should be
looking at?
Foster Care Case Management (40 minutes): 11:40-12:20
The rest of our time today is going to be focused on how [ORGANIZATION] entered the
foster care market. Over the past decade all three organizations I am studying have
started both foster care services and services for older youth. I’ve chosen to focus on
foster care because this seems to actually be a source of profit for the organizations (in
most years) and is most different from previously-offered services.
1. First I want to make sure that my understanding is correct since I actually don’t have
that much specific performance data.
Is foster care a source of excess revenue for most years?
Has the program grown more than your other programs?
Has it required more organizational change than other strategies have?
--Assuming Foster Care is deemed an appropriate strategy to focus on-2. Can you tell me when and how [ORGANIZATION] decided to get involved with
foster care?
PROBE: Why did [ORGANIZATION] decide to enter this market?
PROBE: What did [ORGANIZATION] do to make this decision?
PROBE: How formal was the decision making process?
PROBE: Did the decision making process happen within a routine planning
process? Why or why not?
PROBE: Who was involved in the decision making process?
3. How was entering the foster care market expected to impact performance?
4. How did [ORGANIZATION] go about entering the foster care market?
PROBE: Why did [ORGANIZATION] decide not to join CG1?
PROBE: What stakeholders were involved and how?
PROBE: Who did what? Who had to change? (Executives, board, management,
staff)
5. From the decision to enter the market to having services up and running, how long did
it take for [ORGANIZATION] to enter the foster care market?
PROBE: Was this how long was expected?
6. How many resources were dedicated to the implementation? What kind?
7. Was the plan revised (or abandoned) at any point? When? Why? How?
8. In your opinion, how successful was the implementation of your plan? How did you
define success? How did you monitor it?
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Wrap-Up (10 minutes): 12:20-12:30
Ask for performance measures and data related specifically to FCCM
o Census
o Referral source
o Reimbursement rates vs. cost of care
o ??
Ask for staff contact information for interview and preferred contact process
o Looking for staff who could speak to the process of [ORGANIZATION]
getting involved with foster care case management.
o Would prefer to have several possible interviewees, to have ED contact on
my behalf and then them anonymously opt into being interviewed by
contacting me directly.
Thank for time and openness

Wave 4 (Sample from O3)
Introduction (5 minutes): 10:00-10:05
Return 2007 Strategic Planning Binder
Turn on recorder
Like last time, I have a wide smattering of topics to talk you about, including some
follow-up from our previous interviews and [ORGANIZATION’S] capacities in various
organizational areas. So let’s just jump right in:
Interview Questions
Follow-up from previous interviews (40 minutes) 10:05-10:45
My first set of questions are following up on things we’ve maybe touched on in previous
interviews or questions that I thought of when looking at your performance data or
documents:
1. What kind of feedback did you get from your staff about the strategic planning
workshop a few weeks ago?
2. What did you think of the workshop? How did it compare to previous processes?
PROBE: Did anything surprise you?
3. Last time we talked you said that about 19% of your budget is from the reserve fund,
but I’m not sure how you define that. I’ve done a few calculations from the 990 and none
come to around 19%. I was assuming it could be from the amount of revenue coming
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from dividends and interest over total expenses. Is there another place I should be
looking?
4. Revenue dipped significantly, from over $11.5M to $8.7M between 2007 and 2008.
What caused this decline? (the other two organizations also saw their revenue decrease,
but yours went down by almost a quarter.)
5. It’s very interesting that you’re so concerned about your reserve fund when yours
dwarfs all of your peers’ and has actually increased in the past 10 years, whereas
everyone else’s has decreased. What’s the impact of your fierce protection of these
resources?
PROBE: Do you think that cushion has made you less efficient?
6. What made your hesitant about hiring a comptroller?
PROBE: What impact has she had on the organization?
7. In listening back over the interviews, a common theme that came up is concerns about
the organization’s ability to implement your plans. While I know for some the external
environment was a bit factor, can you reflect and what organizational barriers might have
held back your ability to fully implement?
PROBE: Did you monitor the process enough?
PROBE: Did you lack buy-in, motivation or incentives?
PROBE: Were your goals too ambitious?
8. How did you develop your KPIs?
9. How frequently do you monitor your KPIs? What do you do with the information?
10. Do you use volunteers? If so, how and how many?
11. How is the “Gotcha” program going? Has it had an impact on morale and turnover?
My next several sets of questions are about various areas of organizational capacity.
The first is:
Development and fundraising capacities (15 minutes) 10:45-11:00
Effective development and fundraising efforts are another area that is crucial to your
survival. Right now I don’t have a very good sense of [ORGANIZATION’S] capacity in
this area, so I have similar questions about this area of the organization as I did about
data management.
1. How many people do you have in your development department?
2. How do your current development capabilities compare with where you ideally want
them to be?
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3. How did you go about developing and maintaining these capabilities?
PROBE: When and why do you put resources into it?
PROBE: Where do you get the funding for it?
PROBE: How do they maintain these resources?
4. Why is [ORGANIZATION] not a United Way agency? What are your thoughts on the
United Way?
ED as a leader, communicator and controller (10 minutes) 11:00-11:10
As the leader of this organization, I’m also interested in your leadership philosophy and
practices.
1. What areas of leadership and management do you think you really excel at?
PROBE: Can you give me an example?
2. What areas of leadership and management are you still trying to develop and improve?
PROBE: Can you give me an example?
3. How do you coordinate and ensure consistent, high-quality services in all your
programs across all of your sites? What processes do you have in place?
ED reflection and thoughts on growth (10 minutes) 11:10-11:20
[ORGANIZATION] has expanded a lot in the past decade and has been one of the few
organizations to weather many many environmental storms without closing its doors. I
keep reminding myself as I do my analysis that these are the organizations that have
survived. You guys are already exceptional. Acknowledging that just staying open has
been a huge accomplishment, I’m wondering if there is anything you may regret.
1. Thinking back over the past ten years, what would you have done differently in terms
of your strategic management of [ORGANIZATION]?
PROBE: Any missed opportunities?
PROBE: Any things you wished you hadn’t have done?
PROBE: Any changes in process?
PROBE: Any capabilities you wish you would have developed?
2. Have you ever had a target for how big you wanted [ORGANIZATIONN] to get?
Based on revenue or clients served?
PROBE: Where did this target come from?
PROBE: Do you feel you’ve accomplished this goal?
3. What is your philosophy on growth and expansion?
PROBE: Is growth essential?
PROBE: What are the boundaries beyond which you don’t think you’ll expand
(geographical, programmatically, etc.)?
Wrap-Up (10 minutes): 11:20-11:30
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I want to wrap things up by sharing with you my next steps and some initial thoughts and
hypotheses.
My timeline and next steps are:
o Finishing final ED interviews next week
o In the process of auditing transcripts and culling together performance
data
o Moving mid-July through September
o Will be back at analysis and writing by mid-September
o Hope to have a report for you by November for your review
o Hope to have final findings by early 2011 once I defend my dissertation
o Will keep you abreast of my progress
As I said, I am just wrapping up data collection, but over the past several months I have
had the chance to reflect a long on the roll of strategic planning and management and its
impact on performance. These are very very preliminary ideas, but right now I am
thinking that:
Organizations use their experience and best judgment to develop strategies more
than any sort of formal planning process. There’s just a bare minimum of
openness and comprehensiveness that is needed, if that is met the same strategies
seem to be chosen.
So, strategic planning doesn’t really dictate strategy—that is much more about
organizational leadership and culture.
Internal organizational culture drives the selection and execution of planning
processes, but these processes can also transform organizational culture. They
have a very interesting dynamic relationship, which points to strategic planning’s
potential to act as a catalyst for change.
I think formal planning can be an extremely useful catalyst for organizational
change and a wonderful communication and control mechanism to ensure largescale initiatives get accomplished.
Figuring out how to monitor and implement large strategic initiatives can then be
filtered down into more day-to-day process and vice versa.
To this end, I think all of the organizations could do a better job using their
planning process and documents to connect the dots between
SWOT/environmental scan and chosen strategies. Having a compelling and
consistent rational articulated for each strategy could increase understanding, buyin and motivation to accomplish the goals among staff and board. It could also
enhance your ability to learn in the future where assumptions may have been
flawed.
I think many of the organizations could benefit from having a more definitive
statement of a long-term vision. Right now the plans seem very incremental and
lack a rallying cry toward a future direction. It’s possible to be too timid in
declaring and motivating toward stretch goals.
All of that being said, implementation clearly of the utmost importance and
implementation is very dependent on organizational capacities, which take time to
develop.
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o Strategic planning can help develop crucial areas of data management,
communication and control.
Annual planning punctuated by occasional larger-scale assessment of strategy
seems to be a good way to manage environmental uncertainty. It also keeps the
momentum going and makes it more of an ongoing management tool.
Consistent themes that appear to be associated with better performance are
consistency in message and efforts and feelings of local responsibility and
authority. Therefore, it seems to be useful to diffuse and institutionalize the
planning process throughout the organization—having programs and regions
create their own plans that are tied to the larger plan seems effective. Things need
to be aligned.
I’m still teasing out strategic planning’s impact on organizational performance
given its relationship with organizational culture, but I do feel positively that
strategic planning can positively impact performance by improving engagement,
communication and alignment.
Ask for any remaining performance data needed
o 2009 990
Thank for time and openness
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APPENDIX F: WRITTEN INFORMED CONSENT (ED EXAMPLE)

CONSENT FOR PARTICIPATION IN RESEARCH ACTIVITIES
Title of Project:

Strategic Management in Nonprofit Mental Health
Service Organizations: Understanding Processes and
Impact on Performance

HRPO Approval
Number:

Exempt
HRPO#09-1738

Research Description
You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by doctoral student Jennifer Schurer, MSW, and
Professor David Gillespie, Ph.D., from the Brown School of Social Work, Washington University in St. Louis. The
overall purpose of this research is to better understand how nonprofit mental health service organizations create and
implement strategies and what impact these processes have on organizational performance. During this study you
will be asked to talk about your organization and its experience creating and implementing strategies. You will
also be asked to provide documents related to your organization’s strategic management and to facilitate the
researcher’s observation of key meetings and access to Board and Staff members.
The amount of time required for your participation in the interviews will be no more than 5 hours over the course
of the next six months, with interviews every other month lasting approximately 1.5 hours for each interview. In
return for your time and effort, your organization will receive a detailed case report regarding its strategic
management as well as a brief report on the project’s findings that will provide insight into trends in and the impact
of strategic management processes within your subsector.

Risks and Benefits
There are no known risks associated with this research other than the potential for mild boredom or fatigue. The
possible benefits you may experience from your participation in this study are a chance to reflect on your
organization’s strategy formation and implementation processes.

Voluntary Participation
Your participation is entirely voluntary and you may choose not to participate in this study or withdraw your
consent at any time. You will not be penalized in any way should you choose not to participate or withdraw. Your
decision to participate and information you share in the study during the key informant interviews will not be used
to evaluate your performance as an employee/board member of this organization.

Privacy and Confidentiality
We will do everything we can to protect your privacy and the privacy of your organization. As part of this effort,
your decision to participate will not be made known to anyone else in your organization and your identity or your
organization’s will not be revealed in any publication that may result from this study. This may result in the
disclosure of your data as well as any other information collected by the researcher. Audio recordings will be
transcribed and any identifying information removed. Audio recordings will be kept until the end of the study and
then destroyed. Only members of the project team will have access to audio recordings and transcripts.
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Contact Information
If you have any questions or concerns regarding this study or feel that you have been harmed in any way by your
participation in this research, please contact Jennifer Schurer at (314) 249-7361 or via email at
jschurer@gwbmail.wustl.edu. You may also contact David Gillespie, Ph.D. at (314) 935-6674 or via email at
davidg@wustl.edu.
If you wish to talk with someone else or if you have questions about your rights as a research participant, please
call Dr. Philip Ludbrook, Executive Chair of Washington University's Human Research Protection Office, at 3l4633-7400 or 1-800- 438-0445.
I have read this consent form and have been given a chance to ask questions. I agree to participate in the research
study described above titled, Strategic Management in Nonprofit Mental Health Service Organizations: Understanding
Processes and Impact on Performance. I will receive a signed copy of this form for my records.

_____________________________________
Signature of Research Participant

__________________
Date

_____________________________________
Printed Name of Research Participant

_____________________________________
Signature of person obtaining consent

__________________
Date

______________________________________
Printed Name of person obtaining consent
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APPENDIX G: QUALITATIVE CODING CODEBOOK
AIM

CODE NAME
ORG INFO

General Organizational
Information

Approaches to financial management and development; funding
levels, sources, requirements, etc.

BOARD

Information about how the board is organized or functions

EXTERN
CONTEXT
COMP & COOP
POSITIONING

Aim 2: To describe the
organizations’ strategy
formation processes within
their internal organizational
contexts.
Aim 3: To explore whether
and how the organizations’
external environmental
context and strategy
formation processes
influence resulting intended
strategies.
Aim 4: To describe the
organizations’ strategy
implementation processes
relative to the intended
strategies within their
internal organizational
contexts.
Aim 5: To clarify causal
mechanisms and explore
patterns of how strategy
implementation mediates the
relationship between
strategy formation and
organizational performance.

Research Process

Organizational statistics (number of employees, sites, services, etc.),
history, etc.

MONEY

IT & DATA

Aim 1: To describe each
organization’s strategic
position within its external
environmental context.

DEFINITION

FORM PROCESS
FORM PROC
OPINION
INTERN
CONTEXT

FORM PROCSTRAT LINK

IMPL PROCESS
IMPL OPINION

STRATEGIES

Capabilities or deficiencies around IT and data collection and
management
Regulatory climate, significant historical events, demographic changes
or technical requirements, etc. Impressions of level of control and
autonomy. How the organization interfaces with external
stakeholders.
Competitive and cooperative dynamics with other service providers
and government
Org’s position relative to environmental demands and competitors
Activities undertaken to form strategies; evidence of how these
activities are impacted by/impacted the internal culture
Opinions and expectations about the activities undertaken to form
strategies—their effectiveness, etc.; opinions about the rationale for
engaging in a particular process
Descriptions or examples of the organization’s internal culture and
climate, executive’s general management process, leadership style or
philosophy

Evidence of a link or lack thereof between strategy formation process
and content of intended strategies; Respondents’ opinions about the
impact of strategy formation processes on the content of intended
strategies

Activities undertaken to implement an intended strategy; How org
made the strategy a reality
Opinions and expectations about the activities undertaken to
implement strategies—their effectiveness, etc.; opinions about the
rationale for engaging in a particular process
Descriptions of and rationale for chosen intended strategies.
Description of realized strategy and how and why, if at all, it differed
from what was intended.

PERFORMANCE

Definitions of performance; references to 990 financial data; opinions
about how the org has performed over past decade; factors that have
impacted performance

PERF FACTORS

Statements of factors that influenced performance, be they a particular
strategy (intended or realized), the ability of inability to implement a
strategy or some other influence

QUOTE

Candidate for quotation in report—a crystallization of a point or a
colorful anecdote (should be double coded with another content code)

PARTICIPANT
EXPECT

Participant’s voiced expectations of returns for participating in
research process

ANALYSIS TIP

Clarification or tip on how to interpret performance or other data
(should be double coded with another content code)
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AIM

CODE NAME
CONCLUSIONS

RECOMMEND

DEFINITION
My articulated conclusions during the course of the interviews
(shouldn’t be double coded with another content code since it is the
interviewer’s opinion, not the respondent’s)
My articulated recommendations to the organizations during the
course of the interviews (shouldn’t be double coded with another
content code since it is the interviewer’s opinion, not the respondent’s)
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APPENDIX H: O1’S 2007 BALANCED SCORECARD
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APPENDIX I: O1’S 2000 BALANCED SCORECARD
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